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Abstract
Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a leading voice in the neoconservative movement, is best known
for her articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes that served as the foundation for the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policies.
Her prominence within the neoconservative movement, her impact on foreign affairs, and her
political accomplishments in a masculine environment make her an important historical figure in
recent American domestic and diplomatic history. This work explores her transition from liberal
democrat to neoconservative by examining her early life and educational background, her
publications and critiques of American diplomacy in the 1970s, along with her membership in
neoconservative organizations. Moreover, this piece scrutinizes her efficacy as Permanent
Ambassador to the United Nations and assesses her impact on American foreign policy
throughout her tenure with the Reagan Administration.
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Introduction
Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a political science professor at Georgetown University from
1967 to 2002, was a prominent member of the neoconservative movement of the 1970s and
1980s who became President Ronald Reagan’s Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations in
1981, a post she retained until 1985. Kirkpatrick served on Reagan’s National Security Council,
the National Security Planning Group, was a member of the Presidential Cabinet, and was widely
acknowledged to be the expert within the administration on Latin American affairs. Following
her resignation as Permanent U.N. Ambassador, Kirkpatrick remained active in governmental
matters, serving as a member of the Presidential Commission on Space (1985-1987), the
Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Nuclear Products (1985-1987), the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (1985-1990), the Defense Policy Review Board (1985-1993), the
Commission on Fail Safe and Risk Reduction, Department of Defense (1990-1992), and
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Commission (2003). Moreover, the
political scientist helped to provide the legal justifications for George W. Bush’s war on Iraq.
Kirkpatrick also worked for several advocacy groups including the Coalition for a Democratic
Majority, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Committee for a Free World, Empower
America, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs, Freedom House, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, U.N. Watch, the Center for
a Free Cuba, the Nicaraguan Freedom Fund, and the Cuban-American National Fund, among
others. In addition, Kirkpatrick joined the staff of the conservative think-tank, the American
Enterprise Institute, where she remained a senior fellow until her death in 2006. Throughout her
life, the ambassador published several books and articles, and wrote a syndicated weekly column
for the Los Angeles Times (1985-1998).

1

The Georgetown professor is best-known for being a leading voice amongst
neoconservatives and for her articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. The distinctions she drew
between right-wing authoritarian and left-wing totalitarian governments served as the rationale
behind American support for right-wing dictatorships throughout the Reagan years. Indeed, it
was the Kirkpatrick Doctrine that caused Ronald Reagan to recruit the political scientist to be an
advisor on foreign affairs for his 1980 presidential campaign. Following his victory, the
president made Kirkpatrick the first female ambassador to the United Nations from the United
States. She also became the first woman to sit on the National Security Council and the National
Security Planning Group.
Her prominence within the neoconservative movement, her political achievements in a
male-dominated environment, and the importance of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine in the formulation
of the Reagan administration’s foreign policies make Jeane Kirkpatrick a significant historical
figure in the examination of American domestic politics, gender studies, and Cold War
diplomacy. Despite this, the literature devoted to the former U.N. Ambassador remains rather
slim and incomplete, in part because her papers are inaccessible at the moment.1Works that have
referenced her tenure with the Reagan administration focus almost exclusively on her role as
mouthpiece for the president and pay little attention to her involvement in policy-making.2

1

There are only two biographical accounts of her life: Harrison, Pat. Jeane Kirkpatrick. Part of
the American Women of Achievement Series, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991);
Collier, Peter. Political Woman: The Big Little Life of Jeane Kirkpatrick. (New York: Encounter
Books, 2012). Harrison’s account is rather brief and was written for a younger audience.
Collier’s account, though much more thorough, suffers from bias due to his own friendship with
the subject. Moreover, perhaps due to his background as a journalist, Collier’s work is lacking in
primary source research and citations.
2
See: Gerson, Allan. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy without Apology (New York: The
Free Press, 1991); Hindell, Keith. “Madame Ambassador: An Appraisal of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981-1985” Passport, Vol. 39, Issue 3,
January 2009; Finger, Seymour Maxwell. American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics,
2

Accounts written by Reagan’s staff and foreign policy elite follow suit in their marginalization of
Kirkpatrick and their refusal to credit her with the development of diplomatic strategies.3Works
on the rise of neoconservatism relate her transition from liberal Democrat to neoconservative to
her disenchantment with the New Left and her foreign policy views; however, most gloss over
the details of the political scientist’s studies of domestic politics, rendering their accounts
incomplete.4Throughout the literature, scant attention is paid to the fact that she broke the gender
barrier that had prevented women from attaining the highest diplomatic positions, thus paving
the way for Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton.5

and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York: UNITAR, 1992); Fasulo, Linda M.
Representing America: Experiences of US Diplomats at the UN (New York: Praeger, 1990);
Ostrower, Gary B. The United Nations and the United States (New York: Twayne
Publishers/Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1998). Gerson provides an overview of his experiences
working with Kirkpatrick as the U.N.; however, it is not a comprehensive account of the
important issues brought up at the international organization during Kirkpatrick’s tenure.
Hindell, Finger, Fasulo, and Ostrower focus on the ambassador’s ‘confrontational style’ and
inexperience.
3
See: Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2009); Haig, Alexander.
Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984);
Meese, Edwin. With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992);
Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles
Scribners’ Sons, 1993). Reagan often misspells her name, while Haig references complaints
made by the ambassador regarding her office, limo, staff, and security detail. Meese states that
her UN duties kept her away from the NSC and NSPG which limited her ability to influence
policy. Shultz claims she was too ideological and confrontational to be National Security
Advisor. In all these accounts, Kirkpatrick is a negligible figure.
4
See: Vaïsse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Gerson, Mark. The Neoconservative Vision:
From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (New York: Madison Books, 1996); Ehrman, John. The
Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1995); Hoeveler, Jr, J. David. Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in
the Reagan Era (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). Vaïsse provides the best
overall analysis of Kirkpatrick’s domestic and foreign policies and their places within the
neoconservative movement. Gerson only mentions Kirkpatrick in nine pages of his work, but he
relies heavily on her works for his analysis of neoconservatives’ foreign policy views. Ehrman
and Hoeveler focus on the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and neoconservative foreign policy.
5
See: Morin, Ann Miller. Her Excellency: An Oral History of American Women Ambassadors.
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995). Morin examines what it is like to be a female
3

This work will attempt to address such issues in the historical literature by providing a
more thorough examination of Jeane Kirkpatrick’s life. Chapter One surveys the formative years
of her life from childhood to the first years of her marriage. Throughout this period, Kirkpatrick
refused to conform to stereotypical gender roles, became a loyal member of the Democratic
Party, and received an education in the evils of totalitarianism through her mentor Franz
Neumann, his friend Hannah Arendt, and her exposure to first-hand accounts of totalitarianism in
Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Red China. The chapter ends with an early articulation of the
Kirkpatrick Doctrine as laid out in her first edited work – The Strategies of Deception.
Chapter Two focuses on three books published by Kirkpatrick in the 1960s and 1970s:
Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study in Peronist Argentina, Political Woman, and The
New Presidential Elite. Her dissertation – Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society – was a study
of Argentine politics in the years following the downfall of Juan Perón which Kirkpatrick used to
further buttress her distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In addition, the
publication of this work won Kirkpatrick a reputation as an expert in Latin American political
systems. In contrast, both Political Woman and The New Presidential Elite dealt primarily with
American domestic politics – the former constituted the first major study of women in politics,
while the latter was an analysis of the rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party. These
works offer valuable insight into the ambassador’s views of feminism and other facets of the
New Left’s domestic and foreign agendas which pushed her further to the right of the political
spectrum.
Chapter Three concentrates on Kirkpatrick’s transition into neoconservatism through her
membership in neoconservative organizations and her criticism of the Carter Administration’s
ambassador in a male-dominated world. Her work places Kirkpatrick at the end of a short line of
female ambassadors and diplomats.
4

foreign policies. In the late 1970s, the political scientist joined several neoconservative groups
including the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), the Committee on the Present Danger
(CPD), and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Kirkpatrick was a founding member of the
CDM, an organization dedicated to saving the Democratic Party from the influence of the New
Left. She was also a founding member of the CPD, an organization that traced its intellectual
origins to Paul Nitze and NSC-68. The CPD criticized détente policies for allowing Soviet
expansion and called for increased military spending and action on the part of the U.S.
Kirkpatrick joined the AEI, a conservative think-tank, in 1977 as her disenchantment with the
Democratic Party grew. In 1979, the Georgetown professor published “Dictatorships and Double
Standards” a scathing review of Carter’s foreign policies based on her distinctions between
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The chapter concludes with an overview and analysis of
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine.
Chapter Four examines Kirkpatrick’s efficacy as United Nations Ambassador by
concentrating on various issues discussed in the international body including the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the
occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The chapter also investigates the legitimacy of various
criticisms of Kirkpatrick’s performance as ambassador, along with her opinions of the
organization and her recommendations for increasing American influence therein.
Chapter Five is devoted to Kirkpatrick’s role in the formulation of the Reagan
Administration’s Latin American policies. It begins with an overview of her article “US Security
and Latin America” which lays out a blueprint of sorts for successful diplomatic strategies in the
region. The administration’s policies – providing aid to the Contras, waging covert operations
against the Sandinistas, giving military and economic aid to the government of El Salvador

5

regardless of the regime’s human rights’ violations – all squared nicely with Kirkpatrick’s
prescriptions for containing communism and protecting national security in America’s front
yard. The chapter concludes with the ambassador’s analysis of the significance and intentions of
the Reagan Doctrine.

6

Chapter One: An Education in Totalitarianism
Jeane Kirkpatrick’s distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian governments, her
assertion that authoritarian regimes were capable of collapsing into approximate democratic
states, thus warranting American support, while totalitarian governments were not, and her
criticisms of totalitarianism and modern revolutionary liberation movements did not arise out of
a vacuum. Rather, the Kirkpatrick Doctrine was the culmination of years of academic study and
life experiences. Therefore, in order to properly understand and critique her theories as they were
utilized by the Reagan Administration and in the United Nations, one must examine her early life
experiences and the various works that influenced the evolution of her thought. This chapter will
attempt to do just that through a brief investigation of her childhood, her college years, and early
married life, culminating in an analysis of her earlier articulation of the doctrine.
“An American Girlhood”6
Jeane Duane Jordan was born on November 19, 1926 to Welcher ‘Fat’ Jordan and Leona
Jordan in the small, southwestern town of Duncan, Oklahoma.7 Her parents were both natives of
Texas. Though born in Texas, Welcher’s family moved to Walters, Oklahoma when he was a
young boy. There he grew up wrestling with local Native American boys, along with his seven
brothers, and developed into an imposing athlete. The University of Oklahoma offered him a
football scholarship and he happily accepted the offer, seeing athletics as a means to enable him
to study the law. Unfortunately, he broke his leg in a preseason scrimmage and was unable to

6

Title is taken from Jeane Kirkpatrick’s own account of her younger days. “An American
Girlhood” by: Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Weekly Standard, Monday, February 5, 2007.
Article can also be found at http://www.aei.org/article/25531 Last accessed: 10/01/12
7
Biographical information is taken from Harrison, Pat. Jeane Kirkpatrick. Part of the American
Women of Achievement Series, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991); Collier, Peter.
Political Woman: The Big Little Life of Jeane Kirkpatrick. (New York: Encounter Books, 2012);
and Kirkpatrick, Jeane. “An American Girlhood”.
7

continue his gridiron career. Without the athletic scholarship, Jordan could not afford college
tuition and was forced to drop out and become a laborer in the oil fields. Eventually, through
hard work and thrifty living, he worked his way up from laborer to driller to drilling contractor.
In 1922, while visiting a friend in Arlington, Texas, Welcher Jordan met Leona Kile. Described
by her daughter as “an independent woman in the flapper era”8, Leona was temporarily living
with her sister while she took shorthand, typing, and bookkeeping courses. Leona and Welcher
fell in love and were married in 1923, after which they moved into a rented, two bedroom house
in Duncan, Oklahoma.
Duncan was located approximately forty-four miles north of the Oklahoma-Texas border
and eighty-one miles southwest of Oklahoma City. The town was founded by William Duncan
who took over a trade store in 1879 located near Cow Creek alongside the Chisolm Trail, a
cattle-driving route between Texas and Kansas. In 1884, Duncan opened a post office. Soon
after, the entrepreneur heard rumors that the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railway had
plans to construct a rail-line through Indian Territory which prompted him to buy land in the
area. Through his wife, Sally, a member of the Chickasaw Nation, Duncan was able to claim 500
acres of land, and there he laid out a site for a town. In 1892, the promised railroad line was
constructed through Duncan’s land and the town bearing his name was born.9
In 1907, Oklahoma received official statehood, and Duncan was made the county seat of
Stephens County. By 1909, the town claimed approximately 150 commercial establishments
including cotton gins, flour mills, a grist mill, and a farm implements dealer. In 1918, oil wells
were opened in southeastern Stephens County and the town began to boom. In 1920, the

8

Kirkpatrick, “An American Girlhood”, 3.
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/D/DU005.html
Last accessed: 10/12/12
9

8

population of Duncan stood at 3,463; ten years later, it had more than doubled to 8,363. In
response to the economic and population booms, the town leaders “prohibited the construction of
shacks and aggressively policed other boomtown activities to ensure that Duncan grew
substantively in an orderly, permanent fashion.”10 During the 1920s, a variety of oil-related
industries developed in Duncan, foremost among them being the Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Company founded by Erle P. Halliburton.11 Though Welcher Jordan was acquainted
with Halliburton, he worked for various other clients including Carter Oil, a producing company
of Standard Oil out of Indiana.12In 1922, one year before the Jordans moved to Duncan, the town
had its first oil refinery – the Rock Island Refinery.13
In 1926, after three years of marriage, Leona Jordan gave birth to the Jordans’ first child.
It became apparent to the couple from an early age that their daughter, Jeane, was blessed with
an intelligent and inquisitive mind. Jeane could say her alphabet backwards by the age of three,
was reading by the age of four, and, by the age of five, she had committed to memory entire
passages of a multi-volume set of poems, essays, and stories designed for much older children.
Her mother instilled in her daughter a love of reading, and Jeane often lost herself in books for
weeks on end. At the age of ten, Jeane managed to save enough of her allowance to buy her first
book - a thesaurus. Her interest in literature and learning made her an excellent student who
consistently ranked at the top of her class. In addition to her scholastic aptitude, Jeane was
musically inclined. At the age of seven she started taking piano lessons and joined the Schubert
Music Club, a group of piano students who studied the lives of composers and performed recitals

10

Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Collier, 6.
13
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/D/DU005.html
10/12/12
11

9

for each other. When she was not engaged in musical or academic pursuits, Jeane spent a lot of
time involved in what she described as “unconventional role behavior” or tomboyish activities –
collecting arrowheads and feathers, climbing trees, and playing softball and touch football with
the neighborhood boys.14
Though her childhood revolved largely around school, church, music, and play, Jeane’s
parents made sure to introduce their daughter to the world of politics – specifically, the
Democratic Party. With but two exceptions – Welcher’s father, who in his youth was with both
the Populist and Socialist Parties, and Leona’s great-grandfather, who fought on the side of the
Union during the Civil War – both of Jeane’s parents came from a long line of Democrats. They
were of the Southern yellow dog variety who would vote for any member of the party unless he
had been convicted of a felony.15 According to Jeane, Franklin Delano Roosevelt “cemented the
allegiance of everyone in my family to the Democrats;” during the depression, they regarded
New Deal programs such as the Rural Electrification Program, the Civilian Conservation Corps,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Social Security as ‘godsends’ and Roosevelt as a ‘savior’.16
Family loyalty to the Democratic Party became even more obvious to Jeane when her father
informed her that she could bring home a black boy or an Indian boy, but, by God, she had better
not bring home a Republican.17
It was also during her childhood that the Jordans’ daughter became aware of various
racial inequalities that existed within her hometown. Despite the Jordan family’s tolerance and
acceptance of minorities, Duncan was not well-known for its racial tolerance or commitment to

14

Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4.
Ibid, 2. This was Jeane’s mother’s modification of the saying “I’d vote for a yellow dog if he
was Democrat”.
16
Ibid.
17
Collier, Political Woman, 8.
15
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social equality. Because the town boasted a large Native American population and was located
only twenty miles from a major Indian reservation, Jeane grew up being exposed to Native
American culture. She attended school with several Native American children and listening to
them speak in their native tongue was her first exposure to foreign language. Jeane found them to
be exotic and romantic symbols of a vanishing America, which prompted her to read Indian lore,
make bows and arrows and beaded things, and imagine herself as an Indian girl with “shiny
black braided hair”.18 Despite her interest in their customs and culture, Jeane’s friends and
playmates were white children. Furthermore, Jeane’s piano teacher, Mrs. Thompson, remained
an object of ‘curiosity’ to her students and the local townspeople for having married, and
subsequently been abandoned by, an Indian man.19
Race relations between blacks and whites in Duncan were of a different nature. The Ku
Klux Klan had been active in the town harassing both blacks and Catholics, lynching several of
the former.20 In her reminiscences of life in Duncan, during the twilight years of her life, Jeane
claimed that the races were not segregated in Duncan as blacks lived in white neighborhoods as
servants. Moreover, African Americans participated in nearly all aspects of white society and
family life, but again, as servants. In contrast to Jeane’s recollections of the lack of racial
segregation, there were few blacks living in Duncan, and those who did reside there lived in their
own run-down neighborhoods. Furthermore, Oklahoma had instituted Jim Crow laws beginning
in the 1890s before the territory became a state. Though segregation was not written directly into
the initial Oklahoma state constitution in 1907, due to fears that President Theodore Roosevelt

18

Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4.
Collier, Political Woman, 9.
20
Harrison, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 27.
19
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would not approve it, one of the first acts of the new state legislature had been the passage of
‘Senate Bill Number One’.
This measure defined an African American as any person with any black or mixed
ancestry (basically, the ‘one drop rule’), banned interracial marriages, and segregated all schools,
public facilities, and means of public transportation. In 1915, Oklahoma made history by
becoming the first state to segregate public pay telephone booths.21Thus, prejudice against black
Americans permeated throughout Duncan society just as it did in other regions of the United
States, especially in the South. Such prejudice was built into the local vernacular where “nigger
toes” referred to Brazil nuts and a “nigger shooter” referred to a sling-shot.22 To a young girl,
these words seemed perfectly ordinary; however, as Jeane matured into adolescence, she began
to recognize the derogatory nature of such terms and how segregation and discrimination
violated the basic ideals of equality guaranteed by the American constitution.
Jeane’s awareness of the inequalities that existed between the races in American society,
along with the history behind them, was heightened by her family’s decision to move to Illinois
when she was twelve years old. Though not a state at the time of the Civil War, many residents
of Oklahoma, including various Native American groups, had sympathized with, and fought for,
the Confederacy. Thus, Jeane had grown up hearing about the nobility of the Confederate cause
in the “War of Northern Aggression”. In Illinois, she learned about the Civil War from another
perspective. After all, Illinois had been a Union state and the home of President Abraham
Lincoln. In fact, the first middle school she attended in Vandalia, Illinois had been a stop on the

21

http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/S/SE006.html
10/12/12
22
Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4.
12

Underground Railroad. After spending less than a year in Illinois, Jeane became an ardent fan of
Abraham Lincoln and a strong supporter of the Union.23
Regardless of her newfound sympathy for the Union cause and her recognition of the
social and economic inequalities of her hometown, Jeane remained quite fond of Duncan, using
it throughout her life as a model when writing about the nature of, and conditions necessary for,
democracy. To Jeane, the culture of Duncan, Oklahoma was democratic, egalitarian, and
libertarian, all attributes that constituted the basic building blocks of a truly democratic society.
Furthermore, Duncan was a ‘frontier town’ with an open, ‘frontier society’. “A frontier society is
open in special ways,” Jeane wrote, “It is new – so there was unusual opportunity for individuals
to break free of invisible chains and define themselves and make their way.”24 She went on to
describe the fluidity of such a society, where nobody was stuck in one role, where anybody could
be whatever they wanted to be, and where everyone was welcome. She noted, “The most
remarkable fact about American frontier societies, surely, was that people who found themselves
in the same area found it natural to govern themselves by democratic means, by getting together,
talking things over, choosing leaders, and working together to provide basic community
needs.”25Moreover, the civic culture exemplified within such towns appeared to Jeane as the
epitome of the American experience and political philosophy; for it was in these towns where
initiative, optimism, determination, and the acceptance of shared responsibility dominated the
American mentality. Much later in her life, as she transitioned from liberal Democrat to

23

Harrison, 29-30.
Ibid, 4.
25
Ibid, 4.
24
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neoconservative Republican, Jeane often criticized liberal democrats as embodying the opposite
of these truly American traits.26
Jeane’s political transformation was far into the future when the family first moved to
Vandalia, Illinois in 1938 before settling permanently in Mount Vernon, Illinois in 1940. Jeane
described the family’s move as one of the two dramatic events that punctuated her childhood, the
other being the birth of her baby brother, Jerry, when she was eight. The family’s move to
Illinois left Jeane inconsolable for a time. Her idyllic life appeared to be at an end and she
recalled that she thought she might die.27 Her initial loneliness and unhappiness over moving
caused her to spend most of her time in the public library. There she eagerly absorbed the
classics – Dickens, Thackeray, Dumas, Jane Austen, and George Eliot – as well as many
contemporary authors such as Steinbeck and Hemingway. Jeane continued with her piano
lessons, acted in school plays, fell in love with Shakespeare, and edited the high school
newspaper. For her senior thesis, she wrote an essay on four novels by George Eliot, a British
woman who chose to publish her works under a male pseudonym due to the prejudices of that
time.
Jeane had always engaged in activities that were, for the most part, not deemed suitable
for girls, hence, perhaps her attraction to the works of Eliot. Her parents had approved of her
academic curiosity and were proud of her scholastic achievements, but they expected her to
conform to prevailing gender roles after finishing high school which meant marriage and

26

This is most evident in her fiery speech at the 1984 Republican National Convention where
she labeled Democrats as members of the ‘Blame America First’ club who had lost the initiative
in the Cold War, the determination to fight the Cold War and stand up to the communist menace,
and who were entirely too pessimistic about America’s strength and moral role in the world.
Furthermore, she accused them of not accepting responsibility for the deterioration and
demoralization of society by allowing the rise of the New Left and its ‘radical’ policies.
27
Ibid, 5.
14

children. Jeane, however, had other ideas. After graduating at the top of her class, she requested
that her parents allow her to go to college. Jeane wanted to attend the University of Chicago, but
her parents preferred something less rigorous and more feminine. Thus, it was determined that
Jeane would go to Stephens College, a two year women’s college in Columbia, Missouri. In the
minds of Welcher and Leona, college was only a two year detour before their daughter entered
into a normal, domesticated life. Jeane, whose ambitions at that time were to be a spinster
teacher, did not share their view.
An Education in Totalitarianism
In 1944, Jeane left home to pursue her studies. Stephens College, the second oldest
women’s college in the United States, was established in 1833. At the time of Jeane’s arrival,
Stephens served as both a finishing school, designed to prepare elite women for marriage and
social niceties, and as a women’s college with a rather progressive curriculum. For example, the
college offered communication classes designed to enable women to write effective and clear
business and social letters. Stephens also offered a wide variety of science courses including
psychology, chemistry, biology, geology, etcetera, but it should be noted that these were geared
towards women’s needs. For instance, botany classes were designed to help women plant
gardens on the grounds of their future homes. Stephens was the first women’s college to offer
aviation courses, but it also encouraged women to take marriage education, child-study, and
clothing courses. In addition to history, economics, international relations, and sociology classes,
young women attending Stephens were instructed in hair styling, make-up procedure, and good
grooming.28 For these reasons Jeane described Stephens as “an unlikely place for a would-be

28

http://cdm.sos.mo.gov This website contains all of the yearbooks from Stephens College
dating back to the early 20th century. I have taken course descriptions from its yearbook, the
Stephensophia, between 1944-1948. 10/10/12
15

intellectual”; however, eschewing the majority of the finishing school aspects of the college and
throwing herself into liberal arts studies, she found much to stimulate her academic curiosities.29
During her two years at Stephens, Jeane devoted herself to the study of literature, history,
writing, and philosophy. It was there that Jeane discovered Plato and Aristotle. She read Thomas
Hobbes and John Stuart Mill and briefly embraced Utilitarianism. She absorbed Dostoevsky,
Virginia Woolf, George Eliot and embraced Modernism. She read Karl Marx and flirted with
Socialism. Her exposure to Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf, and other writers on the
subjugation of women allowed her to articulate more clearly her “vague feeling that the
distribution of privileges and power between the sexes was not quite as symmetrical as it should
be.”30
As her two years at Stephens began to come to an end, her parents assumed that she
would soon return home, living the life of a lady, playing the piano, reading, and helping her
mother in the home until she got married. Jeane was determined to continue on with her
education, however. Her academic prowess earned her a full scholarship to the University of
Chicago. She was also accepted to Barnard College, which was affiliated with Columbia
University, and one of the finest women’s colleges in the United States. Jeane opted for the
University of Chicago. She was so excited by this opportunity that she could not wait for
September classes to begin, and in June she moved to Chicago where she hoped to enroll in
summer courses. Unfortunately, everything seemed to go wrong for her. First, there appeared to
be no housing available for her near campus. Second, the university lost her student file, and by
the time they found it, all of the courses she wanted to enroll in were full. The last straw for
Jeane occurred while she was waiting at a bus stop when a group of men grabbed her and
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attempted to drag her into the bushes. Jeane screamed which caught the attention of bystanders
who scared the attackers away. At that point, she decided that Chicago was not the place for her.
So, she spent the rest of the summer of 1946 at home in Illinois before leaving in September for
New York City to attend Barnard College.
“New York was the right place to pursue big ideas,” Jeane wrote, “and it was big ideas
that I decided to aim for in my life.”31Upon arriving at Barnard, her first task was deciding on a
major. Though she had planned to study political philosophy, Jeane decided instead to major in
political science reasoning that it would allow her to continue to study both philosophy and
history. Furthermore, a degree in political science appeared to her to be quite practical. After all,
Jeane needed a degree that might offer her job opportunities after her college education was
complete since she had no plans for returning to Mount Vernon and settling into domestic life.32
Accordingly, the young woman threw herself into her studies. In addition to her political science
courses, she began taking French classes and soon fell in love with the language and French
culture, spending the summer following her junior year enrolled in an intensive language course
at McGill University in Montreal.
The two years at Barnard College went by quickly for Jeane and in 1948 she graduated
with a Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Political Science. This was quite an accomplishment for
during that period only 6% of all women in the United States had a bachelor’s degree and only
23% of American women had completed four years of high school.33 Because her parents (and
most other Americans) believed that she had received more than enough education for a woman,
the Jordans expected their daughter to at long last return to Mount Vernon. As usual, Jeane had
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other plans. She considered attending law school, but decided instead to enroll in graduate school
at Columbia where she would pursue a master’s degree in political science.
A major factor in drawing Jeane towards Columbia was the prospect of having Franz
Neumann as her advisor. Neumann was a German Jew who had fled to Great Britain following
the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933.34During the Weimar period, Neumann had served as a
labor lawyer to the Builders Workers’ Union. When he was not involved in a specific case,
Neumann delivered lectures at various German universities on business and industrial law. He
completed two doctoral degrees, one in Germany where he wrote his dissertation on the
relationship between the state and punishment, and the second on the rule of law and the
relationship between political theories and the legal system which he completed at the London
School of Economics.35During World War II, Neumann moved to the United States and worked
for the Office of Strategic Services. He later served under Justice Robert H. Jackson during the
Nuremburg trials and helped author a new constitution for West Germany.36In 1942, Neumann
published his magnum opus, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. Jeane
had read this book while attending Barnard and it was this work that prompted her lifelong
interest in non-democratic regimes and totalitarianism, an interest that would eventually propel
her into the national spotlight as both a public intellectual and a policymaker.
The first class Jeane signed up for at Columbia was a four semester course on German
politics taught by Neumann. As a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) during the
Weimar Era, Neumann was a staunch defender of democratic socialism. In his writings and
lectures he identified dual causes for the destruction of the Weimar Republic: the inability of the
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socialists and leftist liberals to implement effective social and political reforms, and the inability
(or unwillingness) of all the German political parties to defend parliamentary democracy from
minority groups bent on its destruction.37 Neumann placed the blame for these problems on
extremists from the right – the fascists, authoritarians, conservative clergy, and military – who
had no respect for democratic institutions, and on extremists from the left – the Communists
(German Communist Party, KPD) – who shared the right’s distaste for liberal political systems.38
Thus, in his view, extremists from both the right and the left collaborated to cause the fall of the
Weimar Republic while its supporters passively stood by appeasing them.
Jeane paid close attention to the dangers posed to democracies from both right-wing and
left-wing extremists. Her biographer, Peter Collier, notes Jeane recounting how Neumann’s
description of life in the late Weimar Republic appalled her, particularly stories about Nazi or
Communist groups who took over German towns while the Social Democrats responded by
filing law suits. By the time the courts produced a verdict, “the totalitarian party had already
consolidated control, killed some people and smashed some things.”39Further fueling her outrage
toward political extremists were the Nazi government files in Neumann’s possession which he
allowed her to read. Much of the material contained within the files pertained to the Holocaust,
information that Jeane found chilling. “I had led a pretty sheltered life up until then,” she said, “I
had little idea of the human capacity for evil. It was a deeply disturbing view that I acquired from
these documents and from the sense I was getting of the magnitude of the Holocaust. It changed
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me forever.”40 Her exposure to the inner workings of the Nazi regime, especially in relation to
the “Final Solution”, along with the lessons she absorbed in the classroom about political
extremism, only enhanced her desire to learn more about totalitarianism.
Much of her fundamental understanding of the nature of totalitarian regimes came from
her advisor’s book – Behemoth. From this work, Jeane learned how totalitarian parties took over
all legislative and administrative functions of the state, thereby eliminating representative
government and democracy.41Having eliminated the political power of the people through the
disbanding of parliamentary bodies, the totalitarians then proceeded to invest legislative,
administrative, judicial, and military power in the hands of the party’s leader. Thus, a totalitarian
dictatorship was formed.42 Jeane learned that anxiety, periods of civil strife, religious turmoil,
and profound social and economic upheavals could cause the “least rational strata of society” to
turn to charismatic leaders of totalitarian movements.43Subsequently, the special, messianic
qualities supposedly possessed by the leader were used to foster a continued sense of
helplessness and hopelessness amongst the people in order to more easily abolish equality and
substitute a hierarchical order upon a previously democratic society.44
In Behemoth, Jeane read about how totalitarians managed to reorganize a nation’s or
people’s society and culture. First, all private organizations and civil institutions which gave the
individual an opportunity for ‘spontaneous behavior’ were replaced by totalitarian, authoritarian
organizations, the goal of which was to atomize the subordinate population by destroying every
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autonomous group that mediated between them and the state.45Thus, family, church life, work
associations, etc. were all broken down and replaced by large bureaucratic organizations; the
greater the size of the organization, the greater its bureaucratic power, and the less important the
individual member.46 Even leisure time was taken away from the population via ‘Strength
Through Joy’ programs which did nothing but glorify work as it enhanced the power of the state.
Finally, Jeane learned that propaganda, supplemented by terror, were necessary in order for the
totalitarian state to maintain control over the masses47.
The knowledge that Jeane collected from her mentor’s writings and lectures on
totalitarianism was supplemented by her exposure to other intellectuals who were speaking and
writing about this new political phenomenon. One such intellectual who inspired and influenced
the aspiring student was Hannah Arendt. Neumann introduced Jeane to Arendt, and together they
attended her lectures on totalitarianism.48 Arendt was a German Jew who had fled to Paris from
Nazi Germany in 1933. In 1941, she migrated to the United States where she became a noted
political philosopher, publishing books and essays on totalitarianism, revolution, freedom,
authority, and tradition. Two of her major works, The Origins of Totalitarianism, and On
Revolution, proved to be instrumental in the development of Jeane’s political theories regarding
the nature of modern revolutions and the evils of totalitarianism.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt expounded upon various characteristics of
National Socialism discussed by Neumann in Behemoth and applied them to Communism in the
Soviet Union. For example, the book described the atomization of society through the abolition
of individual freedom, autonomous institutions, and the elimination of human spontaneity, the
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qualities of the ‘infallible’ leader of the totalitarian party, and the use of terror and propaganda
by both the Soviets and the Nazis. Thus, the book served to reinforce Jeane’s initial
understanding of how such regimes functioned, while also supplying her with new information
about totalitarianism, all of which she used later to buttress the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. In
particular, she learned from Arendt that the goal of totalitarian regimes was global
domination.49Though many historians have claimed that the Russians were merely obsessed with
defending themselves and that any talk of ‘global domination’ was purely rhetoric, Arendt
disagreed. She claimed that having declared itself to be on the side of history and the victor of
the war against capitalism, the communist government in the Soviet Union had to pursue global
domination or it would lose its legitimacy.50 Jeane also learned from Arendt that despite the
abhorrent nature of totalitarianism and its desire for world domination, many still found it to be
appealing, especially totalitarianism in its communist form. Arendt blamed its appeal on the
world’s fascination with utopian dreams of universal equality, where wishful thinking about the
nature of communism blinded the world to its evil.51
In addition to her writings about the evils of communist totalitarianism, Arendt also
published On Revolution. In this book, Arendt focused on the differences between the
‘successful’ American Revolution and the ‘unsuccessful’ French Revolution and concluded that
a combination of history and ‘the social question’ determined the course of these and all
subsequent revolutions. According to Arendt, “there is nothing more natural than that a
revolution should be predetermined by the type of government it overthrows.”52Arendt noted that
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the American colonists had been living under a constitutional monarchy with limited
representative government. Thus, their political history made the transition from limited
government to democratic republic relatively easy. On the other hand, the French had lived under
an absolute monarchy without representation; therefore, the transition from absolutism to
democratic republic was quite problematic.53The rise of Napoleon and the failure of the
revolution, then, were not surprising given French political history.
Arendt, along with her emphasis on the role of a nation’s political history, spent much
time analyzing ‘the social factor’ in revolutions. According to her, the American Revolution was
fought against the political rule of Great Britain and did not involve any attempts to remake
American society by instituting social and economic equality amongst the citizenry. Conversely,
the French Revolution’s emphasis on equality meant that society would have to be entirely
remodeled. This reconstruction of society would have to be brought about through the use of
politics. The failure of the new French government to accomplish this – to solve the social
problems in France, specifically, its inability to institute social and economic equality – caused
the people to turn against the revolution, which resulted in the Republic resorting to state terror
in order to maintain its control.54Thus, a comparison can be drawn between the goals of the
communists in the Soviet Union and those of the French Revolutionaries of the 18th century.
Both desired to remake society in the name of equality, and both utilized an authoritarian,
terroristic state to either achieve their goals or repress the emergence of counterrevolution when
those goals were not realized. Arendt concluded, perhaps erroneously, that no revolution had
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ever solved the ‘social question’ and “liberated men from the predicament of want”, and that all
attempts to solve the social question through revolutionary means have led to terror.55
The knowledge Jeane gained about totalitarianism and revolution from both Neumann
and Arendt constituted the core of what would be known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. At the
time, however, such readings only served to further arouse her interest in non-democratic
governments and totalitarianism. Accordingly, under the direction of Neumann, Jeane wrote her
master’s thesis on Oswald Moseley’s British Union of Fascists. She was a hard worker, and by
the time she finished her MA degree in 1951, she had already completed nearly all the
coursework required for her PhD. She lacked only one seminar course and a dissertation. She
had already begun working on her dissertation, an inquiry into the appeal of communism to the
French middle classes, but was unable to continue with her studies when her father suddenly cut
her off financially.56Welcher believed that his daughter had received more than enough
education for a woman and was in danger of becoming a spinster. At this point, Jeane had two
options: she could move back to Illinois with her parents or she could get a job. Not surprisingly,
she opted for the latter.
Armed with letters of recommendation from her mentor, Jeane left New York for
Washington, DC to interview for two positions in the State Department – one with Herbert
Marcuse, another European émigré with whom she was familiar from her days in Columbia, and
who would later be an intellectual godfather to the New Left, and one with a political science
professor, Evron ‘Kirk’ Kirkpatrick. Both interviews went well, but Jeane, who found Marcuse
to be a bit off-putting and pompous, chose to accept Kirkpatrick’s offer to become a research
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analyst in the Office of Intelligence Research. Her first assignment was to edit and condense
interviews of Russian citizens who had fled from the Soviet Union during World War II.57
The interviews Jeane read came from a variety of sources: some had been collected by
the Nazis from Russians attempting to flee the Soviet Union during World War II, while others
originated from Allied military personnel. No matter the source, each Soviet citizen’s description
of life in communist Russia left Jeane horrified. The refugees talked about the series of purges,
the show trials that were held, the millions who died from enforced famine in the Russian
countryside, and the existence of the gulag, all of which served to keep the population in a
constant state of terror. Jeane, of course, had heard or read about many of these things, but she
had never been exposed to first-hand accounts of life under a communist system. Reading those
interviews confirmed her sense that totalitarianism did nothing but create a hell on earth.58
Jeane worked for about a year at the Office of Intelligence Research before she won a
fellowship to study at the Institute de Science Politique at the University of Paris in France.
Some speculation surrounds her rather abrupt decision to move to France. According to one
account, Jeane had gotten bored with her work at the State Department and saw the French
fellowship as a means to finish her dissertation and PhD.59However, her biographer and friend
Peter Collier asserts that she had fallen in love with Evron Kirkpatrick, a much older man who
was in the midst of ending his second marriage, a situation from which she wanted to
flee.60Whatever the reasons behind her decision to leave, in September of 1952 Jeane boarded
the Ile de France and set sail for Paris.
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When Jeane arrived in Paris, she settled into Reid Hall, an international home for women.
Despite the fact that it consistently had heat and hot water in a time when much of Paris was
suffering from fuel shortages and a lack of utilities, the young American felt that if she stayed in
Reid Hall she would not be able to immerse herself completely in French culture and society.
Consequently, she rented a room in an apartment belonging to a French widow on the Rue de
Lübeck. A routine soon developed: attending classes at the University of Paris, researching at the
Bibliotèque Nationale, shopping in outdoor markets, eating at bistros, and drinking coffee in
Parisian cafes.61 Various activities planned by the French government for the foreign fellows at
the University of Paris provided some variety – Jeane went on excursions into the French
countryside, met French politicians, and heard lectures from French intellectuals including JeanPaul Sartre and Albert Camus, two men whose recent falling out was the talk of the town.
The fracture of the friendship between Sartre and Camus had followed the 1951
publication of Camus’ work The Rebel which Sartre’s Les Temps modernes had given a rather
unfavorable review. Camus took the critique as a personal insult and responded with an angry
letter to the paper in which he blasted Sartre’s political and philosophical points of view. This
was followed by a series of insults and accusations between the two men, at the core of which,
was their stance on communism. By 1951, Camus had come to the conclusion that ‘communism
equals murder’ which caused him to reject Marxism-Leninism as a means for the reordering of
society. Sartre, on the other hand, while not a member of the Communist Party, viewed the
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communists as being on the side of history and the best means for bringing social and economic
equality to France and the world.62
Between 1946 and 1948, both Camus and Sartre had called for a democratic and
transformed Europe that would avoid war and pursue a path between communism and
capitalism. By 1950, however, Sartre had decided that this was an unrealistic option, and, as he
was committed to socialism and change, he accepted what he viewed to be the reality of the
situation, that the best option for social change and progress in Europe was communism.63Sartre
was attracted to Marxism’s stress on science and its eschatology, and was convinced that the
communists were on the side of history and the working classes. Though Sartre was aware of the
violence associated with the rise of communism, especially in the Soviet Union, he still regarded
the Soviets as true proletarian leaders who would transform the world into a socialist paradise.64
He excused proletarian violence as a justifiable means for countering violence brought about by
the capitalists; after all, to make an omelet one must break some eggs. In Sartre’s mind, the
violence and brutality of Russian communism confirmed how serious they were about creating a
new society.65Camus disagreed.
In The Rebel, Camus sought to define the difference between a rebel and a revolutionary.
According to him, a rebel continually struggled against a power that he viewed as oppressive
while maintaining a respect for human life. The rebel was immersed in an ‘obscure protest’
involving neither systems nor reasons which was limited in scope and only a testimonial.66In
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contrast, the revolutionary, through ‘nihilistic frustration’, sought to transform the world and
strove to acquire the power to do so. Revolutionaries, in their zeal for total societal
transformation, sought to do too much, which, in part, resulted in their resorting to killing in
order to achieve their goals.67Camus deplored such acts of political violence where philosophical
systems were utilized in order to justify murder. He described such acts as ‘crimes of logic’. In
his mind, communism fit this model, a philosophy in which the initial impulse of the
revolutionary for freedom and equality led to murder and totalitarianism.68To him, the creation
of a communist world did not justify the liquidation of millions, therefore he rejected ‘Marxist
realism’ and violence, maintaining that there were moral values which were independent of
history. He insisted that communism was a flawed doctrine based on utopian dreams and the
faulty belief that historical dialectics constituted the entire context of the human experience.69
According to Collier, Jeane considered herself very fortunate to have arrived in Paris
during the midst of the famous intellectual battle royale between Sartre and Camus over
communism.70She, along with many other intellectuals, French and foreign, avidly followed their
debate in Les Temps modernes, as it appeared to represent in microcosm the conflict between the
Soviet Union and the West in the burgeoning Cold War. Jeane bought Camus’ work, The Rebel,
which had inspired the debate between the two men, and read it in French. She attended a lecture
sponsored by the University of Paris which featured Camus and was fascinated with what she
called his ‘moral voice’. Jeane saw Camus several times in Paris and actually spoke with him on
a few occasions. She also attended a Sartre lecture at a Parisian bookstore, and though she
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remained impressed with his intellect, she was appalled by what she called his ‘intellectual
delirium’ regarding the nature of communism in the Soviet Union.71
Given Jeane’s educational background, it was not surprising that she supported Camus in
his debate with Sartre. She was most impressed with “his suspicion of abstract theory and its
friendship with totalitarianism; his elevation of the human dimension over the political one; his
focus on the impact of ideas and the personal consequences of ideologies.”72As the Parisian elite
increasingly supported Sartre and attacked Camus, Jeane felt as if she were watching “the
intellectual equivalent of mob violence.”73Jeane furiously defended Camus to her French
fellows, and in doing so, felt as if she were defending herself and her country. According to her
biographer, the Camus-Sartre debate crystallized her view of the evils of totalitarianism and the
righteousness of the United States’ role in the Cold War.74
During her ten months in Paris Jeane had perfected her French language skills, actively
engaged with intellectuals and politicians from all over Europe, acquired a love for French
cuisine, and finished the research for her dissertation. Only a couple of instances marred her
otherwise heavenly time in France – the return of an illness that a French physician diagnosed as
rheumatic fever, a condition which permanently weakened her heart, and the return of Evron
Kirkpatrick into her life. Evron had written her letters throughout her stay in France, and Jeane
considered remaining in France indefinitely in order to “outrun the moral issue Kirk
represented.”75The issues surrounding her feelings for her former employer, however, could not
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be avoided. Near the end of her fellowship, Evron arrived in Paris determined to woo Jeane. His
efforts were successful and the two of them sailed home together as a couple to the United States
in the fall of 1953.
Life After Paris
Upon arriving back in Washington, Jeane felt it would be improper to return to work for
Evron Kirkpatrick, so she got a job working for the Economic Cooperation Association. There
she aided in the writing and publication of a book detailing the successes of the Marshall Plan.
Jeane wrote several chapters of the book which dealt with the political aspects of the massive aid
scheme, but when the book, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, was finally published, she was
given no credit. Angry, Jeane blamed this omission on “prejudice against women.”76This
experience made her determined to get back to work on her dissertation and finish her doctoral
degree. Unfortunately, her mentor, Franz Neumann, was killed in a car accident in 1954 while on
a vacation in the Swiss Alps. Neumann’s death took its toll on Jeane both personally and
academically, for in addition to grieving for the loss of her mentor and friend, Jeane was
informed by Columbia University that no other member of the political science department was
qualified to guide her dissertation. As none of the faculty members were well-versed in French
intellectual and political theory, she would have to change her dissertation topic and start her
research anew. Momentarily overwhelmed, she decided to postpone her doctoral work and look
for another job.
Jeane soon got a job at the Human Resources Research Organization at George
Washington University transcribing interviews with communist Chinese soldiers who had been
taken as prisoners of war in Korea and subsequently refused repatriation. The project, known as
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“Project Tick”, was underwritten by the Defense Department and run by University of Chicago
psychologists and sociologists as part of an effort to understand what was going on behind the
bamboo curtain.77The interviews reminded Jeane of the Nazi files that Neumann had allowed her
to read at Columbia along with the testimonials of Soviet citizens that she had read while
working at the Office of Intelligence Research. Thus, for the third time in a few short years,
Jeane was again exposed to the impact that totalitarianism had on individual citizens.
The psychological aspects of totalitarianism – the methods used to break down
individuals in order to create politically compliant zombies – she found quite intriguing. “It was
perversely fascinating,” she wrote, “to watch through these interviews as a version of the New
Man was created by the slow drumbeat of daily psychological violence.”78 Jeane read about
doctors who were told they could no longer practice medicine, engineers who were forced to
build bridges that they knew would collapse, and families who were forcibly separated and
commanded to denounce each other. All of this she viewed as ‘systematic violations of the
human being’. “I became convinced,” Jeane noted, “that a diabolical vision of the public good is
the greatest horror and the source of the greatest evil in modern times.”79
When she was not engrossed in researching the real-life Orwellian nightmare that was
communism, Jeane continued to date Evron and in 1954 he proposed. Jeane was then forced to
inform her parents of her decision to get married. The Jordans were somewhat uneasy about the
match at first; after all, Evron was sixteen years older than Jeane, with three children, two of
which were still living, from two previous marriages. However, Jeane’s parents had long wanted
her to get married and settle into domestic life so Welcher informed his daughter that he would
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rather her be married to a man paying alimony and child support than be a spinster.80He, Leona,
and Jeane’s brother, Jerry, came to Washington over Christmas of 1954 and gave their blessing
to the marriage. On February 22, 1955, Jeane and Evron were married in her parents’ living
room in Mount Vernon, Illinois. The next day they left Illinois for their honeymoon which they
spent at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association at Northwestern
University.81
In his biography of Jeane, Collier describes Evron as “the Pygmalion who would
intellectually sculpt” Jeane in a way that brought her fully to life.82And, in fact, many of her
friends noted that Evron always pushed her hard to achieve academically, and as he got older, he
increasingly urged her specifically to embrace the role of public intellectual. As her husband, the
father of her children, and her intellectual companion Kirkpatrick’s support and influence on
Jeane became central to her life.
Evron Maurice Kirkpatrick, known to his friends and family as ‘Kirk’, had been born in
1912 in Indiana. His parents divorced when he was four years old and Evron lived with his
mother. Shortly thereafter, his mother married a divorced man who had a daughter named Doris.
Though his mother was uneducated, she saw education as a means for her son to get ahead, so
she saved money to buy her son books and encouraged him to excel in school. At the age of
sixteen, Evron graduated high school and left home to attend college at the University of Illinois
at Champaign. Within four years, he had finished both his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in
political science. In 1932, he accepted a scholarship to Yale where he received his doctoral
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degree after two years.83While at Yale, Evron was recruited by the political science department
at the University of Minnesota.
In between finishing his master’s degree at the University of Illinois and starting his
doctoral studies at Yale, Evron was forced into marriage. His mother and step-father accused him
of impregnating his step-sister, Doris, and a shotgun wedding was performed. Though Doris was
not pregnant at the time of their wedding, she and ‘Kirk’ had two children together after they
moved to Minnesota – a son named Thomas and a daughter named Mary.84Their marriage had
problems, specifically his infidelity and her lack of education, and in 1949 they divorced. In
1950, Evron met Evelyn Petersen, a journalist who later became the first female editor of
National Geographic, and the daughter of a former Minnesota governor. The political science
professor found her to be both physically and intellectually attractive and Evelyn soon became
pregnant. The couple married in 1951. Shortly after their marriage, Evelyn gave birth to a
daughter – Anna. Meanwhile, tragedy struck as Evron’s son from his first marriage, Thomas,
died in a car accident at the age of 16. By the time of Anna’s birth and Thomas’ death, Evron and
Evelyn’s marriage was already on the rocks and divorce proceedings soon followed.85It was
during this time that Evron Kirkpatrick and Jeane Jordan first met.
Though Jeane met Kirkpatrick when his personal life was in disarray, his professional life
was flourishing. During his time in Minnesota, Evron – a New Dealer and loyal member of the
Democratic Party – founded and headed Minnesota’s first chapter of the American Federation of
Teachers. He had also published a book entitled The People, Politics, and the Politician with
other big names in his field including V.O. Key, Stuart Chase, Harold Laski, and Charles Beard.
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In the 1940s, Kirkpatrick, a fervent anti-communist, worked to rid the Minnesota Farmer Labor
Party from communist influence in order to unite it with the Democratic Party in the state. In
addition to his teaching, writing, and political activities, he mentored the politician and future
Vice President of the United States – Hubert Humphrey. Evron helped his mentee to get a job at
LSU, supported his efforts to become mayor of Minneapolis, and later backed Humphrey’s
senatorial and presidential candidacies. Kirkpatrick and Humphrey became life-long friends, and
along with Eugene McCarthy (future Senator) and Orville Freeman (future governor of
Minnesota) they formed a tight-knit social circle known as the ‘Minnesota Mafia’.86
For several years, Evron’s life revolved around his teaching and political activities in
Minnesota. This all changed, however, with U.S. entry into World War II. Following the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he attempted to join the military, but due to a hearing
impairment, he was turned down. Subsequently, he volunteered to serve in the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) as a specialist in politics and political systems. During his time at the
OSS, he became friends with the organization’s head, William Donovan.87When the war ended,
Evron moved back to Minnesota, but by this time, public service was in his blood. Consequently,
he wrote a memorandum proposing that the government continue to maintain contacts with
academics whose work might be useful to the government in restructuring the postwar world.
Several months later the professor received a call from the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
requesting that he return to Washington and work for the State Department. In 1947, Evron
moved back to Washington and became the deputy director of the Office of Intelligence
Research, later known as the Office of Research and Intelligence. From this position, and later
from his position as director of the Office of External Research, Kirkpatrick forged ties between
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leading intellectuals and the State Department, while coordinating the intelligence community’s
uses of scholars and research institutions such as RAND – a research and development
organization that started as a research project under the U.S. Air Force.88
Shortly after Jeane and Evron’s marriage, he published a book entitled Target: The
World: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955.89 The following year he edited its sequel,
Year of Crisis. Both of these works were intended to alert the American population to the
supposed propaganda advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold
War. The books discussed the organization and direction of the Communist Party in the Soviet
Union, the various propaganda themes utilized by the party, communist-dominated international
front groups, and propaganda activities in several areas of the world. Though the books were
associated with the United States Information Agency and published by a private company, the
information in them came from the Office of Research and Intelligence which was associated
with the Central Intelligence Agency.90
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Evron Kirkpatrick began his book by describing communism as the official ideology of a
movement totalitarian in nature, international in its scope, and global in its aspirations. He
asserted that unlike traditional dictators, communist leaders have not been content with
launching political revolutions and achieving power. Instead, the communists sought to impose a
cultural revolution from above.91Due to the communists’ emphasis on cultural revolution, he
warned, Americans must pay more attention to the ever mounting communist cultural offensive,
i.e. propaganda, of the Soviet Union. According to him, the United States had been forced into a
propaganda battle, a battle that the free world must win due to goal of global domination by the
communists92.
Like a number of liberal intellectuals of the time, Evron Kirkpatrick likened communism
to fascism, and labeled them both as totalitarian systems. Similar to the Nazis, the Soviets seized
monopoly control over the mass media and communications networks, demanded conformity to
an official ideology that dominated all aspects of life, monopolized political power, and
organized an oppressive secret police which operated through terror. Both totalitarian regimes
exterminated or incarcerated all political opponents, attempted through military or political
campaigns to subvert or capture the governments of neighboring countries, and used propaganda
to help them achieve their goals of global domination.93The last characteristic of the communist
totalitarian system described by Kirkpatrick – the use of propaganda in order to facilitate world
domination – constituted the primary theme of the book.
According to Kirkpatrick, the communists used propaganda to hide from the world their
ultimate goal of domination. When they joined “United Front” parties or organizations, it was
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only to lend to themselves legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Furthermore, the communists saw
joining with other political parties as only a temporary necessity, a means to gain some of their
goals immediately, while waiting to consolidate total control later on.94The political scientist
maintained that their goals were to divide and conquer, to cause confusion among allies in the
West, and to use colonialism, a salient issue in the 1950s, to make the Western nations, along
with their political and economic systems, appear unappealing to the Third World.95All of this,
he claimed, was evident in their propaganda. For example, Kirkpatrick asserted that the Soviet
adoption of a ‘soft line’ approach in 1955, their embracing of the ‘Spirit of Geneva’ where the
Soviet Union touted itself as the promoter of world peace, was merely a propaganda tactic
designed to make the Soviets appear conciliatory.96Moreover, he believed that Soviet opposition
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons was nothing more than a ploy to distract the West from
the Soviet nuclear build-up.97Finally, the offering of economic aid to developing nations by the
Soviets, accompanied by with anti-colonial propaganda, was merely a means of ensuring the
economic dependence of the Third World on the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, a
dependence that would eventually facilitate a communist take-over of those states.98 In short,
Kirkpatrick firmly believed that the Soviet Union and all communists were extremely
duplicitous, thoroughly untrustworthy, and bent on world domination.
At the time that Target: The World was published, Evron and Jeane were settling into
married life. Following their honeymoon, the Kirkpatricks moved into a house in the
Georgetown area of Washington, DC where Jeane continued working for George Washington
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University while Evron took on the Executive Directorship of the American Political Science
Association. Outside of their work, the Kirkpatricks were at the center of a busy social network
that included members of the Minnesota Mafia, such as Hubert Humphrey and Eugene
McCarthy, and others of a similar political and academic pedigree. Members of the Kirkpatrick’s
social circle in the 1950s and 1960s were committed Cold Warriors and over the years several
transitioned into neoconservatism.
One such person was Ernest Lefever, the husband of Margaret Briggs, an old college
friend of Jeane’s from her days at Stephens. Lefever was a professor, a minister, and the founder
of the Ethics and Public Policy Center.99 In 1957, he published his first major work, Ethics and
United States Foreign Policy. This was followed over the years by several books that covered a
wide range of topics, including United Nations policy in the Congo, arms control, violence and
revolution, and the impact of television on national defense. These works were supported by the
Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, and the
Brookings Institution.
Max Kampelman was another member of the Kirkpatrick’s social circle. Kampelman met
Hubert Humphrey and Evron Kirkpatrick at the University of Minnesota during World War II. A
pacifist at the time, he went to the University in order to take part in a ‘starvation project’ that
studied the effects of malnutrition in order to treat American prisoners of war upon their release
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from Japanese camps.100 While in Minnesota, Kampelman, already an established attorney,
decided to get a PhD in political science. In later years, he worked for Hubert Humphrey while
he was in the Senate, turned his back on pacifism, at least when it came to the totalitarian menace
of communism, and was recruited by Ronald Reagan to head delegations to both the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1981-1983) and the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space
Arms in Geneva (1985-1989).101
Other members of the group included Howard Penniman, Willmoore Kendall, Sidney
Hook, Freda Utley, and Hede Massing. Penniman was a political science professor, associated
with the American Enterprise Institute, who published numerous studies on elections and
electoral politics in nations around the world. Willmoore Kendall was a political science
professor who had worked for the OSS, the CIA, and in the Office of Research and
Intelligence.102 Kendall, a former communist, became a mentor to William F. Buckley, Jr. during
his years at Yale and was the only ‘conservative’ member of the Kirkpatrick circle. Sidney
Hook, also a former communist, was a professor of philosophy at New York University who
became a well-known public intellectual, publishing numerous books, articles, and editorials
until his death in 1989.
Freda Utley was introduced to the Kirkpatricks through Hook. Utley was a well-educated
British woman who had joined the communist party in the late 1920s. She married a Russian
communist, and the two of them lived in the Soviet Union from 1930 until his arrest and
subsequent imprisonment in the gulag in 1936. Utley fled from the Soviet Union after her
husband’s disappearance, going first to Great Britain then to the U.S. The former communist
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published several works on Japan, China, and the Soviet Union and became an outspoken
opponent of communism and the Soviet Union.103Hede Massing, the former Austrian actressturned-communist spy who testified against Alger Hiss, was introduced into the Kirkpatricks’
circle by Hook.
The members of the Kirkpatricks’ social circle kept Jeane intellectually stimulated and
politically active; however, she soon had to divert her attention to more pressing, domestic
concerns. Shortly after her marriage, Jeane became pregnant and on July 17, 1956, she gave birth
to her first son – Douglas. Jeane had planned on returning to work shortly after the baby’s
arrival, but she soon changed her mind. “I think any woman who voluntarily deals herself out of
motherhood,” she said, “is making a terrible mistake.”104 Despite such sentiments, Jeane also
believed that women should not give up their careers entirely, noting “If a woman declines to
develop her intellectual, aesthetic or professional skills, she also is dealing herself out of major
life experiences. Why should anybody voluntarily truncate her life in such a fashion? My motto
is ‘refuse to choose’.”105 During the next several years Jeane was both a full-time mother, giving
birth to two additional children, sons John and Stuart, and a part-time academic, taking on
freelance work as a research associate at Amherst College.106 Her research at Amherst revolved
around communism in the government and was supported by a private party, the Fund for the
Republic, an organization sponsored by the Ford Foundation.107
Following the birth of their third son, the Kirkpatrick family bought a home in Bethesda,
Maryland where Jeane continued to pick up freelance research work. In between raising her
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children, doing housework, and researching, Jeane still managed to remain active in political
affairs. In 1960, she and her husband campaigned for Hubert Humphrey in his run for the 1960
Democratic Presidential nomination. Early in the primary season, Evron encouraged his wife to
write a pro-Humphrey article about the Wisconsin primary. The article, published in the New
Republic on April 15, 1960, pointed out that northern, urban African Americans, a strong voting
bloc for the Democrats, tended to favor Humphrey over John F. Kennedy. Much to the
Kirkpatricks’ chagrin, Kennedy’s popularity within the party increased throughout the primary
season, and Humphrey was forced to drop out of the race. Nonetheless, the Kirkpatricks attended
the Democratic National Convention that year in Los Angeles, California where they hoped
rumors that Minnesota governor, Orville Freeman, might receive the Vice Presidential
nomination would prove to be true. The Kirkpatricks were with Freeman when Robert Kennedy
informed the governor that the vice presidential nomination had gone to Lyndon Johnson.108
Though the Kirkpatricks voted for Kennedy in 1960, neither of them demonstrated much
love or admiration for the Kennedy Administration. Their lack of enthusiasm arose from their
disappointment in Humphrey’s and Freeman’s losses in the nomination process, and from
Evron’s suspicion of the ‘New Frontier’ and Kennedy’s foreign policies, specifically his failure
to keep communism out of Cuba. Both Jeane and Evron blamed the Cuban missile crisis in
October of 1962 on Kennedy’s lack of leadership.109 Like many other Americans, Jeane stayed
glued to the television throughout the crisis which she described as “the most dangerous time, the
closest to war that we’ve come in the post-World War II period.”110 The family even considered
building a fallout shelter in their backyard.
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Shortly before the Cuban missile crisis, Jeane began working out of her home. With her
youngest child finally in nursery school, she gave up freelance work and accepted a part-time
position as an assistant professor of political science at Trinity College. Trinity was a small,
women’s, Catholic college located outside of Washington, DC where Jeane began teaching four
days a week. In addition to her teaching duties, Jeane received an offer to assemble and edit
various essays by leading political scientists of the day on communist tactics around the world.
The book, Strategies of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics, was published in
1963 and contained essays on communist tactics and strategies in China, India, Africa, Spain,
France, Latin America, the United Nations. It included an essay, authored by the Kirkpatricks’
friend, Max Kampelman, about the communist activities in the CIO. Jeane’s introduction to the
book constitutes the culmination of her education in the evils of totalitarianism and represents an
early articulation of what would later be known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine.
In The Strategies of Deception, Jeane began by asserting that communists were not swept
into power by the tides of historical inevitability, but rather through political contests that they
corrupted. Except where they come to power through military occupation, the success of the
communist party depended on the skills utilized by their leaders in order to exploit political
opportunities. Therefore, the world was not dealing with an “amorphous historical force”, but
with the activities of ruthless men in specific situations.111 To further buttress this argument,
Kirkpatrick pointed out that Marxist theory had actually been disproven by history, for in
capitalist nations, the working classes had not been kept at a subsistence level as Marx had
predicted. Instead of becoming more miserable and desperate, the working classes of highly
industrialized nations enjoyed a level of prosperity “unprecedented in history” and unequaled in
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any communist state.112Moreover, the governments of industrialized states had not become
instruments of “fascist repression”, but had instead used regulation to eliminate the worst abuses
of the capitalist system.113
In addition to her critique of Marxist ideology, Kirkpatrick noted that modern
communists had moved far away from Marxist theory. According to her, this began during the
Russian Revolution when Lenin “emancipated communists from the encumbrance of Marx’s
error”, by moving the party away from economic determinism and towards political
volunteerism.114This occurred when Lenin declared that Russia could bypass the capitalist stage
of economic development. Such a claim flew in the face of Marxist doctrine and was, according
to Kirkpatrick, the first time that a communist leader advocated the use of state power to
circumvent or transcend the laws of history. “Marx had suggested the communists could assist
history,” she wrote, “Lenin proposed they outwit it.”115 The elimination of Marxist economic
development theories from communist doctrine resulted in two consequences. First, if a capitalist
stage of development was no longer required to bring about communism, then underdeveloped
and colonial areas now appeared ripe for communist expansion. Second, the notion that
communism could be brought about through the use of state power ensured that the goal of the
communist party would be to capture state power everywhere.116
The presence or absence of the proletariat now meant nothing: it was the communists
versus the non-communists. “In the name of tactical flexibility ‘socialism’ is imposed on prefeudal societies; Communist parties serve as ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ in nations with no
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proletariat, no capitalists, no industry,” Kirkpatrick observed, “military conquest, subversion, and
coups d’état are substituted for proletarian revolutions; tiny elites of intellectual freebooters are
substituted for the working masses.”117Thus, classical Marxism was absent from modern
communism, and merely invoked to surround the communists with an aura of intellectual and
historical validity. Moreover, Kirkpatrick contended that through its faith in the inevitable
triumph of the movement, classical Marxism provided communists with moral justification; it
freed the communist elite of moral inhibitions in their quest for power, justified their unceasing
hostility towards all persons and organizations outside the movement, and sanctioned aggression
as moral and inevitable.118
Kirkpatrick claimed that this absolute split between theory and practice made the
communists merely another group of elites competing for political power, an idea that has
proven to be difficult for many to comprehend. However, she asserted that Americans must
understand that the Marxist theory of historical development had become irrelevant to the
communist movement. The communists had no economic base, no specific relationship with any
class, but instead concentrated their efforts on whichever groups were the most alienated from
the traditional power structure. Americans often failed to recognize these facts, Kirkpatrick
argued, because the communists continued to utilize the language of Marx; for instance, when
they labelled tribal conflicts as struggles against the bourgeoisie.
“The notion that the communists are somehow engaged in the struggle between rich and
poor,” she wrote, “haves and have nots, workers and employers, oppressed and oppressors leads
to the consistent notion that communism is somehow more democratic and progressive than its
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undemocratic rivals.”119 According to Kirkpatrick, in all nations ruled by communists, the
Marxists had never been elected to head the government or been swept into power by a mass
revolt. Whenever they did receive large support from the masses, such as support from peasants,
it was because they promised land reform, a promise they subsequently failed to deliver.
Communists gained power by conducting guerilla warfare and terrorism against governments
and opponents, or through military occupation. Such means to power did not suggest democracy
or progress to Jeane.120
Following her critiques of Marxist theory and modern communism’s abandonment of it,
Kirkpatrick drew from her studies of totalitarianism and outlined distinctive differences between
communism and other non-democratic regimes. One of the primary differences between the
communists and traditional authoritarians was how they utilized power. According to
Kirkpatrick, authoritarians were interested in maintaining the traditional social structure and
culture. She used General Francisco Franco, a fascist, as an example, noting that he had not
attempted to undermine the Catholic Church or despoil the large landowners. Furthermore,
Franco and military dictators in Latin America had not attempted to alter the cultural, social, or
economic status quo. Kirkpatrick claimed that maintaining a culture required less repression than
the effort to radically alter it, and that though the traditional social structure found in
authoritarian regimes may have produced hardships and poverty, its norms were internalized.
Furthermore, traditional oligarchs and autocrats could rely on tradition to keep the masses of
people under control, and for this reason they typically utilized coercion only to protect their own
political power.121 Conversely, communists were more repressive than traditional dictatorships
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because they want to restructure society, culture, and personality. This caused them to try to
control a wide range of activities normally governed by custom and personal preference, which
in turn, required more police, more surveillance, and more terror.122
Conclusions
Jeane Kirkpatrick’s childhood, education, work, and early married life constituted
formative life experiences that worked together to mold her into the public intellectual she would
become in the ensuing decades. From the time of her early childhood, Jeane demonstrated that
she was an intelligent, inquisitive, determined individual who resisted both familial and societal
pressures to conform to stereotypical gender roles, and who chose, instead, to pursue her own
dreams. Her independent and adaptive nature, along with her natural intelligence, allowed her to
turn her back on traditional ideas of femininity and to embrace her own unique character. Note
her tomboyish play as a child, her decision to ignore the finishing school aspects of Stephens
College, her determination to go to graduate school, her decision to work, to go to Paris, and to
marry and bear children on her own terms. This strength of will remained with Jeane throughout
her life, enabling her to meet the challenges and pitfalls of life as a public intellectual, United
Nations Ambassador, and American policy-maker.
In addition to molding her autonomous nature, the early years of Kirkpatrick’s life shaped
her political views. Her family’s deep roots within the Democratic Party, their support for New
Deal programs, and Jeane’s own beliefs concerning race, gender, and the Cold War caused her to
remain a member of the party long after she became disillusioned with its platform. As late as
1984, when Kirkpatrick, already a noted ‘neoconservative’, gave a speech in support of Reagan
at the Republican National Convention, she was still a registered member of the Democratic
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Party. “One’s party is a part of oneself”123, she declared, and her decision to leave the
Democratic Party in 1985 weighed heavily upon her for the rest of her life.124
Not only was Kirkpatrick’s political affiliation fashioned by her early life, but her views
on the nature of democracy itself were formed by her experiences growing up in Duncan,
Oklahoma. Though probably romanticized, it was her vision of Duncan – a frontier town with a
fluid, open society, where democracy, egalitarianism, and libertarianism prevailed – that
Kirkpatrick referenced as the prime example of the nature of, and conditions necessary for,
democracy. In later years, whether she was critiquing the changes brought to American
democracy by the rise of the New Left, or evaluating political systems, revolutions, and regime
changes abroad, Kirkpatrick used her hometown as a model for how democratic societies should
function.
A belief in the righteousness of democratic political systems was reinforced by her indepth study of totalitarianism. Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt both offered her a
fundamental understanding of how totalitarian regimes came to power and how they functioned.
Neumann’s analysis of the fall of the Weimar Republic, blaming it on political extremists on
both the right and the left, provided Kirkpatrick with ammunition against the New Left whom
she viewed as political extremists, determined to destroy the American democratic experiment in
order to completely restructure American society and culture. Based on what she learned from
Neumann and Arendt about political groups that sought to remake society and culture,
Kirkpatrick later concluded that the New Left was ‘totalitarian’ in its nature.
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Kirkpatrick utilized other lessons that she had learned from Arendt; for example, it was
Arendt who first made distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian governments,
distinctions that Kirkpatrick would expound upon and utilize over time. Furthermore, Arendt’s
analyses of revolutions and the ‘social question’ influenced Kirkpatrick’s views of revolutions
abroad. Kirkpatrick believed that it was impossible to create democracy anywhere at any time,
and often relied upon the history of a nation to determine whether a revolution in pursuit of
democracy could be successful. Moreover, like Arendt, she believed that any attempt by
revolutionaries to institute social and economic equality, i.e. to do more than incrementally
change the political system, would result in totalitarianism and state terror. Finally, Kirkpatrick
spoke often as a public intellectual about the hazards of utopian political ideologies, dangers she
learned about from both Arendt and Camus.
Kirkpatrick’s education in the evils of totalitarianism was buttressed by her exposure to
firsthand accounts of life in NAZI Germany, the Soviet Union, and communist China.
Neumann’s Holocaust files, interviews with Russians who had fled from the Soviet Union during
World War II, and interviews with Chinese communists who refused repatriation following the
Korean War painted a dystopian picture of the lives of those unfortunate individuals forced to
live under totalitarian rule. Kirkpatrick never forgot these stories; nor did she forget any of the
horror stories that she heard from Neumann, Arendt, Freda Utley, and other persons she met
throughout her lifetime who had fled from the totalitarian menace. Rather she utilized these
firsthand accounts in her frequent denunciations of communism.
Kirkpatrick’s critiques of totalitarianism and American domestic and foreign policies
were also influenced by her husband. Evron provided her with a new social circle, composed of
intellectuals, political scientists, government officials, politicians, and professors; all committed
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Cold Warriors whose interests overlapped with those of the Kirkpatricks’. In addition, Evron
encouraged his wife to remain intellectually and politically engaged. Moreover, his own research
and work could not help but to influence Jeane’s intellectual evolution. Already a fervent anticommunist prior to World War II, Evron’s research into the global propaganda techniques of the
communists in the 1950s further cemented the Kirkpatricks’ belief in the dangerous, powerhungry, duplicitous, and untrustworthy nature of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by 1963, with the publication of The Strategies of Deception, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s
view of totalitarianism and the American role in the Cold War had been crystallized. Her
critiques of communism and defense of traditional authoritarian regimes in the book were based
upon all that she had learned over the years about the nature of totalitarianism from Neumann,
Arendt, Camus, her work, and her husband, and constituted the core of what would later be
known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. Over the next two decades, Kirkpatrick continued to
expound upon her critiques and defenses of non-democratic governments, which, along with her
criticisms of the leftward drift of the Democratic Party and her condemnation of the foreign
policies of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations, propelled her into the national spotlight.
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Chapter Two
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s professional life thrived. She
completed her doctoral degree in Political Science at Columbia University, gained tenure at
Georgetown University, and published three books - Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A
Study of Peronist Argentina, Political Woman, and The New Presidential Elite. In Leader and
Vanguard in Mass Society, Kirkpatrick continued to build upon her defense of authoritarian
regimes, as compared to totalitarian ones, through a study of Argentine politics in the 1950s and
1960s. The book not only served to reinforce the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, it also helped her to
establish a reputation as a Latin American political expert in the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike her
work on Peronist Argentina, Political Woman and The New Presidential Elite were devoted to
the analysis of domestic politics, namely the role of women in American politics and the rise of
the New Left within the Democratic Party. Published in the mid-1970s, these works were
inspired by the rapidly changing nature of American society and politics brought about via a
rising tide of protest by women, the youth, African Americans, and anti-war advocates. Though
providing astute assessments of female politicians and the political characteristics of delegates to
the national conventions, the books also provided insight into Kirkpatrick’s critiques of the New
Left. Her opposition to both the methods and goals of the New Left caused her to become
increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party, which, in turn, pushed her further to the right
on the political spectrum.
A Lousy Decade
The tumultuous nature of American society during the 1960s prompted the Kirkpatricks
to label the decade as ‘lousy’.125Despite their overall unfavorable opinion of the period, the
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couple’s careers, political activism, and family life flourished. Jeane Kirkpatrick began to gain
renown both with the general public and in academic circles when her first book, The Strategies
of Deception, was featured as a national Book of the Month Club. She continued to teach parttime at Trinity College while her husband maintained his position as the Director of the
American Political Science Association.126 In addition to their scholarly pursuits, the
Kirkpatricks remained active in politics, specifically, party politics, and together they attended
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. The couple was thrilled that their friend Hubert
Humphrey was chosen to be Lyndon Johnson’s running mate, and they spent the majority of
their time at the convention working on Humphrey’s speeches. Throughout the campaign, the
couple continued to write speeches for the future Vice President, and Jeane analyzed polling
data.127
Before the campaign, Evron had begun pressuring his wife to finish her PhD, telling her
that in order to accomplish her goals she needed to complete her doctoral degree. By this time,
Jeane had more free time as all three of the Kirkpatricks’ sons were enrolled in the Sidwell
Friends School, a prestigious private institution, run by Quakers. Kirkpatrick was committed to
finishing her doctorate, but was at a loss as to what her dissertation topic should be. Due to her
interest in non-democratic forms of government, both she and Evron decided that Peronism in
Argentina would be an ideal topic. Thus, Kirkpatrick made arrangements to be re-admitted into
the Political Science doctoral program at Columbia, was assigned a new dissertation advisor, and
began to seek funding for her research. She first applied to the American Association of
University Women; however, her application was rejected and a representative from the AAUW
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informed Jeane that her children were too young for her to go back to school.128Though stung by
this rejection, Kirkpatrick persevered and was finally able to secure funding for her research
through the Andreas Foundation, an organization run by Hubert Humphrey’s friend and
campaign contributor, Dwayne Andreas.129
Having obtained the necessary funding, Kirkpatrick began working on her dissertation.
As a political scientist, her research was based on interviewing and collecting data from a
‘representative’ sample of the Argentine population between October and December of 1965.
The majority of the fieldwork, though, was carried out by the International Research Associates
who completed interviews with a total of 2,014 persons. As the data was being collected,
Kirkpatrick focused on researching the history of Latin American politics, and in particular, the
phenomenon of Peronism. In 1968, she completed her doctoral work and was awarded a PhD in
Political Science from Columbia University130. Kirkpatrick’s dissertation was later published as a
book entitled Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina.131
Contemporary reviews of the book were mixed. In The Journal of Politics, Kenneth
Coleman praised her analysis of Peronism as a continuation of “politics as usual”, rather than a
“distinct political subculture”, a “radical mass movement”, an illustration of “left-fascism”, or an
example of “working class authoritarianism”.132 Whereas Coleman commended Kirkpatrick’s
conclusions on the nature of Peronism, other reviews were more critical. In the Political Science
Quarterly, Eldon Kenworthy accused Kirkpatrick of failing to produce a fresh perspective on
Peronism and adhering too often to conventional wisdom by presenting Perón’s supporters as
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“alienated” and “psychologically predisposed to authoritarian leadership”. 133 Kenworthy
bemoaned the fact that Kirkpatrick could not clear her mind of “working-class authoritarianism”
and “Latin-Mediterranean” political styles which would have allowed her to project “herself
freshly and emphatically into the lives of those whose opinions she tabulated.”134 He went on to
criticize Kirkpatrick for hiring a polling organization to do her work, and for not spending time
in Argentina talking to Peronists as real people instead of “isolated responses to a
questionnaire.”135 Though acknowledging that the data in the book was useful, Kenworthy
concluded that Kirkpatrick’s work “exemplifies that style of research from afar… that makes
other people’s politics look far simpler than one’s own. Is not ‘condescension’ the word we
generally apply to such behavior?”136
Reviews of the book in the journals International Affairs and the Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs were also uncomplimentary. J. A. Camacho criticized
the book for being misleading, as its subtitle, A Study of Peronist Argentina, promised a study of
the years Perón was in power, yet the bulk of the work was focused on the mid-1960s.137 In
addition, Camacho asserted that the book failed to shed new light on the nature of Peronism,
noting “it did not take a poll to discover that the bulk of the support for Peronismo comes from
the working and lower middle classes”, and “a poll is hardly necessary to discover that the bulk
of the population of Argentina is Catholic”. “Kirkpatrick’s conclusions,” he declared, “expressed
in a manner so elaborate as to be almost obscure, are no different from those of other competent
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observers.”138 Alberto Ciria claimed that the book did not provide a satisfactory analysis of the
nature of Peronsim in 1965, due in part to the fact that the questionnaire utilized in the survey
“reads like a superficial adaptation of North American ‘political culture’ values with obvious
concessions to Argentine idiosyncratic features.”139
Though apt, contemporary critiques of Kirkpatrick’s work were written before she
became a member of the National Security Council and the United Nations Ambassador.
Naturally, they could not examine how the book correlated either to her foreign policy views or
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, nor could they assess how her education in totalitarianism may have
affected her views on the nature of authoritarian regimes in general and Peronism in particular.
Kirkpatrick noted in her introduction that her interest in Peronism grew out of her
interest in non-democratic regimes, an interest that was stimulated by her tutelage under Franz
Neumann. She claimed that traditional autocracies, political systems that tended to be neither
democratic nor totalitarian, had been neglected by political scientists, and that despite their
“antiquity and ubiquity”, autocratic governments were often viewed as “transitional” systems,
political incidents on the way to becoming democratic regimes.140 According to Kirkpatrick,
Latin America contained a wide array of non-democratic systems ranging from military
dictatorships, traditional autocracies, left and right-wing movements and regimes, to
dictatorships that had incorporated some democratic practices. Peronism in Argentina, a nation
with wealth, a large European population, high literacy rates, an industrialized economy, and a
Latin political tradition that mixed autocratic and democratic elements, proved especially
interesting to her as it provided another variant of autocracy. She compared Peronsim to a
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contemporary Caesarist movement in a technologically advanced society, with Perón as a nonrevolutionary military leader supported by a mass base, and went on to assert that such systems
would become more common in Latin America as technological advances were made in societies
with autocratic systems.141
In her analysis of the history of the Argentine and Latin American political systems,
Kirkpatrick noted that such systems had a long history of regime instability, oligarchy,
democratic interludes, military coups, direct action, personalismo, and institutionalized violence.
Argentina itself had a very limited experience with democracy, having enjoyed only twenty years
of it since its independence in 1810. Electoral reforms were implemented within Argentina in
1911 and 1912 that provided for a secret ballot and suffrage rights for all adult males. Such
reforms increased the voting population of Argentina from 9% of the total male population (landowning, upper classes) to one of universal male suffrage. In the wake of these enfranchisement
measures, a constitutional, democratic government remained in place until 1930 when a military
coup toppled the regime and claimed power.142
The Peronist period began in 1943 when Juan Perón participated in a coup that overthrew
the conservative, minority government in power at that time. Perón was part of a group of
officers (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos or GOU) who saw themselves as progressive nationalists
and who sympathized with European fascism, specifically, that of the Italian variety. The officers
hoped to bring to Argentina the unity, strength, progress, and discipline that they believed were
characteristic of the German and Italian fascist states.143However, despite their calls for unity, the
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GOU was perpetually divided. As a result, three different generals rapidly succeeded each other
as Argentina’s leader, with Perón ultimately ascending to power in 1945.
In her study, Kirkpatrick was careful to distinguish Peronism from totalitarianism.
According to her, Peronsim lacked most of the distinguishing characteristics of totalitarian
systems; for example, there was no official ideology for re-ordering society, culture, and
personality. Moreover, Perón did not attempt to establish total control over the political process
or to destroy those associations such as church, family, or schools that influenced political
practices. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick claimed that during his rule, there was not a single, mass
party that monopolized political functions in Argentine society. Finally, no ‘ubiquitous terror’
was associated with Peronism.144 Instead of ‘totalitarian’, Kirkpatrick labels Peronsim as neither
communistic nor capitalistic, but rather a reformist, “justicialist philosophy” that mixed limited
individualism and limited collectivism.145
In order to buttress her arguments about the nature of Peronsim, Kirkpatrick examined
various aspects of the regime, including its class orientation, the economic and social changes
initiated by Perón, the social characteristics of the Peronist elite, and the cultural and political
policies of the government. She began by noting that Perón gained a mass following from the
working classes. In her discussion of why this was so, Kirkpatrick focused on the economic and
social changes wrought by Perón. She devoted most of her attention to welfare measures and
their impact on workers’ lives, describing the Peronist system as a ‘New Deal’ for Argentine
workers that included a comprehensive system of social security that provided for old-age
pensions, disability pay, and other benefits. In addition to social security, workers received paid
vacations, sick leave, holidays, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, and child labor
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laws. Price controls were also introduced that reinforced wage benefits. Furthermore, collective
bargaining, the right to strike, public housing projects, and slum clearance all contributed to
workers’ well-being. Finally, a system of free public education through college “democratized
the distribution of skill and enlightenment”.146According to Kirkpatrick, such measures
constituted limited social and economic change which altered the pre-Perón economic and social
structures of Argentina, but did not destroy them.147
The integration of the working classes into political life made Perón’s relations with
Argentina’s traditional ruling classes especially interesting to Kirkpatrick. One might think that
mass support from the working classes would lead to a dismantling of the traditional Argentine
hierarchy; however, this did not occur. According to Kirkpatrick, Perón’s treatment of the
Argentinian oligarchy qualified as evidence of the non-communist, non-revolutionary, reformist
nature of his regime. The oligarchy in Argentina consisted of large-landholders, the hierarchy of
the Catholic Church, wealthy merchants, and the upper ranks of the military. During the Peronist
period the traditional Argentinian ruling classes managed to hold on to some of their political
power, while new social groups were welcomed into the political arena. Under Perón, the
political power and social status of the large-landholders and wealthy merchants declined, but,
their economic status remained relatively unchanged. Furthermore, the power and prestige of the
Catholic Church and the military remained intact.148
Kirkpatrick maintained that such changes in the political system more accurately
reflected the transformations that had occurred within the population and economy of Argentina
in previous decades. According to her, the economic base that had allowed the large-landholders
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to ascend to political power in the past had been eroded by industrialization, urbanization, and
the commercialization of Argentina’s economy. Thus, Perón attacked a segment of the oligarchy
whose political and social status and influence exceeded its economic power, thus bringing the
social, political, and economic power of the oligarchy into a more realistic relationship.149
Though, for the most part, politics continued to be dominated by members of the oligarchy,
specifically the military and the plutocracy, some governmental positions were opened to those
who had previously been excluded from political power including trade union leaders, sons of
immigrants, Jews, and members of the working-classes.150
Although Perón championed political, social, and economic reforms designed to create a
more just and equitable society, these moves were not accompanied by protection of individual
rights and liberties such as those enshrined in Western, liberal, democratic governments. This
becomes quite evident in Kirkpatrick’s discussion of Peronist cultural policies. For example,
freedom of the press did not exist in Peronist Argentina. Newspapers were prohibited from
publishing items that were ‘contrary to the general interest of the nation or disturbing to public
order’. In addition, the press could not publish anything that undermined Christian morals, upset
Argentina’s relations with other states, injured government officials, or was ‘untrue’. Of course it
was Perón who could determine what constituted a violation of these laws, and opposition
newspapers, or those found guilty of breaking these laws, were harassed and ultimately shut
down by the state. Enforcement of this legislation was possible because of a selective purge of
the Argentine judiciary.151
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In an effort to distinguish these policies from similar ones instituted by totalitarian
governments, Kirkpatrick was quick to point out that Perón was unable or unwilling to stifle all
opposition. First, she notes that anti-Peronist papers, though harassed by paper shortages, threats,
and arrests still managed to print anti-Peronist editorials. Second, opposition politicians, though
harassed and arrested, continued to criticize the government. Third, Peron allowed elections in
1946 and 1951. Finally, though the opposition parties were debilitated by restrictive legislation,
threats, and arrests, they were not totally destroyed. “Perón hamstrung and limited his opponents
but did not silence all opposition,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “he did not attempt to achieve full control
of the symbolic environment, but he dominated it through a combination of censorship,
intimidation, and harassment.”152 Thus, she concluded that the Peronist regime constituted a
continuation of the Argentine tradition of a hybrid government that combined democratic and
autocratic elements.153
Despite the existence of democratic elements associated with Peronism, the political
scientist asserted that it did not constitute a step on the road towards democracy. In order to back
up this assertion, Kirkpatrick drew from Arendt’s writing on the nature of revolutions and looked
to Argentina’s political history. She wrote,
Given Argentine experience, it would have been extraordinary in 1955 if Argentine
political culture had been characterized by attitudes, opinions, and, especially,
expectations typical of developed democracies. It would have been most surprising if,
just after the downfall of Perón, broadly aggregative democratic parties had emerged
capable of organizing and channeling opinion, recruiting leaders, competing in elections,
and accepting the results. It would have been very surprising if Argentines had expected
that political decisions should, could, and would be made by majorities whose
preferences would be peaceably expressed through honest institutions and implemented
by officials responsive as well as responsible to the people. It would have been very
surprising if military officers, politicized by several decades of participation in the
distribution of values in the society, should have promptly eliminated themselves from
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the political arena. It would have been surprising indeed if, after 150 years of experience
with a different tradition, Argentina should have emerged after the fall of Perón a fullblown, Anglo-Saxon democracy.154

Following her discussion of Peronism, Kirkpatrick examined the development of
Argentine politics in the decade after Perón was overthrown via a military coup in 1955. She
argued that the continued instability of Argentine politics during this period was typical of Latin
American political systems. Despite the instability and violence inherent within the Argentine
political system, Kirkpatrick maintained that the nation’s system was competitive, that
competitors for power were comprised of diverse actors with diverse goals, that competition took
place in a variety of arenas despite governmental restrictions, and that the style of politics and
the arenas of competition changed due to the political involvement of the middle and lower
classes.155
In support of these assertions, Kirkpatrick pointed out that no man or party held power
for even four years, a fact that demonstrated that no one group possessed sufficient power to
preempt control of the government. Instead, there were multiple groups who competed for
political power in a variety of arenas. Kirkpatrick defines an ‘arena’ as a site of decision-making,
and in Argentina, competition was not limited to the arenas typical of constitutional democracies.
Groups who competed for power in various arenas included conventional political parties who
sought power in the electoral arena; labor unions who sought power through electoral
participation, strikes, lobbying, and violent action; movement-type parties that sought power
through electoral politics, street demonstrations, and quasi-terrorist actions; military leaders who
sought power through civil war, coups, and electoral politics; and the clergy, student groups,
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industrialists, and landowners who sought power through direct action and electoral activities.156
According to the political scientist, the interactions between such groups vying for political
power determined the policies and personnel of the Argentine government. Though not all of the
competitors were involved in interactions in all political arenas, each group’s strengths, methods,
and commitments had to be taken into account at all levels of the decision-making process.157
“The persistence of competition between such diverse groups and by such diverse
methods,” Kirkpatrick noted, “demonstrates the continuing lack of agreement in Argentina about
the legitimate sources of political authority.”158As no political procedure was recognized as the
legitimate route to power, no group had enough power or authority to impose its political will for
very long. Furthermore, the lack of agreement on legitimate means to power meant that multiple
routes were acceptable, including the use of violence and military coups. According to her, the
presence of violence in a political system, though often associated with a breakdown in the social
order, was, in the case of Argentina and many other Latin American and autocratic regimes,
patterned, and thus must be considered a ‘mode’ of the social order rather than a disruption.159
Violence was an integral, regular, and predictable part of the Argentine political process, even
during Argentina’s democratic interludes; therefore, revolutions and military coups actually
constituted signs of continuity and stability within the Argentine system.160
“It seems to me,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “that a new name is needed to designate those
political systems in which, through a substantial period of time and regardless of the legal
structure of government, diverse and multiple actors compete for political power in diverse and
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multiple arenas.”161Such systems may be called ‘polyocracies’, where ‘poly’ references the
multiplicity of both political actors and arenas. Such systems tended to suffer from institutional
instability caused by a lack of agreement about legitimate arenas of decision-making or modes of
competition. Consequently, shifting power relations among actors are usually accompanied by
structural changes in the political system. Political parties were the most vulnerable actors to
such changes as their strength depended upon mass support expressed through the electoral
arena. Conversely, the positions of military leaders, church leaders, and other political actors
were less vulnerable to shifts between democratic and autocratic systems because their political
activities took place largely outside of the electoral arena.162
Kirkpatrick’s analyses of the Argentine political system served to buttress her defense of
authoritarian regimes in Latin America and other regions around the globe, along with American
support for such regimes. According to her, though autocratic governments, such as Peronist
Argentina and other Latin America dictatorships, were oppressive, they were less repressive than
their totalitarian counterparts. Therefore, though he purged the Argentine judiciary, repressed
opposition parties, and imposed severe restrictions on the press, Perón did not eliminate all
opposition to his regime through mass terror as a totalitarian dictator would do. Moreover,
authoritarian regimes left in place existing allocations of power, wealth, and status, but they
worshipped traditional gods and observed traditional taboos. Unlike totalitarian regimes, they did
not disturb the habitual places of residence, rhythms of work, or patterns of family and personal
relations. Furthermore, because they allowed for limited competition and political participation,
authoritarian governments, especially those in Latin America which had a long tradition of
mixing liberal and autocratic political styles, were more susceptible to liberalization and thus
161
162

Ibid, 78.
Ibid, 78.
62

capable of evolving into approximate democratic states.163 Even though the political system of
Argentina between 1945 and 1965, like those of other autocratic states, was far from democratic,
political action and freedom existed outside of the electoral arena as long as political actors were
able to stage demonstrations and utilize strikes, lobbying actions, and violence in order to
influence the political system.

In 1967, while in the midst of completing her dissertation, Jeane Kirkpatrick was hired as
an Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. She
was offered the job by Karl Cerny, Howard Penniman’s successor as Chairman of the Political
Science Department. Both Cerny and Penniman had been members of the Kirkpatricks’ social
circle for years. In her role as a faculty member at Georgetown, Kirkpatrick developed a
reputation as a committed teacher who did her own work, without the aid of researchers or
assistants. She even insisted upon grading exams herself. Her hard work paid off, and she
became only the second woman to gain tenure at Georgetown.164
Jeane Kirkpatrick finished her PhD and began working at Georgetown during a time
when American society, politics, and foreign affairs were experiencing enormous changes. Much
of this upheaval was due to the emergence of the New Left, a countercultural movement that
centered on the expansion of rights to various minority groups and women, and the American
population’s increasing disenchantment with the Vietnam War. The Civil Rights movement that
began during World War II had garnered increasing support over the ensuing decades, and, by
the mid-1960s, had achieved several victories for African Americans including the restoration of
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voting rights, the integration of public schools, and the end to de jure segregation. The success of
the Civil Rights movement for African Americans soon prompted other minorities within the
United States, such as Native Americans and Latinos, to fight for their own rights. Feminism
and the struggle for equal rights for women also gained momentum during the 1960s as an
increasing number of working and college-educated women became more willing to address the
inequalities that existed between the sexes within American society. College students across the
nation banded together to protest against university policies which they deemed to be repressive
and stifling, and homosexuals began agitating for equal rights and an end to sodomy laws. In the
realm of foreign affairs, Cold War tensions increased as the Cuban Missile Crisis reignited fears
of nuclear war and mutually assured destruction, the Iron Curtain gained a new permanency to
Americans with the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the war in Vietnam escalated.
By the late 1960s, the rise of the New Left and the growth of the anti-war movement had
fractured both the social and cultural norms along with the Cold War consensus which had
dominated American life in the postwar years. To many Americans, the Civil Rights movement
appeared to have degenerated into violence with the emergence of Black Power organizations
and urban rioting. Radical Feminist groups, labeled ‘bra burners’ by the media, began actively
protesting events such as the Miss America pageant and calling for a war between the sexes.
Student organizations staged sit-ins, strikes, and protests against their alma maters and managed
to temporarily shut down universities all across America. Meanwhile, anti-war protests increased
in number and intensity.
The rising tide of protest within the United States reached its zenith in 1968. During that
year, the nation was shocked by the assassinations of two larger-than-life political figures –
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy. Meanwhile the Tet Offensive belied the
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government’s claims that the war was nearly won in Vietnam. Kirkpatrick personally
experienced the effects of the student protestors when on April 23, 1968, between 150 and 300
members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) occupied several administration
buildings and the Low Library of Columbia University.165
The SDS were protesting against the construction of a gymnasium that they labeled as
‘racist’ as it was to be built on the site of a park that had served the surrounding black
neighborhood. Though community residents would be able to use the gym, they would have to
use a separate ‘colored’ entrance. They were also protesting against the Institute for Defense
Analysis, a Columbia University defense organization affiliated with the U.S. government which
supported the war in Vietnam.166 In the midst of the student occupation, Kirkpatrick had to
deliver her dissertation to the library. In order to avoid the chaos occurring on the campus, she
had to be escorted by police through underground tunnels beneath the university. Though she
was able to avoid any direct contact with the protestors, two of her friends, both of whom were
faculty members at Columbia, were not as fortunate. One had his office destroyed by members
of the SDS, while the other was hit on the head by the brass nozzle of a fire hose.167 Kirkpatrick
later described the students and their actions at Columbia as ‘fascist’.168
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Her encounters with radical protest groups did not end with the incident at Columbia. In
August of 1968, she, her husband, and her eldest son attended the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago, Illinois. The Kirkpatrick family stayed at the Palmer House at night and
spent their days at the Conrad Hilton analyzing polls for Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. At
one point, the police and the military were called in to respond to a bomb threat at the
Hilton.169Then, a radical group identified by Jeane as ‘The Weathermen’ put uric acid in the air
conditioning system at the Palmer House, causing the building to reek of vomit for several
days.170Outside of the convention, an army of anti-war protestors and New Left countercultural
organizations had amassed to demonstrate. Though most were there to peacefully protest, some,
like the Yippies, were not. The Yippies threatened to poison Chicago’s water supply with LSD,
and both the SDS and the Yippies resorted to throwing bags of urine at police.171 Chicago police
and Illinois National Guardsmen responded with violence, beating and gassing the protestors.172
The violence between police and protestors continued for three days.
Tensions ran high inside the Democratic National Convention as well, as the delegates
were divided on multiple issues, the most polarizing being the Vietnam War. The anti-war
faction that supported unconditional, unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam coalesced behind
169
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Senator Eugene McCarthy. The pro-war faction of the party lent its support to Vice President
Hubert Humphrey who favored a negotiated settlement in which U.S. action depended upon
reciprocal action from the North Vietnamese.173Humphrey, despite being labeled a warmonger
by the peace faction and members of the New Left, still managed to secure the nomination. Due
to the turbulent nature of American society, culture, and politics in the late 1960s, Evron
Kirkpatrick had encouraged Humphrey to ask Nelson Rockefeller, a member of the Republican
Party, to be his Vice Presidential candidate in order to run on a ‘Unity’ platform. After much
discussion, Humphrey agreed to let Evron Kirkpatrick and Max Kampelman broach the matter to
the New York Republican. Though he initially appeared to be in favor of the idea of a unity
ticket, Rockefeller declined the offer174. With Rockefeller out of the picture and the nomination
secured, Humphrey chose the moderate liberal Edmund Muskie as his running mate.175
The Kirkpatricks were upset by the divisions within the Democratic Party, but they were
happy that their candidate had won the day and both worked diligently over the next few months
on the Humphrey campaign. Unfortunately, the “Happy Warrior” lost the election by a narrow
margin. Nixon received 31.7 million votes to Humphrey’s 31.2 million. However, in the
Electoral College, Nixon was able to secure 32 states, leaving 13 to Humphrey and 5 Southern
states to George Wallace. Jeane Kirkpatrick blamed Humphrey’s loss to Nixon in 1968 on the
rise of the New Left and on President Johnson. According to her, Johnson set the convention date
too late, leaving very little time for campaigning. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick accused Johnson of
not raising enough money for the Democratic Party which further hampered the campaign.
Johnson biographer, Randall B. Woods, supports her assertions. “Unbeknown to the media, the
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delegates, and the American public,” Woods writes, “the chief challenger to Hubert Humphrey…
was Lyndon Johnson.”176 Johnson attempted to dominate the convention and its proceedings,
made sure that the convention coincided with his birthday, August 27, and even tested the waters
for his own re-nomination, despite the fact he had already announced he would not run. After
discovering that the party would not re-nominate him, Johnson finally threw his support behind
his Vice-President177
Disheartened by Humphrey’s loss and the seeming disintegration of the Democratic
Party, the Kirkpatricks decided to take a vacation from politics. Accordingly, Jeane Kirkpatrick
took a sabbatical from Georgetown while her husband took a leave of absence from the
American Political Science Association allowing the family to spend 1969 in France. Evron
Kirkpatrick took a position as president of the board of trustees for the Institute of American
Universities, an organization based in Aix-en-Provence and dedicated to helping American
students to study abroad in France. The plan was for Evron to spend the year teaching at the
Institute while his wife wrote. The family rented a house near Mount St. Victoire, a picturesque
location which had been the subject of many works by the famous French painter Paul Cézanne.
With their three sons enrolled in a local French school for boys, the Kirkpatrick family spent the
next year immersing themselves in French culture.178
Jeane was especially excited about being back in France. She loved the language, the
culture, and especially the food. In between writing and spending time with her family, she
began learning about local ingredients and practicing her cooking techniques. The learning
process was not easy on the family as Kirkpatrick was frequently distracted from the kitchen by
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intellectual pursuits. Often the kitchen resembled a disaster area: pans smoking, food burning,
water boiling away, all while Kirkpatrick was immersed in reading a book. Despite such culinary
chaos, spectacular dinners sometimes appeared on the table.179
Jeane often described the family’s time in France as the best of times. On weekends, the
entire Kirkpatrick family would go on road trips throughout the South of France. Evron labeled
these weekend getaways “Kirkpatrick’s Follies”. The three boys sat in the backseat, bickering as
siblings do, and complaining of car sickness, while their mother helped their father to navigate.
In between giving directions to Evron, Jeane read books such as The Odyssey and The Iliad
aloud to the family. The family enjoyed their time in France in 1969 so much that the country
became the site for annual summer vacations. The Kirkpatricks would spend all of 1974 living in
France and eventually bought a home in Provence.180
A Political Woman: Jeane Kirkpatrick in the 1970s
As the turbulent era of the 1960s gave way to the decade of disco, the lives of the
Kirkpatrick family began to change. Evron Kirkpatrick, now a man in his 60s, began retiring
from the public eye. Having spent decades working in academia, for the government, in electoral
politics, heading the American Political Science Association, and sitting on the boards of various
organizations, Evron was ready to embrace a less rigorous lifestyle. In addition, he felt
increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Such an estrangement hastened his desire to retire from large-scale political activism. Finally,
Evron’s work for the government came under attack in the late 1960s as his name was associated
with alleged front organizations for the Central Intelligence Agency.
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In the late 1950s, Evron Kirkpatrick founded and chaired the Operations and Policy
Research (OPR), a non-profit organization associated with the United States Information
Agency. The OPR was staffed by American academics, primarily in the social sciences, who
recommended books and pamphlets for distribution overseas. The organization also conducted
political studies within the United States and abroad, specifically in Latin America. In 1967, the
OPR was accused of being a CIA front organization.181 Max Kampelman, Vice President of the
OPR, long-time friend of the Kirkpatricks, and friend and former aide to Hubert Humphrey,
denied having any knowledge of the organization’s relationship with the CIA.182 Jeane
Kirkpatrick also remained rather ambiguous about her husband’s activities within the OPR,
stating, “I became aware that Kirk was advising the CIA on public opinion polling – sampling,
interviewing, analyzing data – during the Vietnam War… I have no doubt that his activities were
honorable and his purposes were good and that I would have been proud of them if I’d known
more about them than I did.”183
As Evron settled into retirement, he encouraged his wife to remain active and in the
public eye. Refreshed from her year abroad, Jeane returned to her job at Georgetown and began
working on a new book. Shortly thereafter, her parents’ health began to deteriorate. Kirkpatrick
had maintained close ties to her father and mother, Fat and Leona, and with her brother, Jerry,
now a prominent attorney living in Ohio with his wife and three children. In 1974, one of those
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ties was irrevocably broken when her father passed away. Five years later, in April of 1979,
Kirkpatrick’s mother, Leona, died of leukemia.184 With her parents gone, her husband retired,
and her sons reaching adulthood, Kirkpatrick felt a sense of loss, not only in her personal life, but
in her political life as well, for like her husband, Kirkpatrick had begun to feel more and more
isolated from the Democratic Party.
Her disaffection began in 1968 and continued to grow throughout the 1970s. Kirkpatrick
took issue with many of the policies espoused by various New Left groups, who she perceived as
gaining too much power within the party, but she was especially upset by their attack on centrist
liberalism that she and her husband believed to have been the source of American postwar
prosperity and the guarantor of the nation’s defense and safety. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick
resented the fact that liberals such as herself who had supported Civil Rights at home, along with
decolonization abroad, were now labeled as ‘racists’ and ‘imperialists’ by the New Left.185
Moreover, she found the belief of these groups that the United States was “a sick society,
presided over by a repressive government whose motives are base, whose methods are immoral,
and whose soul is corrupt”186 to be particularly repugnant and wholly untrue. “I deeply opposed
attacks on the integrity of our government and culture,” Kirkpatrick said, “I always believed in
the importance of truth, law, and authority. Military kids grow up with such values. So do
Oklahoma kids.”187
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Steeped as she was in the literature of totalitarianism, Kirkpatrick found the New Left’s
cavalier attitude towards communism to be reprehensible. She was particularly offended by the
anti-war protestors who claimed that the United States’ escalation of the war in Vietnam was
immoral. But, in truth, such sentiments were not confined to radical anti-war protestors, as many
of her academic associates, such as Hans Morgenthau, began criticizing the war based on both
moral ground and the American national interest. During the late 1960s, Kirkpatrick attended a
lecture given by Morgenthau during which he critiqued the war in Vietnam in several ways. In A
New Foreign Policy for the United States, Morgenthau elaborated on his views, arguing that
communism in Vietnam was nationalistic in nature, meaning a revolution would have occurred
without the presence of communists, and that the United States was now involved in a
counterrevolution. Morgenthau went on to assert that because the Vietnamese Communist Party
was primarily a vehicle to achieve national unity and independence, it was different from, and
thus irrelevant to, the containment of Chinese or Soviet communism. He pointed out that for
centuries Vietnam had acted as a barrier to Chinese expansion, yet, ironically, American
involvement in Vietnam was pushing the Vietnamese closer to their traditional Chinese enemies.
In Morgenthau’s opinion, the war did not serve the national interests of the United States.
Furthermore, the limited nature of the war was illogical in view of the rationales put forward to
justify U.S. involvement – that the Chinese and the Soviets were manipulating Ho Chi Minh.
Finally, Morgenthau asserted that American objectives in Vietnam were unattainable without
incurring unacceptable moral liabilities and military risks.188
In many ways, Kirkpatrick disagreed with Morgenthau’s analysis of the war. She did
admit that there were issues with the ways in which the Johnson and Nixon administrations had
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sold the war, stating that “One of the responsibilities governments have to citizens is not to ask
them to make impossible sacrifices – in this case, sacrifices ordinary Americans can’t
understand, identify with, or accept.”189 Her problem seemed to be not with the war itself, but
rather with the government which had not properly explained to the American public the reasons
why Vietnam was so important. As a political scientist educated in the evils of totalitarianism,
the Cold Warrior believed that the American cause in Vietnam was both right and moral. “I
didn’t have a moral issue with Vietnam. I thought we were morally right,” she said, “Kirk and I
were never under any illusions that Ho Chi Minh was just some peasant nationalist.”190
Following the American withdrawal from Vietnam, Kirkpatrick complained to Hubert
Humphrey that American policies in Vietnam constituted “the most shameful display of
irresponsibility and inhumanity in our history.”191
In addition to her disagreements with the anti-war faction of the New Left, Kirkpatrick
found herself at odds with the radical feminist vision that emerged in the early 1970s. Though
she was a feminist, Kirkpatrick viewed herself as a rugged, female individualist whose
accomplishments were of greater value since she had achieved them without the “institutional
brace of a movement.”192 She disagreed with radical feminist assertions that men were the enemy
and that women were the “most oppressed political caste in history.”193 Furthermore, feminist
organizations’ refusal to respect Kirkpatrick as a woman who “made it in a male world”194
served to further increase her indignation towards the movement. Even in the 1980s, after
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becoming the highest ranking woman within the American foreign policy apparatus, feminists
continued to vilify her. For example, in 1981, Vassar College held the Berkshire Conference on
the History of Women. Though Kirkpatrick was now a United Nations Ambassador and author
of a book on women in politics, the keynote speaker at the event, history professor Joan W.
Scott, dismissed her as “not someone I want to represent feminine accomplishment.”195
Just as radical feminism began to gain strength in the United States in the early 1970s,
Kirkpatrick published her third book – Political Woman.196 As a feminist, a political scientist,
and a political activist, Kirkpatrick began questioning the role of women in politics and
government; specifically, why, fifty years after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, were
women absent from the upper levels of American politics? In hopes of gaining greater insight,
Kirkpatrick took part in a 1972 conference for women in politics sponsored by the Center for the
American Woman and Politics at Rutgers University. There she conducted interviews and
handed out questionnaires to the fifty female state senators and representatives from 26 states
who attended the conference. The politicians surveyed had all served more than one term in their
state legislatures and were all selected for the conference by the various state organizations of the
American Association of University Women, the League of Women Voters, and the National
Federation of Business and Professional Women.197 Kirkpatrick took information gained from
these women, along with similar data gathered from male legislators, to write one of the first
major studies of women in American public life.
Kirkpatrick began by noting that male dominance of governments and policy-making was
indisputable. “Political man is a familiar figure with a long history,” she wrote, “As chief,
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prince, king, counselor, premier, president, dictator, chairman he has led, battled, pillaged,
conquered, built, judged, governed. Political man has fascinated and challenged historians and
philosophers; he has been described, dissected, praised, excoriated and psychoanalyzed.”198
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that women had traditionally been ignored in studies of politics due to
the fact that they have had such a small share of political power. However, given the changes in
the roles of women that had occurred in the 20th century, in particular, the enfranchisement of
females, she wondered why very few women sought or wielded political power. Kirkpatrick
noted that women were quite numerous at the lower levels of American politics – being active in
precincts, at party picnics, getting out the vote, telephoning, and fundraising, yet “no woman has
been nominated to be president or vice-president, no woman has served on the Supreme Court…
no woman in the cabinet, no woman in the Senate, no woman serving as governor of a major
state, no woman mayor of a major city, no woman in the top leadership of either party.”199 Why
was this so?
In order to answer this question, Kirkpatrick first examined women as a political
category. Politics was an activity that was carried out in the name of collectivities where the
possession and use of power is generally justified with reference to some larger good and
demands are made in the name of a group. As time goes on, new collectivities or groups are
created around attributes such as nationality, religion, race, income level, or gender. In general,
once a group with such common identities had coalesced, its grievances and demands were made
manifest. In late 20th century America, “women” had been transformed from a group possessing
specific biological characteristics into a symbol of political identity.200Despite being identified as
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a political collectivity, Kirkpatrick asserted that gender has only occasionally been used as a
basis for common political activity by women. For example, women worked together to achieve
voting rights, successfully organizing and agitating in the name of their sex; however, once the
right to vote was secured, the collective concerns of women were rarely articulated within the
political arena. Furthermore, unlike after the enfranchisement of other categories of people,
women’s suffrage did not affect the major social composition of government, as the feminine
half of the population was seldom represented by more than five to ten percent of the members
of any state legislature. Moreover, according to Kirkpatrick, gender has had less influence on
political behavior than ethnic, regional, or economic identifications.201Thus, the tendency of
women to coalesce around issues other than their gender may account, in part, for their absence
from political power.
Following her assessment of women as a political category, Kirkpatrick considered four
hypothetical constraints that might also account for the low levels of political participation of
women – physiological constraints, cultural constraints, role constraints, and male conspiracy.
Physiological constraints referred to the biological differences between men and women, both
physically and mentally, and were based on the notion that the political aspects of social life
have evolved around power and force. Men were able to physically dominate; women were not.
Men were programmed for leadership, decision-making, and force; women were not. Though
brute force was not necessary for a person to achieve political power in the United States,
political scientists maintained that underlying modern campaigns was a continuing struggle to
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achieve and assert dominance – a struggle that largely excluded women based on their
physiology.202
In addition to hypothetical physiological constraints, women also faced cultural
constraints that could discourage them from engaging in politics. Kirkpatrick noted culture
elaborates the psychological, moral, and social implications of biological characteristics, where
definitions of masculinity and femininity are learned and internalized. She noted,
The essential elements of the cultural explanation of sex role behavior are the
propositions that:
1. Culture embodies norms defining the sexes and identifies behavior appropriate for
each: these are perpetuated through the socialization process
2. These norms determine the identity, expectations, and demands of males and females
3. Sex stereotypes are not necessarily derived from the physiological characteristics of
the two sexes
4. Norms are internalized regardless of their biological relevance
5. In all modern, industrial societies, specifically including the United States, cultural
norms exist which arbitrarily limit women’s personal development, social choices, and
opportunity to share fully in the dominant values of society.203

Thus, politics becomes an example of cultural exclusion; for though legal barriers to women’s
participation in political life had been abolished, cultural norms have preserved the definition of
politics as ‘man’s world’. Furthermore, cultural expectations regarding gender roles were
complemented by a dual status system that measures women by different criteria than men where
women gain status through excelling in sanctioned roles – nurturing, homemaking, personal
adornment, etc. Any effort to perform roles assigned by the culture to the opposite sex is likely to
result in a loss of status.204Though cultural norms concerning gender roles were changing, and
the penalties of nonconformity were not as great as they had been in the past, Kirkpatrick
predicted that traditional culture may conserve politics as a male domain for some time.
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Kirkpatrick argued that role constraints were more restrictive to women than
physiological and cultural restraints.205 Both the physiological and cultural explanations viewed
the personality of men and women, whether programmed through biology or culture, as the
primary cause for women’s absence and men’s dominance of politics; however, personality was
deemphasized in discussions of social roles. A role refers to a position in the social structure and
its associated set of coherent norms. In most societies, roles are complementary, meaning men’s
roles and women’s roles complement one another and provide structure for the relations between
the sexes. Women’s primary role of wife and mother had been viewed as irreconcilable with the
role of professional as both had been described as full-time, life-long jobs. Furthermore, two
professions were more easily combined when they have common role requirements, for example,
law and politics, but the nurturing skills associated with women’s roles as wives and mothers
were not viewed as applicable to politics.206
Finally, there was the male conspiracy theory, or the belief that women were oppressed,
banned from power by the ruling classes – men. From this point of view, the situation of women
was comparable to that of African Americans, where both groups were dominated and excluded
from power by white men. Not surprisingly, those who adhered to the notion of male conspiracy
viewed feminine traits as similar to characteristics of subjected persons and/or oppressed groups
– lack of education, vulnerable to peer prejudice, economic discrimination, low aspirations, more
emotional than rational, more dependent than autonomous, and more predisposed to be governed
than to govern. Supporters of the male conspiracy theory held that cultural and role constraints
served as effective instruments of male domination.207
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Given that the cards were seemingly stacked against female politicians – the lack of a
cohesive political identity, physiological, cultural, and role constraints, along with male
prejudice – just who were the women who successfully participated in the political world? Based
on the information drawn from interviews and questionnaires, Kirkpatrick depicted the average
female legislator as an attractive, forty-eight year old mother of two, who, despite having a
college education, had rarely worked outside of the home. She lived in the town in which she
was born and was provided for financially by her husband who had supported her decision to run
for government office. Competing for office was an extension of her many years of volunteer
experience. Though the lives of the state legislators surveyed differed in many respects, the vast
majority shared several key characteristics including a small town background, geographic
stability, membership in the middle-class, participant and active parents, higher education, and
community service.208
In many ways, the women surveyed were very similar to the male state legislators. The
majority of the men examined also came from smaller towns, were college-educated members of
the middle class, had active parents, and had participated in extracurricular activities and
community volunteerism before running for political office. Where male and female legislators
differed were in their education levels, employment history, age, and number of offspring. Most
of the men were more highly educated than their female counterparts and had been continuously
employed. In addition, the male legislators tended to have more children and ran for office at an
earlier age. Whereas many of the men had children under the age of ten when they first ran for
office, the majority of women waited until after their children were grown before embarking
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upon a political career.209 Based on the similarities and differences between the sexes surveyed,
Kirkpatrick concluded that “the same social experiences seem to contribute to the development
of politically active males and females. Many of the same personality patterns characterize both.
Observable differences… derive more from social roles than from inherent predispositions.”210
Notwithstanding the many similarities between male and female legislators, the women
surveyed were forced to adapt and survive in a male-dominated environment once they took
office. Many of them reported being rebuffed by their male counterparts in several ways. Some
were excluded from certain events or meetings, while others were excluded linguistically as all
members of the chamber were referred to as ‘men’. Others reported “the most subtle form of put
down” – being killed with kindness and treated like a helpless child.211 These women were called
‘darlings’ of the house and the men treated them with exaggerated courtesy. Still others were
excluded from discussions and debates that revolved around ‘masculine’ topics such as economic
measures and were directed instead towards committees that dealt with more ‘feminine’ issues
like education. Some were openly insulted; one state senator reported being told “You should be
in the kitchen, not in the Senate” by a male colleague.212 Regardless of the difficulties faced by
female politicians, the women surveyed were able to overcome male resistance through hard
work and perseverance. Kirkpatrick wrote, “These women not only feel that it is possible to win
professional acceptance and cooperation of their male colleagues, they are convinced that they
have done so.”213
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Like Kirkpatrick, the majority of female legislators surveyed were critical of radical
feminism. She noted, “Approximately 60% of the legislators expressed opposition to the
women’s liberation movement and many criticisms were leveled against the women’s liberation
movement.”214Several of them expressed the view that the movement posited an inaccurate
conception of women’s situations and problems. Few believed that women were exploited by
men and society and very few felt that they were deprived or denied self-fulfillment and
freedom. Furthermore, many of the legislators disapproved of the movement’s denigration of the
role of wife and mother. Likewise, the majority of the legislators viewed women’s liberation as
extremist. “In the eyes of many,” noted Kirkpatrick, “women’s liberation is a branch of radical
politics – and so is regarded with the same distaste as they regard the counter culture, the ‘new’
politics, student riots, dropouts and flag burners.”215 Moreover, many labeled the movement as
partisan. Kirkpatrick asserted that even the moderate wings of the feminist movement, which
included the National Organization of Women, were regarded as partisans of the most liberal
wing of the Democratic Party. Finally, many expressed the view that women’s liberation actually
made it more difficult to be elected into office as all women seeking to do ‘men’s jobs’ were then
being lumped together as “extremist nuts and bra-burners”.216
Not all of the legislators surveyed were opposed to women’s liberation. Kirkpatrick
divided those favorable to the movement into two categories: those that found the movement to
be too strident and ‘far out’ but saw it as useful in broadening the opportunities and rights for
women, and those that explicitly supported and identified with the movement. Approximately
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1/5 of the women surveyed fell into each of these categories. 217 “Disagreements about the
women’s movement within this group of legislators,” noted Kirkpatrick, “illuminate the problem
of uniting women in a single, political action group.”218In fact, the only issue agreed upon by
those surveyed as being a ‘women’s issue’ was the Equal Rights Amendment, which was
supported by all but three of the women surveyed.
In the conclusion of Political Woman, Kirkpatrick speculated on the future for women in
politics. She maintained that in order for women to gain de facto political equality, both a social
and a cultural revolution were required. Many fundamental beliefs about the nature of men,
women, children, and government would have to be abandoned or, at the very least, revised.
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that within the United States cultural and social changes were already
in progress. “Current trends in mass opinion suggest a continuing and increasing demand for
progressive inclusion of women,” she wrote, “they suggest larger numbers of professional
women, increasing efforts to combine family and professional roles. Should they continue,
increased numbers of women will be seeking public office.”219 Despite these trends, Kirkpatrick
remained cautious, observing that preferences change slowly and that change does not always
follow the opinion of the masses, even in democracies. She stated,
The national experience with desegregation seems to prove that, at least under certain
circumstances, it is possible to legislate against mores. This experience seems to suggest
that, at least under certain circumstances, coercion can be used to achieve goals (e.g. the
end to school segregation) that do not have the support of public opinion. Can political
power be used to bring about the full (equal) participation of women in power processes?
Recently some men have used the power vested in their roles to procure a larger voice for
women in politics. The “McGovern-Fraser guidelines” for the 1972 Democratic
Convention decreed that there should be equal numbers of women and men in convention
proceedings. The various “Affirmative Action” programs of recent years provide
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examples of the deliberate use of public policy to achieve greater participation by women
in various social processes from which they had been excluded.220

Kirkpatrick opposed affirmative action policies and the use of quotas to increase
women’s participation in politics, asserting that they sacrificed important values such as equal
opportunity, intra-party democracy, and self-government.221In lieu of the institution of quotas,
she believed the government could expedite greater political participation for women in several
ways including the appointment of more women to higher positions in government and the
withholding of public support from universities and related institutions that discriminated against
females in admissions, and in the awarding of scholarships, fellowships, and other types of aid.
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick asserted that sexual discrimination in law, employment practices,
education, and elsewhere was intolerable and that such practices had to be addressed by the
government. “These and comparable policies can be adopted without serious violations of
existing norms,” she wrote, “and would probably accelerate the trend towards increased
participation of women in public power processes.”222
Political Woman was praised in both academic and non-academic circles. Noted political
scientist Harold D. Lasswell called it a “landmark study…packed with beautifully analyzed
information”.223 Following the book’s publication, Kirkpatrick developed a reputation as an
expert on women in politics that not only boosted her standing amongst her peers, but also
enabled her to extend her political activities outside of the United States. In 1975, the United
States Information Agency asked her to represent the U.S. at a conference held in West Africa.
The gathering was part of the United Nations’ International Women’s Year. At the conference,
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Kirkpatrick delivered lectures on women in public affairs and American democracy.224 Her
foreign language skills served her well as she travelled to the former French colonies of Togo
and Niger.225
Shortly after the publication of Political Woman, Kirkpatrick completed her fourth book,
The New Presidential Elite. This work grew out of her growing disenchantment with the rise of
the New Left within the Democratic Party. In 1972, Kirkpatrick attended the Democratic
National Convention in Miami, Florida where she worked as a speechwriter and pollster for
Hubert Humphrey’s doomed presidential campaign. Kirkpatrick blamed Humphrey’s loss of the
nomination to George McGovern on changes made to the rules regarding delegate selection. In
1968, the Democratic Party’s Commission on Party Structures and Delegate Selection, more
commonly known as the McGovern Commission or the McGovern-Fraser Commission, took
measures to guarantee participation of all interested Democrats. Such measures included the
institution of racial, gender, and age quotas for delegates which, in turn, she asserted, allowed for
the New Left (or ‘new class’ as she labels them in the book) to dominate convention
proceedings. Kirkpatrick’s disgust over this turn of events led to the publication of The New
Presidential Elite and caused her to vote Republican for the first time in her life.226
In The New Presidential Elite, Kirkpatrick utilized data gathered from mail
questionnaires and personal interviews with delegates to both the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions in 1972 in order to determine whether or not a new breed of political elite
had emerged. Drawing on the data collected, Kirkpatrick described the social and personal
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characteristics of the delegates, the various incentives that caused them to participate in
presidential politics, the delegates’ political perspectives, and the various factions extant within
the parties.
Kirkpatrick began by asserting that large numbers of new men and women whose
motives, goals, and ideas differed from those who have dominated American politics in the past
had ascended to power. Until the late 1960s and early 1970s politicians and politics in general
were, for the most part, pragmatic and moderate rather than ideological and extreme. According
to her, such pragmatic politicians had adopted policies favorable to the electorate and had chosen
candidates based on voter appeal. Kirkpatrick attributed the lack of such pragmatism at the 1972
Democratic National Convention to the McGovern reforms which were themselves a result of
many changes occurring in American politics and society. She wrote,
The decline of party identification and the growth of split ticket voting; the appearance of
a third party; the increased reliance on public relations techniques rather than
organization; the decreased confidence in government and in other public institutions; the
appearance of direct action – assassinations, sit-ins, demonstrations, draft evasion; the
progressive breakdown of consensus on such basic values as patriotism, obedience to
law, and compromise; the rise of new kinds of pressure groups and new kinds of
issues… the persistence of ‘cross cutting’ issues that cut across traditional party
alignments; the landslide defeat of the majority party’s presidential candidate;
‘Watergate’ and all that it implies about the decline of restraint in the use of power –
these and many other phenomena of the recent past argue that the American political
system is undergoing quite fundamental changes.227

The changes occurring in American society had a dramatic effect on American politics,
especially within the Democratic Party. According to Kirkpatrick, from the Great Depression to
the mid-1960s, Democratic politics was dominated by welfare issues, “how to guard the society
against drastic and catastrophic economic fluctuations, how to provide minimum economic well-
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being for all, how to use government’s power to stimulate economic growth, how to pay for new
services and public activities – all without destroying the fundamental elements of the free
enterprise system.”228 However, the issues prominent at the 1972 Democratic National
Convention were not the bread and butter welfare state issues on which Democrats were
relatively united. Instead, focus was shifted towards social and cultural issues, which, she
charged, created a preoccupation with the political advantages of white males. Accordingly,
more attention was paid to three groups: African Americans, women, and youth.229
Beginning in 1968, efforts were made within the party to “overcome the effects of past
discrimination” through the use of affirmative action.230 Kirkpatrick opposed the party’s use of
quotas, writing, “Until recently, liberals and liberal doctrines emphasized providing equal access
to power (as to other values). It was believed that abolition of legal discrimination and of
discriminatory practices satisfied the requirement of equal access; from that point, ability,
ambition, hard work, and luck were expected to serve as the basis of selection.”231 In her mind,
the use of quotas violated the hallowed American value of equal opportunity by providing
special assistance to specific groups at the expense of others.232Furthermore, affirmative action
policies pitted the ‘old-timers’ – those who had dominated traditional politics for decades and
who supported traditional, ‘establishment’ candidates such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry
Jackson, against the ‘newcomers’ – those who were stimulated by passionate concern with the
issues of the late 1960s to enter the political arena and who supported more radical candidates
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like George McGovern.233 This division, she charged, crippled the party organization,
exacerbated party divisions, weakened state parties in the recruitment process and in convention
proceedings, and increased the importance of new constituencies at the expense of traditional
ones.234
Kirkpatrick asserted that the McGovern reforms were much more concerned with
participation rather than actual representation. The political scientist pointed out that
representing the rank and file members of a party was not the same as making sure that everyone
who desired to influence the nominating process was able to do so. Moreover, Kirkpatrick
disregarded the commission’s belief that the previous unequal political participation of women,
minorities, and the youth could only be due to discrimination instead of other qualities such as
ambition, interest, or skill.235 Thus, Kirkpatrick found fault with the convention’s adoption of the
doctrine of demographic representation for choosing delegates over the more traditional doctrine
of radical representation. She claimed,
The goal of demographic theories is an assembly in which some specific physical and/or
social characteristics are present in roughly the same proportions as their occurrence in
the total electorate. The goal of the radical theories is an assembly that reflects the
opinions and orientations of the electorate in its decisions on matters of public
policy…proponents of demographic representation propose to achieve the desired
outcome through institutional devices, notably quotas… radical representation relies on
the dynamics of personal ambition, intraparty and interparty competition, and the
preferences of the represented to determine the composition of the representative
assembly… The radical doctrine… does not deny that sex or race may be importantly
related to social positions and political views. But it does not assume that these
characteristics have special, unique, or definitive relevance to political perspectives,
roles, or outcomes. It leaves the decision concerning the relevance of different statuses to
those to be represented… The demographic approach… requires that someone other than
voters determine which of the many statuses of a person are in fact most important: the
McGovern Commission decided in favor of sex, race, and age.236
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According to Kirkpatrick, despite its efforts, the commission failed to make the party
truly representative of both the rank and file party members and the American electorate in its
entirety. To prove this, she examined the age, sex, and race of the delegates of both parties. As
the women’s movement began to grow in the late 1960s and early 1970s, both parties were
forced to pay attention to women’s issues. This led to an increase in the number of women
present at both the RNC and the DNC; however, based on their totals in the general population,
women were under-represented. Forty percent of the delegates at the DNC were women, while
thirty percent of Republican delegates were female. Kirkpatrick maintained that though more
women were represented, many of them, specifically those belonging to the Democratic Party,
were not representative of the majority of women in America. Instead, the majority of female
delegates were affiliated with the women’s liberation movement, a group she described as
‘political amateurs’ who were most concerned with feminist issues and who cared little for party
unity.237
African Americans, the majority of whom were Democrats, increased their influence at
the DNC as they, like women, benefitted from the new quota system. As compared to their total
numbers within the American population (approximately eleven percent), African Americans
were over-represented at the DNC and under-represented at the RNC, constituting sixteen
percent of Democratic delegates and five percent of Republican delegates. Though overrepresented, Kirkpatrick praised black delegates at the DNC for their party loyalty, noting that
though they had distinct views on busing, crime, and welfare, their views on other issues
resembled those of the rank and file members of the party.238 Nonetheless, black delegates who
supported McGovern were not necessarily representative of black party members. For example,
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many African Americans remained divided over the busing issue, with a slight majority favoring
neighborhood schools; however, black McGovern delegates overwhelmingly favored busing.239
Thanks to the baby boom that occurred within the United States in the postwar era, 25
million persons became first-time voters in 1972. Accordingly, the age structure of the two
conventions changed, most notably within the Democratic Party. Twenty-three percent of
Democratic and eight percent of Republican delegates were between the ages of 18 and 29.
Among Democratic delegates, those under the age of 30 were most numerous in the McGovern
ranks. According to Kirkpatrick, these delegates were similar to the new female delegates in that
“the opinions of that group were remote from those of rank and file Democratic identifiers of any
age.”240 What of other age groups? Whereas persons between the ages of 30 and 50 were
overrepresented at the DNC, those aged 40 to 65 were overrepresented at the RNC. Those over
the age of 65 were substantially underrepresented at both conventions: persons over the age of 65
constituted fifteen percent of the total American population, yet Democratic delegates over the
age of 65 comprised only four percent of the total while only nine percent of Republican
delegates were of this age group.241
According to Kirkpatrick, the McGovern Commission, “for reasons known best to its
own members, preoccupied with representation of women, blacks, and youth” paid little
attention to the representation of socioeconomic classes.242She found the social homogeneity of
the two conventions to be interesting, yet not surprising, noting that the vast majority of all
delegates at both conventions boasted higher educational levels, better jobs, and made more
money than the majority of Americans. This was true even of those delegates who were African
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American, female, or under the age of 30. Although in 1970 fifty percent of American families
had incomes under $10,000.00 per year and five percent had incomes over $25,000.00, only five
percent of Republican and thirteen percent of Democratic delegates earned less than $10,000.00.
Meanwhile fifty-eight percent of Republican and thirty-five percent of Democratic delegates
earned more than $25,000.00. Contrasts in education were sharper: forty-two percent of rank and
file Democrats and thirty-five percent of Republicans had less than a high school education, but
only four percent of the Democratic and two percent of the Republican delegates fell into this
category. Though ¾ of Democratic and 2/3 of Republican Party members had only a high-school
education, sixty percent of both conventions’ delegates held a college degree.243
The occupation of delegates matched their educational levels. Kirkpatrick noted that
relatively small numbers of self-employed businessmen, farmers, and workers were present at
the DNC as compared to previous years.244Businessmen, farmers, and workers constituted selfinterest groups that were concerned with material rewards and economic incentives that
Kirkpatrick deemed as legitimate incentives for political action. In lieu of such typically
‘democratic’ groups there was an increase in the number of middle-class professional elites, in
particular lawyers and teachers, who were, she argued, more concerned with the symbolic
aspects of politics. Kirkpatrick paid special attention to the rise to political prominence of
professionals she termed “symbol specialists” – teachers, advertisers, journalists, clergy,
publishers, and commentators. Such groups were experts in the production, manipulation, and
communication of the symbols with which persons interpret events, define goals, and attribute
meanings. According to Kirkpatrick, symbol specialists not only communicate values and myths,
they were also “guardians, destroyers, and creators of the collective myths that bind together and
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rip apart communities and societies.”245 The majority of symbol specialists present at the DNC
were critics of the traditional culture and supporters of McGovern. Therefore, they used their
communication skills to focus attention on issues with which they were concerned. Kirkpatrick
noted that politics dominated by such professionals, “is likely to have a higher ideological
content and the political process is more likely to be conceived as an arena for setting public
agendas and resolving moral problems than as an arena for winning and compromising material
interests.”246
Consequently, this ‘new class’, which dominated the Democratic Convention, exhibited
less party loyalty and deemphasized winning elections as the party’s principal and legitimate
goal. In her studies of both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions Kirkpatrick
found that an emphasis on winning was high among the Republicans and those Democrats that
supported ‘traditional candidates’ such as Hubert Humphrey. According to Kirkpatrick, an
emphasis on winning stimulated the parties’ efforts to broaden their coalitions and to harmonize
differences between various factions. Those, such as the ‘new class’, who did not emphasize
winning and party loyalty, only increased controversy within the party over various issues.247
Kirkpatrick questioned delegates about their stances regarding a number of issues
including authority, foreign affairs, economic issues, welfare policies, race relations, and crime
in order to ascertain what other differences existed between the New Left or ‘new class’ and the
more established party members. When it came to viewpoints concerning authority, McGovern
supporters exhibited a higher disrespect toward it than traditional Democrats and the vast
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majority of Republicans.248 Kirkpatrick’s interest in authority stemmed from its relationship to
legitimacy and force – legitimate governments have the authority to utilize force to coerce
compliance with their decisions. Members of the New Left repeatedly challenged the legitimacy
and authority of the American government and its policies, and consistently opposed the state’s
use of coercive power, both at home with police and national guardsmen, and abroad with the
U.S. military. Kirkpatrick noted that a low opinion of government and authority was relatively
new on the American political scene, at least since the New Deal and World War II, and that
such attitudes were bound to have important effects on the political system. She claimed,
Cynicism about government and governors can justify diverse assaults on the public
order. The demand for radical change is one well-known response. Corruption is
another… the belief that government is corrupt itself becomes a corrupting factor. When
the political elite holds such beliefs, political dialogue is likely to be shrill or cynical or
both. Redemptive zeal and cynical manipulation are the normal products of a loss of
confidence in the political institutions of society.249

Cynicism, along with the questioning of authority and the legitimate use of force, were
also representative of the New Left’s attitudes towards American foreign relations. According to
Kirkpatrick, several factors caused Americans to re-examine American military and foreign
commitments in the late 1960s and early 1970s including Vietnam and the Nixon
Administration’s emphasis on détente. Of fundamental importance was the emergence of a new
generation who had no personal memory of either the Nazi holocaust or communist
expansionism. Though delegates at both the RNC and the DNC remained divided on many
foreign policy issues, in particular Vietnam and the American presence in Southeast Asia, the
McGovern delegates were most opposed to the use of American military force and to the
maintenance of American military superiority. Instead of force, they favored greater U.S. support
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for the United Nations and increased economic aid to needy nations. Kirkpatrick related this
attitude to their perception of the world, noting that if one viewed the world as a dangerous
place, where the aggression of the great communist powers was only kept in check by the fear of
retaliation, then it was important for the most powerful non-communist nation, the United States,
to maintain military superiority and observe its commitment to collective security agreements
and treaties negotiated during the postwar years. However, if one believed that the world was not
dangerous and that communists did not pose a threat to the vital interests of the United States
then it did not make sense to maintain the world’s most powerful military establishment. From
this point of view, it was more appropriate to embrace a strategy of international cooperation.250
In addition to their lack of respect towards authority and Cold War policies, the New Left
or ‘new class’ differed from traditional Democrats in their economic views. With the economy
showing signs of “acute strain in shifting from a wartime to a peacetime basis and from the
impact of Republican economics”, economic issues – an ever higher cost of living, higher taxes,
and increasing unemployment numbers – were considered most pressing to the American
electorate as a whole in 1972.251 In order to establish the economic orientation of the delegates,
questions were asked about the role of government in the economy and attitudes towards
business interests and labor. Overall, Kirkpatrick found the results interesting, though not
unexpected. For one, the results testified to the withering away of laissez-faire economics by
demonstrating that, at least on the elite level, the economic ‘right’ did not exist, for nearly all
delegates – Republican and Democrat – believed that the government should take action to
combat inflation.252 Second, the delegates’ respective attitudes towards business interests and
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trade unions indicated the persistence of traditional differences between the parties. Democrats
were more favorable towards unions than Republicans, while Republicans were more favorable
towards business interests than Democrats.
At the same time, there were marked differences among the supporters of Humphrey,
McGovern, and Wallace which, as stated by Kirkpatrick, demonstrated a weakening of the
historic alliance between organized labor and the Democratic Party. Whereas Humphrey
delegates were much more favorable towards organized labor, Wallace delegates remained
hostile towards them. Furthermore, Humphrey delegates, while being the most pro-labor of all
Democratic groups, were also the most favorable to business interests. The New Left’s animosity
towards business was much higher than that of the other groups, yet this animosity was not offset by widespread support for labor. “Apparently McGovern delegates viewed both the major
proponents on the economic scene,” Kirkpatrick noted, “big labor and big business, with a
certain distaste.”253 Such distaste was acknowledged by labor when the nation’s largest union,
the AFL-CIO, refused to endorse McGovern’s candidacy in 1972.254
Yet another indicator of delegates’ economic orientation was their view on welfare
policies. According to Kirkpatrick, during the early 1960s the majority of Americans agreed with
the proposition that governments should provide public funds to help those unable to help
themselves to achieve a minimum standard of physical well-being; however, by the late 1960s,
welfare policies had “collided with the achievement ethic”.255 President Johnson’s ‘War on
Poverty’ defined larger numbers of people as ‘poor’, relaxed eligibility requirements for public
relief, and increasingly abandoned policies that able-bodied recipients of welfare be required to
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work.256 Kirkpatrick charged McGovern’s supporters with attacking the achievement ethic (or
work ethic) by backing the use public funds to support “able-bodied but lazy persons”.257
Conversely, the majority of Wallace and Nixon supporters were in favor of the obligation to
work, while Humphrey delegates remained divided on welfare issues.258
McGovern delegates also differed from traditional Democrats, Wallace supporters, and
Republicans in matters concerning race relations. By 1972, controversy concerning government
action in the field of race relations centered on busing school children across district lines in
order to achieve racial balance. “Busing children out of neighborhood schools involves mixing
cultures and classes as well as races,” Kirkpatrick noted, “It deprives parents who must use
public schools of control over the environment in which their children are socialized.”259 She
went on to point out that the busing issue and civil disobedience were examples of how questions
of race and civil rights had become intertwined with social policy. McGovern delegates were
overwhelmingly in favor of both busing and civil disobedience, while Wallace supporters and the
majority of Republicans were opposed to both. Moreover, the majority of Humphrey supporters
were able to make distinctions between civil rights and social policy by approving of civil rights
and disapproving of busing and civil disobedience.260
Following its publication, the book received mixed reviews. One reviewer praised the
book for its “extremely rich and intelligently analyzed” data, yet noted that it was “too long,
discursive, repetitive, and fragmentary, with bits of theory tacked on here and there”.261Though
this commentator agreed with Kirkpatrick’s overall assertion that a new breed of political elite
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had evolved, one that was motivated primarily by value concerns and issue commitments, others
were less sympathetic. One critic claimed it was not methodologically sound to choose an
extreme case (1972) and compare it with an arbitrarily chosen baseline (1948 and 1952).
Moreover, it was difficult to prove that an evolution in the political elite had occurred since
similar data did not exist for national conventions between 1952 and 1972. Finally, the author
pointed out that the ‘new breed’ Kirkpatrick described was barely present within the Republican
Party, thus the ‘new breed’ may well represent only a short-term phenomenon within the
Democratic Party.262
Overall, it is obvious that Kirkpatrick found the establishment of the McGovern reforms
to be disastrous for the Democratic Party. Whereas some saw the McGovern reforms as a
landmark in the struggle for party democracy, an emancipation proclamation that freed the party
from control by bosses and entrenched interests, others viewed them as a mistaken, though wellintentioned effort that ended up crippling party organization, exacerbating party differences, and
making electoral victory nearly impossible. To others, the reforms constituted “a naked power
grab by one faction that used its control of the reform commission to write rules that assured it an
advantage in the contest for the nomination.”263It is clear from her work, especially by her
assertion that most delegates were chosen as “supporters of particular presidential candidates”264
that Kirkpatrick fell into the latter category.
Conclusions
During the 1960s and 1970s, Kirkpatrick’s interest in totalitarianism and non-democratic
regimes, an interest sparked during her college years and cemented by her exposure to the first-
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hand accounts of fascist and communist refugees, did not wane. Her fascination with
authoritarianism led her to choose Argentina during the Peronist period as the topic of her
dissertation. In her analysis of Peronism and Argentine politics in the decade following Perón’s
downfall, Kirkpatrick asserted that Peronism did not constitute fascism or any form of
totalitarianism; rather it was a blend of authoritarian and democratic elements, common in Latin
American regimes. The Argentine political system, similar to those of other Latin American
nations, was characterized by a limited experience in democratic methods, an entrenched
oligarchy, a military that often interfered with politics, the use of violence by various groups, and
direct political action such as the use of strikes and lobbying activities. Such systems involved a
variety of legitimate political behaviors including voting, oligarchical control, military coup,
violence, and strikes. According to Kirkpatrick, as long as citizens were able to utilize such
methods to influence the political system, a certain degree of political action and freedom
existed.
Despite this, Kirkpatrick was careful to point out that Peronism was not necessarily a
stepping stone on the path to liberal democracy. Based on the history of Argentina, Kirkpatrick
deemed it unlikely that the country’s political system would become a full-fledged democracy in
the near future. Though this assertion seemed to be at odds with one of the major contentions of
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, namely that authoritarian regimes were capable of evolving into
approximate democratic states thereby warranting American support, this was not necessarily the
case. Kirkpatrick believed that it was impossible to create democracy anywhere, at any given
time; instead, democratic values and institutions must develop over time. Even the United States,
the beacon of democracy to the world, did not emerge as a mature democratic state in the late
18th century following its independence from Great Britain; it took another two hundred years for
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political equality to be available to all Americans. Accordingly, the U.S. should be patient and
continue to support authoritarian regimes, especially those in Latin America whose political
systems included some democratic characteristics. Such governments were preferable to
totalitarian regimes, and were, with American support and encouragement, capable of evolving
into liberal states over time.
Kirkpatrick’s belief that political change should occur slowly was not limited to the
evolution of democracy in nations around the world. One of her major critiques of the rise of the
New Left within American society and politics involved the movement’s demands for
instantaneous social and cultural change. This is particularly true of the radical feminist and civil
rights organizations. Though she was a feminist and an advocate for civil rights, Kirkpatrick
supported only governmental action that would guarantee political equality and nondiscrimination. Once political and social equality were guaranteed, hard work, ambition, and
ability would determine the success of an individual. She opposed the establishment of gender
and racial quotas due to her belief that such laws violated the American tradition of equal
opportunity by providing special assistance to specific groups. Moreover, Kirkpatrick remained
highly critical of legislation that went against social mores or violated existing social and cultural
norms. She maintained that society’s attitudes towards, and beliefs about, women and minorities
could not be changed overnight via legislation. Such changes could occur only gradually as more
women and African Americans took advantage of available opportunities in order to advance
themselves within society.
In addition to its demand for radical change, Kirkpatrick disapproved of the New Left’s
methods and goals. Though she condoned the use of violence, strikes, and direct action in
authoritarian regimes as legitimate political activities that occurred outside of the electoral arena,
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Kirkpatrick found similar actions by student protestors, anti-war activists, and black power
organizations to be unacceptable within the United States. In fact, Kirkpatrick labeled such
activities as ‘fascist’. American radicals were, to her, nothing less than totalitarians whose
ultimate goal was to institute a social and cultural revolution. Though her classifications of the
New Left as ‘fascist’ and ‘totalitarian’ were extreme and exaggerated, based on her educational
background, it is not surprising that Kirkpatrick viewed the New Left as political extremists,
similar to both the fascists who had brought about the fall of the Weimar Republic and to the
communists who had taken over Russia and China, whose goal was to destroy the American
democratic experiment by fundamentally restructuring American society and culture.
Given her beliefs about the nature of the New Left, Kirkpatrick was outraged by its
increasing power within the Democratic Party. Her frustration reached its zenith in 1972 when,
due to rule changes in delegate selection, the Democratic National Convention was dominated by
the New Left and its various agendas. Kirkpatrick’s antipathy towards what she viewed as the
hijacking of the Democratic Party by leftist extremist groups caused her to vote Republican for
the first time in her life. Immediately following the 1972 elections, the political scientist, along
with other centrist liberals, formed the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), an
organization dedicated to reversing the rule changes which had allowed for the New Left’s
temporary takeover of the party. In their zealous efforts to rid the party of radicalism, many
members of the CDM, including Kirkpatrick, were pushed further to the right, so much so, that
by the late 1970s they were no longer viewed as liberals; instead, they became known as
neoconservatives.
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Chapter Three
By the end of the 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick had become part of the burgeoning
neoconservative movement. Though she remained a member of the Democratic Party, the
lingering effects of the New Left’s power both within the party and upon American society had
pushed the political scientist further to the right of the political spectrum. Her transformation
from liberal Democrat to neoconservative was also fueled by her disenchantment with détente
policies and the increasing American tolerance for totalitarianism such policies represented.
Accordingly, Kirkpatrick became a member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority – an
organization determined to defeat the influence of the New Left within the Democratic Party in
both domestic and foreign affairs; the Committee on the Present Danger – a bipartisan group
dedicated to the destruction of détente policies which demanded an increase in American
military spending; and the American Enterprise Institute – a conservative think tank whose
members shared her distaste for détente and the New Left. As a neoconservative activist,
Kirkpatrick was a vocal detractor of the Carter Administration’s foreign policies. Following the
overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979, Kirkpatrick
published a scathing critique of the administration’s policies entitled “Dictatorships and Double
Standards”. The article, a summary of her evolved political philosophy, pointed out several
distinctions between non-democratic regimes, an analysis that became known as the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine. The piece outlined the necessary requirements for democracy, criticized the Carter
administration’s misunderstanding of revolutions and the nature of right-wing governments, and
denounced the administration’s utilization of modernization theory as the basis for a foreign
policy. The article caught the eye of Republican presidential hopeful, Ronald Reagan, who
recruited Kirkpatrick to work for his campaign and later, his administration.
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Coalition for a Democratic Majority
Nearly immediately following McGovern’s loss to Nixon in the 1972 Presidential
election Kirkpatrick, along with several other like-minded liberals, formed an organization
known as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM). The purpose of the CDM was to
wrest control of the Democratic Party away from the New Left by both reversing the rule
changes instituted through the McGovern-Fraser Commission and revamping the party platform.
Members included former Humphrey aid and Kirkpatrick family friend Max Kampelman, Civil
Rights leader and activist Bayard Rustin, Midge Decter, Editor in Chief of Commentary
magazine Norman Podhoretz, political scientist and future National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Soviet historian Richard Pipes, and attorney and former Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, among others. The organization’s manifesto, “Come Home,
Democrats”, written by Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter (and subsequently ‘toned down’
by Kirkpatrick) appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post on December 7,
1972.265
The manifesto began by claiming that Nixon’s victory did not represent a major political
shift to the right in the United States; rather, it demonstrated the American people’s rejection of
New Left policies. Such a decisive refutation should serve as a wake-up call for the party to
return to its traditional roots. According to the coalition, the Democratic tradition involved the
following: the creation of an ever fairer distribution of the fruits of the country’s vast wealth and
productivity; a sustained effort, through compensatory action, to give those who had been
disadvantaged either by birth or background a full opportunity to compete as equals in American
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life; a sober but spirited assumption of America’s share of responsibility for the establishment of
a more secure international community; a knowledge that without democratic order there could
be no justice and without justice there could be no democratic order; a belief that democracy
worked and that it worked because American voters were wisely and prudently aware of their
own self-interests.266
The manifesto goes on to describe the various ways in which the ‘new politics’, or the
New Left, had undermined the traditional beliefs and values of the Democratic Party. In
particular, the CDM faulted the New Left’s neo-isolationism in foreign affairs, its depiction of
American society as immoral and sick, its penchant for disruptive demonstrations, and its
insistence on utilizing quotas in order to bring about social equality. Such activities had
marginalized traditional constituents of the party, and, worse yet, had allowed the Republicans,
“a party so long and so accurately known as the party of privilege,” to represent themselves for
the first time as the champions of the values and concerns that had long been a part of the
Democratic Party’s tradition.267 “Come Home, Democrats” concludes with an appeal for likeminded persons to join the group and support the coalition’s efforts to rescue the Democratic
Party:
to all who believe this society must end all forms of discrimination against some without
recourse to discrimination against others; to all who believe in a pluralistic political
process in which no single group or class enjoys a special moral status: to all who believe
that, regardless of past miscalculations or failures of policy, US involvement in
international affairs continues to be necessary to the establishment of a stable and viable
international order; to all who believe that while our society must be vastly improved, it
has not failed.268
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Until recently, historians have paid little attention to the Coalition for a Democratic
Majority, except to note that many of its founders and members ended up in the neoconservative
camp. When it has been discussed, the organization is often dismissed as ultimately
ineffective.269 This may have to do with the fact that the CDM was a small, underfinanced
association which only produced newsletters and pamphlets, and then only sporadically. Despite
these institutional deficiencies, Justin Vaïsse, author of Neoconservatism: The Biography of a
Movement, views the Coalition for a Democratic Majority as a milestone in the evolution of
neoconservatism and credits the group for ushering in what he calls the ‘Second Age of
Neoconservatism’.
In his work, Vaïsse identifies three ‘ages’ of neoconservatism, the first of which was born
out of domestic political issues, in particular, various social policies of the 1960s that
successfully ruptured the vital center of American politics. Members of the first age of
neoconservatism consisted largely of New York intellectuals and former radicals who began
criticizing the limits of the social policies largely associated with the Great Society. Vaïsse
contends that the second age of neoconservatism was born in 1968 and solidified by 1972 with
the creation of the CDM. This age was distinguished from the previous one by two factors. First,
neoconservatives moved beyond purely intellectual debates over policies and became actively
involved in the political process. And second, they expanded their interests to include foreign
affairs as well as domestic issues.270 Those associated with the second age of neoconservatism
were primarily Democratic Party members who were upset by the rise of the New Left. Vaïsse
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dates the third age of neoconservatism from1995 and argues that it consisted only of right-wing
conservatives who were concerned primarily with increasing the use of American power abroad.
The first priority for the members of the CDM was to retake control of the Democratic
Party; therefore, during the first two years of its existence the organization focused on
restructuring the reforms that had allowed for the New Left to dominate the 1972 Democratic
National Convention. Beginning in 1973, coalition members took part in party efforts to revamp
the delegate selection process and involved themselves in rewriting the Democratic Party’s
charter. Their efforts towards re-empowering party regulars and traditional party members
through work on the Mikulski Commission were somewhat successful. The Mikulski
Commission, also known as the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure,
organized in 1973 and led by future Maryland Senator Barbara Mikulski, was given the task of
reforming the delegate selection process for the 1976 Democratic National Convention. Specific
quotas for delegates based on race, gender, and age were shelved by the commission, along with
the approval of a provision that allowed for greater participation by party regulars.271
Having, it believed, rescued the party from political extremists, the CDM began turning
its attention towards foreign policy issues. This turn away from domestic policies by the
coalition was also facilitated by the decline of the various protest movements of the 1960s
counterculture. In February of 1974 the Foreign Affairs and Defense Task Force was created
within the CDM. Jeane Kirkpatrick became a member of the Policy Drafting Committee of the
task force, a committee that included Eugene Rostow, former Undersecretary of State George
Ball, Norman Podhoretz, former Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, union activist Albert
Shanker, and several academics such as Samuel P. Huntington, Robert James Maddox, Lucian
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W. Pye, John P. Roche, and Paul Seabury.272 Vaïsse credits this task force with producing a
neoconservative foreign policy.
According to Vaïsse, the neoconservative foreign policy espoused by the CDM contained
five elements: the defense of democracy, the promotion of human rights, the assertion of
American military power, support for Israel, and decreased emphasis on multilateral action and
the United Nations.273 Coalition members strongly believed in the defense of democracy: the
United States, as the only democratic superpower, had a duty to protect and support other
democratic states. Though skeptical of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the CDM was a strong
champion of human rights, primarily in communist nations. They worked with the media to bring
about greater awareness of human rights issues and held several events and fundraising dinners
in the late 1970s to support communist dissidents and human rights advocates from the Soviet
Union and the Eastern Bloc.274 Kirkpatrick and the other members of the Foreign Affairs and
Defense Task Force were dedicated Cold Warriors, and as such they called for an increase in
defense spending so that the U.S. military might thwart any efforts made by the Soviets to
expand. Geopolitical concerns, such as the expansion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East,
constituted one of several reasons why support for Israel was such a large part of the
neoconservative foreign policy vision. Other factors, including the defense of democracy in the
region, along with the strong ties between American Jews and Israel on one side, and between
American Jews and the Democratic Party on the other, were also important.275Finally, members
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of the CDM wanted the U.S. to distance itself from the United Nations and multilateral action in
general.
Having established a framework for the conduct of foreign relations, the task force began
criticizing those diplomatic strategies that failed to fall under the purview of their
neoconservative vision, namely the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente. In July of 1974, the
Foreign Policy Task Force of the CDM released a statement entitled “The Quest for Détente”.
This report, issued in response to Kissinger’s call for public debate on American-Soviet
relations, was one of the first major critiques of the Nixon Administration’s efforts at
rapprochement.276
In “The Quest for Détente”, the group claimed to support American efforts to achieve
‘true’ détente – arms limitations treaties and mutually beneficial economic agreements with the
Soviets. However, according to the CDM, three conditions were necessary in order to attain
‘true’ détente: an end to the race for military supremacy, along with agreements on arms
limitations based on parity; a more humane attitude by the Soviets toward the movement of
people and ideas and toward the rule of law; and respect by the Soviets of the Charter of the
United Nations governing the use of international force both in guerrilla and conventional
warfare.277Not surprisingly, the coalition did not envision the meeting of these prerequisites
anytime in the foreseeable future. “It takes two to achieve détente,” the CDM asserted, and in the
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minds of the task force, only the United States was seriously engaged in the process.278 Given the
coalition’s conclusions, the organization found much to condemn in the Nixon policies.
The CDM attacked Nixon’s claims that détente had been achieved and that a new
relationship, one based on mutual understanding, had begun between the Soviet Union and the
United States. The group declared these statements to be both preposterous and dangerous –
dangerous because the belief that they were true led to ‘wishful thinking’, which had a
remarkable power to reshape the appearance of reality, and preposterous because such claims
were not true. The CDM pointed out that the Soviet Union had not changed its behavior; instead
it continued to both repress and undermine democratic movements and governments and provide
support for terrorism, guerilla warfare, and wars of aggression around the globe. Furthermore,
the group argued that détente was an American concept, one completely foreign to the Soviet
Union, and that the American tendency to project its values and motives onto others was
inappropriate. Instead of détente, the Soviets viewed American overtures as the acceptance of
‘peaceful coexistence’ and a retreat from containment. Moreover, according to the report, the
Soviets believed that détente policies stemmed from an American reappraisal of its values and
concerns, a reassessment brought about through intimidation by the increasing military power of
the Soviet Union.279
Though the members of the CDM dismissed this notion that the U.S. initiated detente due
to intimidation, the group was quick to sound the alarm regarding the growth of Soviet
conventional and nuclear forces. The task force pointed to the recent rapprochement with China
as evidence of the growing threat posed by Russian armed forces. “The change in relationships
between the U.S. and China, did not arise through a change in the totalitarian character of the
278
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Chinese regime,” the organization argued, “or through a resurgence of good will toward
Americans that lay dormant in the hearts of the Chinese people…China ultimately approached
the United States for one compelling reason – because it perceived a mortal threat in the Soviet
mobilization of fifty divisions in Siberia, and in the Soviet penetration of India, Southeast Asia,
and the South Pacific. The United States is the only power on earth that can check what China
believes to be a genuine danger of the military power of the Soviet Union.”280
Consequently, the group urged the U.S. government to increase its military spending so
that American nuclear and conventional forces would remain superior to those of the Soviet
Union. The CDM noted that in this area the U.S. and its allies were at a disadvantage when
compared to the Soviets and Warsaw Pact members due to differences among their political
systems. The domestic political repercussions of détente could be controlled and regulated in
closed, communist societies as there was no risk that the rhetoric of Soviet-American détente or
rapprochement could cause independent-minded legislatures to cut defense spending or withdraw
armed forces from Europe. Conversely, the rhetoric and arguments employed in Nixon’s
proclamations of détente in the U.S. had worked to increase the public’s demand for a unilateral
and massive reduction of American military forces.281 Thus, by pointing out the Chinese fear of
the Soviets, highlighting Soviet interventions throughout the globe, and repeatedly emphasizing
the growth of the Soviet military, the organization hoped to overcome the “mood of relaxation
which President Nixon’s claims of ‘détente’ have inspired”.282
The authors of “The Quest for Détente” also criticized the economic dimensions of Nixon
and Kissinger’s policies. They pointed out that the U.S. had gained nothing substantial in return
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for its subsidized sale of grains and the extension of credit for industrial goods at low rates to the
Soviets. Though the CDM claimed to favor mutually beneficial economic relations between the
two superpowers, it noted that this was unlikely to happen since the Soviets had very few
resources that the U.S. needed. The Soviet Union did possess rare precious metals and large
quantities of oil and gas, all of which they proposed to sell to the U.S. in exchange for
technological information and capital, but the CDM opposed such trade agreements for a variety
of reasons. First, the coalition argued that it would be unwise on the part of the U.S. to become
dependent on the Soviets for strategic resources such as oil, for the Soviets could, at any time,
hold these resources hostage. Second, by providing the Soviet Union with capital, the U.S. would
be enabling the Kremlin to continue to finance its large military. After all, the group argued, the
Soviets could finance their own industrial endeavors if they would only divert funds away from
defense spending and towards domestic industrial production, something they consistently
refused to do. Finally, should the U.S. provide the Soviets with advanced technology and large
sums of money, its control over and exploitation of labor would give them an unfair advantage in
the market.283 The CDM maintained that they would only support economic assistance and longterm credits to the Soviets in exchange for clear, substantial political benefits, the specifics of
which they did not describe.
Yet another criticism of détente made by Kirkpatrick and company centered on the
ideological differences between the two superpowers. In the decades following the end of World
War II, anti-communism in the U.S. lost its fervor, so much so that ‘anti-communism’ in the
1970s was largely associated with McCarthyism and witch-hunts. In the meantime, Americans
had fallen prey to ‘convergence theory’ which held that as both American and Soviet
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industrialized societies began facing similar environmental, organizational, and technological
problems the differences between the two would subside. Nixon’s claims of having both
achieved détente and forged a new relationship with the Soviets based upon mutual
understanding served to further undermine anti-communist attitudes in the U.S. Conversely, the
same could not be said of the Soviets whose belief in communism required there to be a
bourgeois capitalist enemy. To abandon its ideological hostility to Western, capitalist nations
would be tantamount to the rejection of communism, the belief system that gave the Soviet
Union legitimacy both at home and abroad. Therefore, despite American efforts to ease tensions
between the two superpowers, the Soviets would never cease to view the U.S. as their major
ideological enemy.284
“The Quest for Détente” declared that it was in the national interest of the United States
in world politics to achieve and maintain a balance of power which could effectively deter
general war. The best way for Americans to do this would be to solidify its relationship with
China, maintain complete solidarity with European and Pacific allies, and do ‘all that is required’
to deter Soviet nuclear and conventional power. The CDM acknowledged that the U.S. should
persist in pursuing détente; however it should do so without any misconceptions concerning the
Soviet Union. The threat of Soviet military power could not be taken lightly, for if “we allow
ourselves to be deceived by a myth of détente, reduce our military strength, and permit our
alliances to erode” the safety of democracy in America could be at stake.285Despite this dire
warning, the CDM remained convinced that the U.S. was up to the challenge. The nation had the
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resources to do it. All Americans required was a common understanding of foreign policy goals
and the recovery of “our confidence and our will.”286
As a member of the CDM’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Task Force, Jeane Kirkpatrick
was a major contributor to the critiques of the Nixon-Kissinger policies. However, the political
science professor’s denunciations of détente were not limited to those voiced by the coalition.
Given her educational background, Kirkpatrick naturally distrusted the Soviet Union, and
consequently, American efforts towards normalizing relations with the communist state. She
often referenced the work of Hannah Arendt in her criticism of détente, noting that wishful
thinking about the nature of communism had blinded the world to its evil. “Again and again in
our century,” she wrote, “the will to disbelieve the horrible has overwhelmed our sense of reality
and left us unable to take prudent precautions.”287 Kirkpatrick blamed this will to disbelieve or
‘wishful thinking’ on utopian dreams of universal equality.
Kirkpatrick was quite critical of utopianism which she likened to rationalism as both
were concerned with abstract theories rather than concrete realities. She wrote,
The rationalist spirit assumes that human nature in the future may be qualitatively
different than in the past. It views non-rational factors such as sentiment, habit, and
custom as obstacles that can and should be overcome. It views each situation as a tabula
rasa on which a plan can be imposed and views experience in other times and places as
having no relevance… Because it assumes that man and society can be brought to
conform to a preferred plan, the rationalist orientation tends powerfully to see everything
as possible and prospects for progress unlimited.288

Such utopian or rationalist thinking had been projected upon the Soviet Union by those who had
instituted détente. According to Kirkpatrick, policy-makers had ignored the fact that the nature of
286
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the Soviet system was a totalitarian one, derived from a tradition of oriental despotism and from
a tsarist synthesis of economic, social, and bureaucratic state power.289 Thus, the American
expectation that the proliferation of economic and cultural ties and rewards would serve as
incentives to restrain Soviet expansionism was based upon the Nixon Administration’s
willingness to ignore and disbelieve historical realities and to substitute rationalism for realism.
Based on such flawed theories, “unprecedented incentives were developed; yet unprecedented
aggression nonetheless occurred.”290
Kirkpatrick also criticized détente because of the policy’s basis in stimulus-response and
frustration-aggression theories. According to these theories, American military superiority served
as a provocation to the Soviets which, in turn, stimulated countermeasures such as the Soviet
military build-up. Should the United States exhibit restraint in its own military build-up, this
would quiet Soviet fears and produce reciprocal restraint allowing for arms limitations treaties to
be signed and a relaxation of tensions all around. Kirkpatrick declared that such theories were
ludicrous: it was unrealistic to believe that the United States could control the actions of other
nations, especially the Soviet Union, by merely taking care not to be threatening. Furthermore,
Kirkpatrick maintained that frustration-aggression and stimulus-response theories placed danger
into a psychological rather than military category, causing the global environment to appear to be
less threatening. Thus, the utopianism and rationalism of détente provided Americans with a
subjective sense of security that ignored the totalitarian, revolutionary, irrational, and
expansionist nature of the Soviet Union.291
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Many neoconservatives, including Kirkpatrick, also viewed détente as the revival of 19th
century European realpolitik policies where nations jockeyed for position and influence within a
stabilizing equilibrium, balanced and measured by professional diplomats. CDM members
maintained that such a view did not accurately describe the U.S. and Soviet rivalry for it missed
the ideological qualities inherent in modern global politics. Therefore, détente or realpolitik
constituted the “vulgar substitution of expedience for principle,” which caused the nation to
sacrifice its moral principles for a cynical appeal to national self-interest.292 Kirkpatrick
maintained that U.S. foreign policy must always serve moral goals. “The notion that foreign
policy should be oriented toward balance of power politics, or realpolitik,” she wrote, “ is totally
foreign to the American tradition and, in fact, foreign to the American scene today. All of our
wars…were justified in terms of the protection and extension of universal human rights.”293 In
her mind, and in the minds of the neoconservatives, the extension of American power and
influence in the world amounted to a human rights program in and of itself. For despite any flaws
in the American system, liberal capitalism, with its emphasis on freedom, liberty, and equality,
was morally superior to communist totalitarianism.
The Committee on the Present Danger
Shortly after the publication of “The Quest for Détente” in 1974, Eugene Rostow called
for the formation of a bipartisan foreign affairs lobbying group that came to be known as the
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). According to Vaïsse, the most important precursor to
the Committee on the Present Danger was the CDM. Rostow, along with other members of the
CDM, felt that the coalition’s foreign policy task force was not as effective in the fight against
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détente as it needed to be.294 Consequently, the CPD was created. The organization that was
formed in 1976 was inspired by both a previous version of the CPD that was active in the early
1950s, and by the findings of Team B – a group of outside ‘experts’ sent to ‘re-evaluate’ the
CIA’s intelligence reports on Soviet missile and military capabilities in the mid-1970s. Several
members of the CDM became members of the CPD, including Jeane Kirkpatrick who was
invited to join by family friend, Max Kampelman. Other ties existed between the groups as
several CDM members, including Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, and Paul Wolfowitz, were members
of Team B. Furthermore, both CPDs could trace their intellectual origins to Nitze, either through
NSC-68, or the reports of Team B.295
In September of 1976, the Committee on the Present Danger drew up its rules of
operation. The purpose of the CPD would be to facilitate national discussion of foreign policy
issues. The organization claimed it existed only to educate the public and that its judgments were
based on a full, fair, and objective factual foundation.296 In order to educate the masses about
national security issues, the CPD planned to conduct and participate in seminars and
conferences, publish pamphlets and articles, and advertise its findings through all forms of
media. The group pledged to stay out of electoral politics and to refrain from supporting or
opposing nominees for appointive offices. The committee declared that it was concerned only
with broad principles and policy objectives. “It is not within our purview or our competence to
comment on the intricacies and complexities of short-range tactics or maneuvers,” the group
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maintained, “Our concern is with strategies and goals… not with all of the ramifications and
details of its day-to-day implementation.”297
Having established what the CPD would and would not do, committee members focused
on drafting the organization’s manifesto ,“Common Sense and the Common Danger”, which was
released at a press conference in Washington, DC on November 11, 1976.298 In its manifesto, the
CPD warned that the primary threat to the United States, to world peace, and to human freedom
was the Soviet drive for world domination and the unparalleled military build-up orchestrated by
Kremlin during the previous decade. The group declared that such a massive military build-up
could not be explained or justified by reasons of national defense; rather it was intended to
enable the Soviet Union to play a more dominant role on the global stage. This increase in Soviet
power, Kirkpatrick and her colleagues argued, threatened the political independence of
America’s allies, fair access to raw materials, and freedom of the seas.299 The U.S. must meet
this challenge by increasing military spending, which was at an all-time low according to the
committee, on both nuclear and conventional forces and research and development. Only from a
strong foundation could the U.S. “pursue a positive and confident diplomacy”. 300 Should the
U.S. ignore the Soviet danger and not opt for military preparedness,
… we shall become second best to the Soviet Union in overall military strength; our
alliances will weaken; our promising rapprochement with China could be reversed. Then
we could find ourselves isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of
Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming preponderance of power. Our national survival
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itself would be in peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between war
and acquiescence under pressure.301

In 1976, as the United States celebrated its bicentennial, Kirkpatrick and the Coalition for
a Democratic Majority began preparing for the Democratic National Convention and the
forthcoming election season. The group threw its support behind Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson
for the Democratic nomination. Vaïsse devotes a significant amount of attention to Jackson in his
work, noting that the second age neoconservatives were often referred to as “Scoop Jackson
Democrats”.302 Jackson’s attitude toward the Soviet Union was relentlessly hawkish; he had
consistently fought for increased defense spending since the 1950s, and, in the 1970s, had
successfully undermined Nixon and Kissinger’s détente policies with the passage of the JacksonVanick Amendment. This initiative made favorable economic and trade agreements between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union dependent upon the liberalization of emigration policies by the
Soviets for Russian Jews.303 Jackson’s Senate staff which included Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, and William Kristol ,was labelled a ‘neoconservative nursery’ by
Vaïsse.304
Jeane Kirkpatrick referred to Jackson as both a mentor and a friend and praised him for
his consistency and integrity.305 In addition to analyzing polling data for him, she travelled with
Jackson across the country during his campaign as one of the Senator’s ‘issue’s people’.
Disappointed by Jackson’s loss to Carter, Kirkpatrick and fellow CDM members Daniel Patrick
Moynihan and Ben Wattenberg focused their attention on the Democratic Party Platform. Their
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hope was to achieve a moderate platform, one that was strong on national defense and did not
give in to the New Left. For the most part, they were successful. The platform included much of
what the CDM and Jackson wanted, so much so that one paper reported that Jackson may have
lost the nomination, but he had won the policy war.306
Following Jimmy Carter’s electoral victory in November of 1976, tensions between the
CDM and the new president began to rise. According to Vaïsse, one of the reasons for the
‘falling out’ had to do with the personal relationship between Carter and Jackson, or rather, the
lack thereof. The two men had not gotten along well before the presidential primary and the
relationship soured further in the wake of Jackson’s failed presidential bid.307In addition, the
group gave two separate lists of personnel recommendations labeled ‘CDM’ to Tony Lake,
advisor to future Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. As only a couple of their recommendations
received nominations, the CDM felt as though it had been blacklisted by the new administration.
Lake later claimed to have misplaced the CDM’s recommendations; however the coalition did
not believe him. Regardless of what may or may not have happened to the lists, Vaïsse points out
that Carter owed nothing to the CDM which had provided only lukewarm support during the
electoral campaign.308
Jeane Kirkpatrick was featured in both of the recommendation lists sent to Lake. She was
suggested for an ambassadorial appointment and for Assistant Secretary of State for Educational
and Cultural Affairs; however she was passed over by the Carter Administration for both.309

306

Vaïsse, 125-6. Collier, 91.
Ibid, 127.
308
Ibid, 128.
309
List of CDM Recommendations to Jimmy Carter for Ambassadorial Appointments, accessed
through:
http://neoconservatism.vaisse.net/doku.php?id=list_of_cdm_recommendations_to_jimmy_carter
_for_ambassadorial_appointments, Accessed 10/29/13. See Also Collier, 91-2.
307

117

Kirkpatrick’s biographer and friend Peter Collier claimed that this was providential, for if she
had been selected she would have “labored for a year or two in obscurity and been so tainted that
Ronald Reagan probably would never have chosen her for his administration.”310

By the time of Carter’s victory, Kirkpatrick had reached middle age. Her focus remained
where it had been for the past two decades – on her family, academia, and politics. Kirkpatrick’s
family life, though, was experiencing some changes. For one, she had lost her father and her
mother would soon follow. For another, her husband was settling further into retirement while
her children – John, Douglas, and Stuart were all growing up. According to friends and family,
Kirkpatrick had always characterized her family life, along with her roles as a wife and mother,
as positives. Though she may have felt occasionally left out as the only woman of the family,
Kirkpatrick was a proud mother, one who often repeated, and possibly embellished upon, the
things her boys would say. For example, she loved to tell the story of how, when asked by his
first grade teacher about his family’s ethnic background, little Douglas responded “Democrat”
when all of the other children were answering “Irish” or “French” or “Scottish”.311 Another story
involved how the Kirkpatricks punished their sons whenever they misbehaved. Normal
punishment involved the boys being sent to their rooms to write an essay about what they had
done wrong and why they would never do it again. Stuart supposedly became exasperated by this
and declared that he wished he and his brothers could get spankings like other kids.312
Kirkpatrick desperately wanted her sons to follow in their parents’ footsteps and become
intellectuals. For this reason, she often helped them too much with their homework. This help

310

Collier, 92.
Ibid.
312
Ibid.
311

118

continued once the boys entered college as Kirkpatrick both allowed them to take her courses at
Georgetown and gave them all very high scores. In truth, none of the boys were as intellectually
or academically-minded as their parents. Furthermore, trouble seemed to visit them, usually in
the form of cars, girls, and alcohol. Kirkpatrick once remarked to a friend that she wished there
were “some sort of ritual like the Indians did where you could send your sons out to kill a bear or
something and they’d come back men.”313
One of the most overwhelming family issues faced by Kirkpatrick was her eldest son’s
alcoholism. Douglas’ drinking, which had started in high school had escalated heavily very
quickly after he reached young adulthood. By the time he graduated from high school, family
members were constantly finding empty bottles hidden under his bed and in other parts of the
house. Over the years, the problem only grew worse. At one point Jeane and Evron sent him to
live with her brother, Jerry, in Ohio who persuaded his nephew to seek help. According to
friends and family members, Douglas was in and out of rehab for over 20 years, costing the
family a little over $1 million dollars. Moreover, in addition to the monetary toll it took on the
Kirkpatricks, Douglas’ alcoholism caused a rift in the family as the other brothers resented his
behavior and the fact that their mother always continued to support him.314
Adding to her familial struggles, Kirkpatrick’s husband’s health began to decline. In the
spring of 1977, Evron contracted Legionnaire’s Disease and nearly died. He had travelled to
Bloomington, Indiana in order to receive an honorary degree where he first became sick. Evron
initially thought it was the flu, but in a matter of days, his health had deteriorated to a dangerous
313
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degree. Legionnaire’s disease was a form of pneumonia that had only been discovered the
previous year, and the newness of the illness, combined with his initial negative prognosis, made
Kirkpatrick fear for her husband’s life. She spent a great deal of time researching the disease
before moving Evron to a better hospital where he eventually recovered.315
While Evron Kirkpatrick was recuperating, his wife was approached by William
Baroody, the president of the conservative think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI),
and asked to join the organization. Feeling increasingly alienated from her fellow liberal
Democrats, Kirkpatrick jumped at the chance to work with colleagues who shared her policy
views, specifically those concerning national security and foreign affairs. Accordingly, she took
a one year sabbatical from Georgetown University in order to devote herself to study at the AEI.
While there, Kirkpatrick ran into several of her fellow CDM and CPD members including Irving
Kristol, and fellow Democrats Michael Novak, Penn Kemble, and Ben Wattenberg. She also met
figures such as former President Gerald Ford, future Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and
former solicitor general Robert Bork. In addition, Kirkpatrick learned more about Latin America
as the AEI staged conferences dedicated to the region’s issues. At one such conference she met
José Napoléon Duarte, the future president of El Salvador.316
Over the next couple of years, Kirkpatrick’s standing as a public intellectual began to
grow. She had published three books of her own along with an edited volume and several
journal articles. She continued teaching at Georgetown and remained an active member of the
CDM, the CPD, and the AEI. Consequently, in 1979, Kirkpatrick was invited by the United
States Information Agency to go on a speaking tour in India. While there, she took part in the
dedication of a new building for the American Studies Research Center in Hyderabad, India. The
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center was home to a 100,000 book library and served as a resource facility for Indian and Asian
scholars who taught or researched American subjects. To mark the dedication, the Center hosted
a three day seminar on “American Studies in Cross-Cultural Perspectives” in which Kirkpatrick
took part. Other participants of the conference came from India, the United States, Nepal, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Japan, and Hong Kong.317
Criticizing Carter
Before her visit to India, Kirkpatrick, along with others affiliated with the CDM and
CPD, had become much more vocal in criticizing the Carter Administration’s policies and in
warning of the increasing dangers posed by the Soviet Union. “Although we had supported
Scoop in 1976, almost no one expected that Carter would turn out as bad as he did,” Kirkpatrick
wrote.318In fact, she viewed Carter as a second George McGovern, another politician who
embraced the flawed worldview of the New Left. She summarized this new liberalism as
embodying the beliefs that ‘weak is strong’, ‘vulnerable is safe’, ‘rich is guilty’, ‘hostile is
neutral’, and ‘friendly is suspect’.319 Fellow neoconservative, Daniel Patrick Moynihan agreed,
noting that with the exception of National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter had
surrounded himself with McGovernites who were not, he claimed, representative of the
mainstream Democratic Party.320
Opposition to Carter from the CDM, and the CPD in particular, centered on arms
limitations agreements. The Committee on the Present Danger became obsessed with what it
viewed as “unfavorable trends in the US-Soviet military balance” and made it its mission to alert
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Americans to the increasing dangers of the “ominous Soviet military build-up”.321 The urgent
tone of the various works of the CPD came from the committee’s belief that the CIA had
consistently underestimated the massive Soviet military effort.322This belief was based on the
findings of Team B. In the spring of 1976, CIA director George H. W. Bush appointed a team of
analysts to review the agency’s intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities. Critics like
the neoconservatives and Republican presidential hopeful, Ronald Reagan, had been charging
the agency with underestimating Soviet power. Three Team A’s and Team B’s were organized,
with Team A’s consisting of CIA analysts, while Team B’s were drawn from outside of the
agency. The first teams dealt with Soviet anti-aircraft systems, the second with the accuracy of
Soviet missiles, and the third with ‘Soviet intentions’. It was the third Team B under the
leadership of CDM and CPD member Richard Pipes, an anti-Soviet Polish immigrant and
historian, which would become famous. The team also included other neoconservative figures
such as Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz.323
According to Team B, the Soviet military build-up was occurring at a pace comparable to
that of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. This surge had occurred despite the signing of SALT and
subsequent American ‘restraint’ in developing and deploying nuclear strategic forces. The Team
asserted that unless the U.S. increased its military spending, the Soviets would gain nuclear and
strategic parity, if not superiority, by the early 1980s. Furthermore, the group maintained that the
CIA had underestimated Soviet capabilities because it failed to take into account the Kremlin’s
intentions, or the ideas, motives, and aspirations behind Soviet capabilities, namely its goal of
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achieving global hegemony. The majority of Team B’s findings were leaked to the press between
October and December of 1976, and then published by the CPD in April of 1977 in a pamphlet
entitled “What is the Soviet Union Up To?”. This, Vaïsse asserts, began a neoconservative
pattern that would endure: “a commission of experts warns decisionmakers about strategic
dangers that have previously been underestimated, most notably by the CIA. These warnings are
always accompanied by leaks to the press designed to launch a polemic and to reach a large
public audience.”324
Though the press began to pay attention to the portentous warnings of the
neoconservative groups, the Carter Administration appeared to ignore their concerns.
Accordingly, both the CDM and the CPD launched attacks against the administration’s efforts at
arms control. First, the CDM attempted to prevent the Senate confirmation of Paul Warnke as
head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief SALT negotiator. The
neoconservatives had several reasons for opposing Warnke’s confirmation: one, he had been an
advisor to George McGovern in the 1972 presidential campaign; two, he had denounced the arms
race as absurd, costly, unnecessary, and dangerous, which was, of course, anathema to the
members of the CDM and CPD; and three, the neoconservatives were opposed in principle to
another round of SALT agreements.325Though ultimately unable to prevent Warnke’s
confirmation to both posts, Nitze’s testimony against him in Senate confirmation hearings
garnered much wanted media attention for the group and their cause.
Subsequently, both the CDM and the CPD endeavored to prevent the Senate ratification
of SALT II agreements signed by Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1979. Prior to the
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signing of the agreements, the CPD had published pamphlets and held press conferences
outlining their opposition to SALT, all of which gained attention from the press. CPD opposition
to the treaty’s ratification coalesced behind Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the leading adversary of
SALT in the Senate, and members of the group testified against the treaty seventeen times before
various congressional committees. Their efforts, combined with the Carter Administration’s
lackluster attempts at defending the treaty and various foreign policy blows suffered by the
administration in 1979, forced the president to give up on ratification and withdraw the treaty
from the Senate.326
Kirkpatrick’s own critiques of Carter began almost immediately after his election. Not
only did she oppose his support for détente, she also found fault with other aspects of the
administration’s foreign policies. In a commencement speech delivered at the University of
Notre Dame in May of 1977, Carter outlined the multiple components of his foreign policy,
highlighting the administration’s emphasis on human rights. For one, the president declared that
the U.S. should have a democratic foreign policy, one based on the nation’s fundamental values
which meant using American power and influence for humane purposes such as the support for
human rights.327 Such a policy would serve as an example for those nations around the world
who doubted the merits of liberal capitalism or the intentions of the United States. Furthermore,
Carter stated that the U.S. was at long last free of rabid anti-communism, the intensity of which
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had caused the nation to embrace any dictator who shared our fear and to utilize the tactics of our
enemies, tactics which failed to live up to the nation’s liberal values.328
Carter declared that a new world had emerged, one not dominated solely by the Cold
War. The end of colonialism was fostering a fresh sense of national identity in newly
independent nations across the globe. Accordingly, U.S. policies should be based on five
cardinal objectives: the promotion of human rights around the world, cooperation with the
industrial democracies of the world, the improvement of American relations with the Soviet
Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to decrease the threat of war, an
increase in economic aid to developing nations, and a focus on international cooperation on
global issues such as the threat of nuclear war, environmental concerns, racism, the arms race,
hunger, and disease.
In addition to these general principles, Carter spoke specifically about the
administration’s goals in achieving a settlement between Israel and Egypt in the Middle East, the
expansion of trade with the PRC and developing nations, decreasing arms sales around the
world, and a peaceful settlement to issues in Southern Africa based on majority rule and
democratic principles. Altogether, Carter maintained, such policies were based on the historical
vision of America’s role, derived from a larger view of global change, rooted in our moral
values, reinforced by the United States’ material wealth and military power, and designed to
serve all of mankind.329
In response to the president’s speech, Kirkpatrick wrote a short essay entitled “On the
Invocation of Universal Values” which outlined her concerns with Carter’s policies. Kirkpatrick
praised Carter for accentuating human rights in foreign affairs as such an emphasis served as a
328
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reminder to Americans that the nation’s identity and purpose had always been deeply involved
with the assertion of human rights. Kirkpatrick declared that there were three positive
consequences of such a policy. First, it broke the anti-establishment, or New Left’s, monopoly on
moral rhetoric. Second, it reassured Americans and others around the world that U.S. policy is
guided by a vision of the public good. Third, it affirmed the idea that there were universal human
rights that persons were entitled to, and that these ought to be respected by governments. In a
reference to détente, Kirkpatrick noted that people could not live on pragmatism and profits
alone. “For having recalled Americans to historic moral imperatives and for having placed
individual rights back on the agenda,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “I applaud Carter.”330
Nonetheless, the political scientist questioned many other aspects of Carter’s foreign
policy. For instance, Kirkpatrick expressed doubt that the example of democracy would actually
help to spread liberal political systems throughout the world because as history had
demonstrated, democratic governments were rare and difficult to maintain. She pointed out that
there were a number of pitfalls and perils that confronted those nations attempting to construct
governments limited by law, based on majority rule, and guaranteeing political competition and
respect for minority rights. “One may hope that the example of freedom provided by the Western
democracies will reinforce the human appetite for liberty, “ she wrote, “but there hardly seem to
be adequate grounds for confidence that their example will be compelling.”331 Her emphasis on
‘hope’ implied her belief that Carter had fallen prey to that utopian rationalism which was
causing many Americans to ignore the reality of global politics.
Kirkpatrick also took issue with Carter’s stance on the arms race, his goal of normalizing
relations with the People’s Republic of China, and his African policies. Carter’s description of
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the arms race as ‘morally deplorable’ naturally aroused the ire of the dedicated Cold Warrior.
Kirkpatrick questioned what exactly he meant by that statement: was it immoral to spend money
on weapons regardless of the context? Did not the moral quality of an arms race depend on the
consequences of arming or not arming?332In addition, she posed many questions about Carter’s
insistence on establishing true diplomatic relations with the PRC: why was it so important to do
so? Did the president truly believe that the future of the Sino-Soviet split depended on the title of
the American emissary in China? In reference to previous Cold War happenings and traditional
American support for Taiwan, Kirkpatrick questioned whether normalization was “more
important that demonstrating the fidelity of our commitments.”333
Finally, Kirkpatrick found fault with Carter’s determination to bring majority rule to
southern Africa. She did not doubt his sincerity in advocating a democratic system in Rhodesia
and other parts of southern Africa, nor did she believe that Carter’s insistence on majority rule
meant ‘black rule’, or that he ‘covertly’ desired to replace white oligarchies with black
dictatorships. However, she found his emphasis on the region to be problematic. She wrote,
…if a white oligarchy does not seem to him more obnoxious than a black
dictatorship, on what principle did the President decide that it is more important to
establish majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than, say, in Uganda, or
Tanzania, or Zaire, or Togo, of Ghana, or Nigeria, or Benin, or Kenya, or Buinea-Bissau,
or Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Senegal, Sierra Lone, Camaroons,
Mozambique, or Angola? Or for that matter, how did he decide that it was more
important to have majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than in, say, Cuba,
Cambodia, North Korea, or the Soviet Union, or than in Chile, Paraguay, or Panama?334
According to her, this question demonstrated the difficulties that could be encountered by a
government when it attempted to invoke universal moral rules as the justification for a policy
which would necessarily be selectively applied. Carter and his administration should, in her
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opinion, move beyond the invocation of universal values to the difficult business of applying
them in an imperfect, intractable world.335
Kirkpatrick’s most compelling critique of the Carter administration occurred in 1979 with
the publication of “Dictatorships and Double Standards” in the November issue of Commentary
magazine. The article was written following the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua
and the fall of the Shah of Iran. The publication of this article would have a profound effect on
Kirkpatrick’s life. The article was widely-read, advancing her reputation as a public intellectual.
One reader, Republican Presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan, was so impressed by her foreign
policy analysis that he began actively recruiting her to aid in his campaign. In addition to
garnering attention in political and academic circles, Dictatorships and Double Standards
outlined various distinctions between non-democratic governments and their relation to
American foreign policy which became known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine.
Kirkpatrick began by claiming that President Carter’s sole foreign policy achievement
was in laying the groundwork for the transfer of the Panama Canal to a “swaggering Latin
dictator of a Castroite bent”.336 Indeed, Kirkpatrick claimed that his administration’s policies
were riddled with failures. For one, she asserted, there had occurred a dramatic Soviet military
build-up which had been accompanied by the stagnation of the American armed forces, and
together, these phenomena had resulted in a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in Africa,
Afghanistan, and in the Caribbean. For another, in one year alone, the United States had suffered
two major blows – the loss of two long-time allies, Nicaragua and Iran. In both cases,
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Kirkpatrick charged Carter with actively collaborating in the replacement of moderate autocrats,
friendly to American interests, with less friendly ones of extremist totalitarian leanings.337
According to Kirkpatrick, there were several similarities that existed between Nicaragua
and Iran, similarities also shared with other American allies. Neither Iran nor Nicaragua was a
democracy; rather both nations were ruled by autocrats. Despite this, the leaders of both nations
tolerated limited opposition including the existence of oppositional newspapers and political
parties. Moreover, both the Shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua were faced with radical,
violent revolutions which threatened their power and the political stability of their respective
states. The violence wrought by revolutionaries caused both leaders to “sometimes” invoke
martial law and to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, “it was alleged”, torture their
opponents.338 Though the Shah had attempted to create a technologically modern society in Iran,
and Somoza had tried to introduce modern agricultural methods in Nicaragua, neither leader had
attempted to reform their societies based on abstract ideals of social justice (which she viewed as
euphemisms for communism) or political virtue, and neither had altered significantly the
distribution of goods, status, or power in their respective nations. Both men were trying to bring
modernity to traditional societies.339
In addition, Kirkpatrick found the course of events in Nicaragua and Iran to be similar to
those that had unfolded in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola. In each case, she maintained, the
American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with
violent internal opposition not only failed; it actually assisted the coming to power of new
regimes in which ordinary people enjoyed fewer freedoms and less security. More important, the
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new regimes were hostile to American interests. In Iran and Nicaragua, autocracies that had
established friendly relations with the United States were attacked by insurgents, some with ties
to communist states, whose arms were provided nearly entirely by communists. The Carter
Administration had ignored or minimized the ‘Marxist’ presence among the insurgents on the
grounds that it was the American support for the dictator that left the revolutionaries with little
options than to search for arms elsewhere.
Over time, violence had spread throughout the two nations, and rhetoric utilized by the
revolutionaries reminded Americans of their nation’s own revolution against autocratic and
imperial rule, increasing sympathy for the rebel forces. In the meantime, requests for help from
the besieged dictators remain unheeded. The U.S. had announced its determination to stay out of
the conflicts as American involvement supposedly “confirms our status as an agent of
imperialism, racism, and reaction; is inconsistent with support for human rights; alienates us
from the ‘forces’ of democracy; and threatens to put the US once more on the side of history’s
losers.”340 Only after the insurgents had come to power and anarchy had spread throughout the
nation would it be noticed that the new rulers had no significant following, no experience at
governing, and no talent for leadership. Meanwhile, Kirkpatrick contended, the United States
would have helped to replace an erstwhile friend and ally with a government hostile to American
interests and policies. “At best we will have lost access to friendly territory,” she wrote, “at worst
the Soviets will have gained a new base.”341
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that not all situations conformed exactly to the sequence of
events described above. For example, in the case of Iran, Carter had continued to support the
Shah for quite some time, and at no point did he call for the Iranian leader to be deposed.
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However, as the revolution in Iran gained momentum, the Carter Administration expressed its
dedication to non-intervention, a principle that proved more important to Carter, Kirkpatrick
charged, than American strategic interests in the region or national pride. For, instead of sending
in marines to protect an ally and maintain stability in the region, Carter and his staff decided that
the course of the revolution had to be determined by the Iranian people.342 The situation in
Nicaragua was different as the role of the communists in the insurgency was much clearer and
more significant than in Iran. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick accused American officials of actively
working to get rid of Somoza. “In a manner uncharacteristic of the Carter Administration,” she
wrote, “which generally seemed willing to negotiate anything with anyone anywhere, the US
adopted an oddly uncompromising posture in dealing with Somoza.”343 Thus, the scenario in
Nicaragua conformed nearly exactly to the described pattern.
According to Kirkpatrick, Carter’s unwitting assistance in bringing to power regimes
hostile to American interests occurred due to several misperceptions about what was actually
going on in Iran and Nicaragua. First, the administration mistakenly believed that a democratic
alternative to the incumbent government existed within the opposition. Second, Carter and his
staff erroneously assumed that it was impossible to continue the status quo in both nations.
Finally, Washington was operating under the misguided belief that any political change in the
two nations was preferable to the current regimes.344
Despite enormous evidence to the contrary, Kirkpatrick contended, Americans, including
President Carter, mistakenly believed that it was possible to democratize governments anytime,
anywhere, and under any circumstances. In doing so, Americans were ignoring the lesson of
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Vietnam which had presumably demonstrated the dangers of trying to be the world’s midwife to
democracy, especially when the birth was to occur in the midst of a guerilla war.345 In fact,
Kirkpatrick insisted, democratic institutions were difficult to establish and preserve under any
circumstances; democratic regimes make heavy demands on their populations, and they were
dependent upon complex social, cultural, and economic conditions. For democracy to work, a
substantial number of persons must consider themselves participants in the decision-making
process and not just subjects bound by laws. Second, leaders of all sectors of society must agree
to pursue power only by legal means and, in doing so eschew violence, theft, and fraud.
Competitors for office must also be able to accept defeat when necessary and be skilled at
finding and creating common ground among diverse points of view and interests; indeed they
must be willing to compromise on all but the most basic of values. Third, democratic
government required institutions strong enough to channel and contain conflict. Finally,
Kirkpatrick pointed out that the development of democracy took time. In nations where
democratic governments did exist, it had taken several decades, and in most cases, centuries for
the people to acquire the disciplines and habits necessary for democracy to thrive.346 Based on
these assessments, Kirkpatrick determined that neither Iran nor Nicaragua possessed the
fundamental preconditions necessary for democracy.
Kirkpatrick went on to point out the difficulties that ensued when rapid political change
occurred within autocratic systems. According to her, the longer a dictator has held power, the
more dependent upon him a nation’s fundamental institutions became. Because of this, the fabric
of authority could unravel quickly once the power and status of the autocrat has been
undermined or eliminated, leading ultimately to the collapse of society as a whole. Kirkpatrick
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noted that the speed with which armies collapsed, bureaucracies abdicated, and social structures
dissolved once the autocrat was removed surprised Americans who were used to public
institutions based on ‘universalist norms’ rather than ‘particularistic relations’. The failure to
understand the relationship between a dictator and his nation’s infrastructure, Kirkpatrick
charged, was one cause for the failure of American policies in recent administrations.347
Furthermore, in the cases of Nicaragua and Iran, as in the previous instances in China, Cuba,
Vietnam, and Angola, the American government had failed to properly understand the nature of
the opposition. The United States had overestimated the political diversity of revolutionary
nationalism, believing that moderate, democratic elements were in the majority, while at the
same time underestimating the power of the radical groups. “When US policymakers and the
liberal press interpret insurgency as evidence of widespread popular discontent and the will
toward democracy,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “the scene is set for disaster.”348
Kirkpatrick declared that many of Carter’s errors in Iran and Nicaragua stemmed from
his conviction that political change in autocracies was inevitable, desirable, and in the American
interest. In part, this was because of the administration’s embrace of modernization theory,
otherwise known as development theory. According to Kirkpatrick, modernization theory
involved more than simple industrialization or liberal political development; it was the process
through which a traditional or pre-technological society passed as it became transformed into a
society characterized by machine technology, rational and secular attitudes, and highly
differentiated social structures.349 Development theory hypothesized an ongoing process of
change that was complex – due to the fact that it encompassed all dimensions of human life;
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systemic – because its elements interacted in predictable ways; global – because all societies
would eventually pass make the transition from traditional to modern; lengthy – because the
process was evolutionary; phased – in that all modernizing societies would pass through the
same stages; homogenizing – modernity would lead to the convergence and interdependence of
societies; irreversible; and progressive in the sense that it was desirable, providing in the longrun significant benefits to all people. Thus, rather than viewing events through the lens of
American national interest, the administration insisted on viewing them in what Kirkpatrick
termed as “a contemporary version of the same idea of progress that has traumatized Western
imaginations since the Enlightenment.”350
Because modernization theory encouraged the view that revolutions and coups were
manifestations of deep, historical forces that could not be controlled, Kirkpatrick firmly believed
that it was wholly inadequate as a foundation on which to base foreign policy. When faced with
such complicated, inexorable, impersonal processes, Kirkpatrick queried, what could one do? If
revolutions were not caused by human conditions but by ‘forces’, then they could not be stopped
by human efforts. The best any government could hope to do would be to serve as a midwife to
history, helping events to move where they were already headed. Consequently,
developmentalists believed that the function of foreign policy under these conditions was to
understand the process of change, and, like the Marxists, to align the United States with history,
in hopes of contributing a bit of stability along the way.351 Never mind, she pointed out, that the
invasions, coups, civil wars, and political struggles around the world did not seem to be incidents
of a “global personnel search for someone to manage the modernization process” or that the
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persons involved in these struggles did not appear to know that they were “searching for viable
forms of government capable of managing the process of modernization.”352
Finally, Kirkpatrick indicted the administration for failing to understand the differences
between right-wing and left-wing revolutionary (totalitarian) autocracies. She pointed out that
the very nature of traditional right-wing authoritarian governments was offensive to Americans.
Americans disliked the notion that public affairs in such systems are ordered on kinship,
friendship, and personal relations as this stood in stark contrast to the objective, rational
standards utilized in liberal democratic systems. Furthermore, the preference for stability over
change in autocracies also bothered Americans whose entire national experiences rested on the
principles of growth, change, and progress. Extremes of wealth and poverty in such nations were
also offensive to Americans, especially since the powerless are often very poor while the rulers
are very rich. Moreover, Americans were offended by the lack of concern on the part of
authoritarians with the poverty, ignorance, and disease of their subjects. When confronted by
such regimes “our vaunted cultural relativism evaporates and we become as censorious as Cotton
Mather confronting sin in New England.”353
Whereas the politics of authoritarian regimes appeared antithetical to the American
system, the rhetoric of left-wing revolutionary and totalitarian regimes was not. Kirkpatrick
maintained that Americans tended to sympathize with socialist revolutionaries because they
spoke the language of the Declaration of Independence. After all, she pointed out, socialism and
communism were ideologies rooted in the same values that sparked the Enlightenment and the
various democratic revolutions of the 18th century, including the American Revolution.
According to her, Marxist revolutionaries spoke the language of a hopeful future, not an
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unattractive past. They emphasized egalitarianism rather than hierarchy and privilege, liberty
rather than order, activity rather than passivity, all of which, Kirkpatrick wrote, was “highly
congenial to Americans at the symbolic level.”354
Thus, Kirkpatrick charged, the Carter administration’s foreign policy failed because of its
lack of realism concerning the nature of traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the
relation of each to the American national interest. According to her, traditional autocracies were
less repressive, more susceptible to liberalization, and more compatible with American interests
than revolutionary nationalism. Kirkpatrick offered as evidence the fact that the communist
governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were much more repressive than the autocratic
regimes that preceded them, that the PRC was more repressive than Taiwan, and that North
Korea was more repressive than South Korea. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick argued that there were
systemic differences between right-wing and revolutionary left-wing autocracies. In general,
traditional autocrats tolerated social inequities, poverty, and brutality, whereas revolutionary
autocracies (totalitarians) created them. Traditional autocrats left in place existing allocations of
wealth, power, status, and other resources, but they allowed for the worship of traditional gods
and the observation of traditional taboos. They did not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and
leisure, places of residence, or patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of
traditional life were familiar, Kirkpatrick maintained, they were bearable to ordinary people who,
growing up within the society, had learned to cope with its difficulties from an early age. Such
societies, Kirkpatrick asserted, did not create refugees.
Conversely, revolutionary communist regimes created refugees by the millions because
they controlled and changed all aspects of society, culture, and politics in their efforts to create
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socialist utopias.355Due to the repressive nature of such regimes, Kirkpatrick claimed that there
was not any evidence that totalitarian governments could transform into liberal, democratic
states. “At the moment there is a far greater likelihood of progressive liberalization and
democratization in the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile,” she wrote, “than the
government of Cuba; in Taiwan than in the People’s Republic of China...”356 This was due to the
fact that traditional autocracies, unlike totalitarian systems, permitted limited contestation and
participation. Therefore, according to Kirkpatrick, it was not impossible that American policy
could effectively encourage the process of liberalization and democratization in autocratic
systems, provided that the effort was not made at the time when the incumbent government was
fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms were aimed at
producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.357
Though Kirkpatrick acknowledged that it might not always be easy to differentiate
between democratic and totalitarian ‘agents of change’ in revolutionary situations, she claimed
that it was not impossible. Should revolutionary leaders describe the United States as the enemy
of freedom-loving people, or as the perpetrator of imperialism, racism, colonialism, genocide, or
war, then they were not authentic democrats. Kirkpatrick maintained that such groups had
defined themselves as enemies and should be treated accordingly. She concluded,
The US is not, in fact, a racist, colonial power, it does not practice genocide, it does not
threaten world peace with expansionist activities… We have also moved further, faster in
eliminating domestic racism than any multiracial society in the world or in history. For
these reasons and more, a posture of continuous self-abasement and apology vis-a-vis the
third world is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate. Nor is it necessary or
appropriate to support vocal enemies of the US because they invoke the rhetoric of
popular liberation. It is not even necessary or appropriate for our leaders to foreswear
unilaterally the use of military force to counter military force. Liberal idealism need not
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be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defense of freedom
and the national interest.358

With the Kirkpatrick Doctrine’s incorporation into government policy in the early 1980s,
“Dictatorships and Double Standards” became the subject of some scrutiny from historians.
According to J. David Hoeveler, Jr. Kirkpatrick’s distinctions between authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes constituted the “most influential contribution to foreign policy discussion in
the conservative literature of two decades.”359 Her analysis, he argued, provided authoritarian
states with a safety valve of tradition, history, and continuity by which one could measure them
against the rending of social fabric caused by leftist revolutions and the total control over all
aspects of life in communist states. Mark Gerson notes that Kirkpatrick’s article served as a
reminder that there were degrees of evil in the world, and authoritarian regimes were the lesser
of two evils when compared to governments of the totalitarian variety.360 Others argued that the
article provided a rationale for ignoring bad behavior from right-wing dictators around the world
as long as such leaders were anti-communist.361 John Ehrman asserted that Kirkpatrick’s work
turned conservatives’ gut feelings into theories and demonstrated how conservative the
neoconservative foreign policy views had become.362
Each of these analyses had merit, as far as they went, but there were other problems with
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. Though she theorized that authoritarian regimes could evolve into
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democratic systems, Kirkpatrick failed to offer any guidelines, prescriptions, or illustrations for
how the United States could help to facilitate such political change. Indeed a number of her
assertions regarding the nature of democracy made it appear as though facilitating in the
development of democratic systems was beyond the capabilities of any one nation, including a
superpower such as the United States. For example, the history of authoritarian regimes which
lack experience with democracy, the amount of time required for persons to develop habits and
customs necessary for a functioning democracy, and the political, social, and economic
instability that occurs when a dictator is removed all appear to indicate that a democratic
progression in authoritarian states is unlikely to occur.
Vaïsse credits “Dictatorships and Double Standards” for pointing out the double standard
in Carter’s policies, namely the American insistence that right-wing authoritarians liberalize and
democratize while not demanding the same from left-wing totalitarian regimes.363 However,
based on Kirkpatrick’s own contentions on the nature of totalitarianism, it was impossible for
such regimes to undergo liberalization. If, as she insisted, there was no evidence that
totalitarianism could evolve into some form of democracy, then any efforts by the United States
to encourage such changes would constitute exercises in futility. Therefore, though her
distinctions squared nicely with her opposition to détente, they failed to buttress her arguments
regarding the inconsistencies inherent within the Carter administration’s policies.
Historian Walter LaFeber contends that instead of evolving into approximate democratic
states, authoritarian regimes sometimes become more repressive and restrictive. He maintains
that many authoritarian dictators, through their actions of repression, brutality, and exploitation,
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bring revolutions upon themselves.364 Ergo, authoritarians were not always as benign as
Kirkpatrick implied in her article with her assertion that they ‘sometimes’ invoked martial law
and ‘allegedly’ tortured dissidents only when faced by violent revolutions. Moreover, it stands to
reason that despite being born into and having adjusted to what Kirkpatrick described as the
‘miseries of traditional life’, many persons may find such miseries unbearable and, in the face of
intractable leaders, opt for revolution. After all, just because certain institutions, practices,
customs, or governments are steeped in tradition does not mean that they are not exploitative,
damaging, demeaning, and destructive towards their peoples.
Shortly after the publication of “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan. This, combined with the ‘losses’ of Nicaragua and Iran, caused the Carter
Administration to take a more confrontational stance towards communism in general and the
Soviet Union in particular. Worried about how such foreign policy issues might affect his bid for
re-election, the president attempted to establish better relations between himself and the more
hawkish members of the Democratic Party, namely the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. To
this end, Carter requested National Security Advisor and former CDM member Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Vice-President Walter Mondale to set up the meeting with Max Kampelman.
Before the meeting, which was scheduled to take place on January 30, 1980, Kirkpatrick,
Ben Wattenburg, Max Kampelman, Elliot Abrams, Norman Podhoretz, and Midge Decter met
over coffee to work out their strategy. The group decided to have Austin Ranney, a political
scientist and friend of Evron Kirkpatrick, serve as their spokesperson. Upon arriving at the White
House, the group was ushered into the Roosevelt Room where they were soon joined by Carter
and Mondale. By all accounts, matters did not go well. According to the neoconservatives, Carter
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remained tense and defensive throughout the half-hour meeting. He reportedly interrupted
Ranney’s introductory presentation, refused to accept criticism of his policies, ignored the
group’s recommendations on specific policy matters, and responded to the groups’ questions in
an often ‘incoherent’ manner.365 After thirty minutes, the president departed rather abruptly,
leaving Mondale to attempt to smooth over relations between the White House and the CDM.
According to Vaïsse, for many of the members of the CDM, the meeting with the
president represented the last straw. The encounter ended the sentimental loyalty that several still
felt towards the Democratic Party, thus paving the way for them to move into the Republican
camp.366Kirkpatrick was among the defectors. Though she remained a nominal member of the
Democratic Party at that time, she told Midge Decter on their way out of the White House that
day that she did not yet know who she would support for the presidency, but it would not be
Carter. Less than a month after the disastrous meeting at the White House, Kirkpatrick received a
letter from Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan praising her for “Dictatorships and
Double Standards” and requesting a meeting. Shortly thereafter, Richard Allen, future National
Security Advisor to Reagan, called Kirkpatrick and invited her to join the California governor in
a discussion of American foreign policy. She accepted, the talks went well, and was soon
followed by another meeting. Kirkpatrick subsequently agreed to act as a foreign policy advisor
for the Reagan campaign.367
Conclusions
Kirkpatrick’s article, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, represented the culmination
of years of higher education, political activism, and academic study. Beginning with her years at
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Columbia, Kirkpatrick embarked upon a study of non-democratic regimes that would last
throughout her entire life and eventually propel her into the national spotlight. Under the tutelage
of Franz Neumann, and later Hannah Arendt, Kirkpatrick learned of the evils of both fascist and
communist totalitarianism. This knowledge was supplemented by her exposure to Nazi
Holocaust files, interviews with Soviet and Chinese expatriates who had fled from communist
regimes, and her personal connections with individuals who had escaped the totalitarian menace.
Her education in the evils of totalitarianism left Kirkpatrick convinced that whether it was
communism or fascism, any diabolical vision of the public good was the greatest horror and the
source of the greatest evil in modern times.
Drawing from the works of Arendt and Camus, Kirkpatrick identified communism as a
utopian philosophy, a set of ideas based upon wishful thinking and blind optimism rather than
history and experience. She likened utopianism to rationalism noting that both failed to
distinguish between the domains of thought and experience, both were more concerned with the
abstract rather than the concrete, and both cared more about the possible rather than the probable.
Kirkpatrick took the comparison further, noting that there was an affinity between utopianism
and rationalism on the one hand, and rationalism and tyranny on the other. “There is a powerful
tendency to move from the conviction that one knows the public good,” she observed, “to the use
of power to impose that good.”368 Thus, the totalitarian impulse was grounded in the rationalist’s
search, through power, for virtue, solidarity, perfect unity, the end of conflict, and the end of
exploitation of man by man. Such goals were unachievable, but the utopian rationalist could not
accept this, and in his zeal to transform society he resorted to terror and murder. Kirkpatrick
wrote,
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When an unrealizable goal becomes the operational aim of an elite endowed with
coercive power and a sense of righteousness, tragedy becomes more probable than
progress. Historians may contemplate the irony of liberating revolutions that enslave, of
brotherhood that ends at the guillotine, of equality enforced by a maximum ruler; the
people, on the other hand, are left to suffer.369

According to Kirkpatrick, the dangers posed to the United States from utopian
rationalists, or totalitarians, were not restricted to foreign affairs and issues of national security.
The political scientist also associated utopian rationalism with the New Left and the rise of the
counterculture within the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s. She viewed their attacks on the basic
beliefs and institutions of American society, their challenging of the morality of the American
experience and the legitimacy of American national interests, and their utilization of disruptive,
sometimes violent protest methods as a threat to democracy and the American way of life.
Kirkpatrick compared the Nazi assault on the Weimar Republic to the New Left’s assault on
American society: in the case of Weimar, the moderates had stood passively by while extremists
destroyed democracy. Kirkpatrick’s refusal to stand by and watch the same thing happen in the
U.S. led her to assist in the formation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. She had no
doubt that the New Left, intoxicated with a utopian vision of society, sought to take over the
state in order to extend the jurisdiction and coercive power of government over all institutions
and aspects of life.370
Though the New Left failed in its bid for power, it had left an indelible mark on
American foreign policy, paving the way for détente and Soviet expansion. Kirkpatrick
maintained that the New Left’s assault on the American experience, namely their belief that the
369
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U.S. was a sick, immoral, and corrupt society, had undermined national security. “As long as the
United States was perceived as a virtuous society,” she wrote, “policies which enhanced its
power were also seen as virtuous.”371 However, if the U.S. were an immoral state, then the
pursuit of American power must also be immoral. This assumption prompted the New Left to
call for a decrease in American military power in the face of a well-armed international
communist community. This crisis of confidence, inspired by the New Left, infected various
segments of the population, including the American national security apparatus, opening the door
to negotiations with totalitarians and a policy of détente. To Kirkpatrick, a committed Cold
Warrior and believer in American exceptionalism, this was intolerable. Consequently, she joined
the Committee on the Present Danger in hopes that the organization could inform both the public
and the government of the dangers of détente before it was too late.
According to Kirkpatrick, the New Left and the forces of international communism were
tacit allies. She maintained that the U.S. was being seduced by Marxist rhetoric due to the
philosophy’s relation to Enlightenment thought and communism’s ‘perverse’ usage of
democratic lexes. Drawing from her study of totalitarianism and from her husband’s work on
Soviet misinformation, Kirkpatrick was adamant in her assertion that the language of MarxismLeninism was nothing more than propaganda. “By calling ‘autonomous’ that which is powerless,
‘federated’ that which is unitary, ‘democratic’ that which is autocratic,” she charged, “by
systematically corrupting language to obscure reality, the communists have made inroads into
our sense of political reality.”372 Kirkpatrick labelled the communists’ appropriation of liberal
language ‘verbal imperialism’ and bemoaned the fact that Americans had begun to believe that
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the communists were engaged in the struggle between the rich and the poor, the haves and the
have-nots, the workers and the employers, and the oppressed and the oppressors.
Kirkpatrick insisted that the communists had, in fact, strayed from the classical Marxist
tradition. Lenin’s revisionism dispensed of the prerequisite capitalist phase of socialist
development in favor of political power, or the imposition of socialism from above. Such heresy
proved that the primary goal of the communists was the capture of state power, and that Moscow
and Beijing viewed colonial and underdeveloped states as suitable targets for communist
expansion. Marxism was invoked to surround the communist drive for political power and global
domination with an aura of morality and science, and to provide moral justification for the
terroristic methods they employed in their efforts to mold societies and cultures into socialist
utopias.
The popular utopian rationalist faith in the perfectibility of mankind, the crisis of
confidence in the American system due to the rise of the New Left, and the language utilized by
leftist revolutionaries and communists had caused Americans to turn a blind eye to the iniquitous
nature of totalitarianism, all of which led to the expansion of communism and the enlargement of
Soviet military power throughout the 1970s. Making matters worse, according to Kirkpatrick,
was the Carter Administration’s acceptance of modernization theory, its misguided belief that
democratic states could be created from without, and its misunderstanding of the nature of right
versus left wing autocracies. Taken together, these misperceptions had alienated traditional
American allies, facilitated the expansion of communism in Latin America, and contributed to
the destabilization of authoritarian regimes friendly to American interests. In order to retake the
Cold War initiative, the U.S. must acknowledge the obdurate nature of communist totalitarianism
and dispense with détente and those policies grounded in utopian rationalist theories.
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Furthermore, the U.S. must continue to provide aid to its anti-communist allies, whether those
allies were fellow liberal democrats or authoritarian dictators. Finally, Americans must regain
confidence in their society, institutions, values, government, and status as a global superpower.
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Chapter Four: Madame Ambassador
In 1980, Americans went to the polls to elect a president. Though initially ahead in the
polls, Carter’s advantage over his Republican opponent began to dwindle by September. Ronald
Reagan, former actor and Governor of California, was a captivating public figure who took
advantage of the foreign policy and domestic disasters that had occurred under Carter’s watch.
From a domestic standpoint, Reagan focused on the economic downturn of the 1970s and asked
Americans if they were better off in 1980 than they were four years previous. Many Americans
were not, and they responded positively to Reagan’s promise of tax cuts and new economic
policies. Moreover, in an effort to stem the tide of what Reagan saw as defeatism that had
plagued the American spirit following U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the former California governor
spoke often of America’s greatness, its exceptionality. Reagan the Cold Warrior reminded
Americans repeatedly that the U.S. was a force for good in the world and promised to restore
American military and economic superiority.
As Reagan’s foreign policy adviser, a member of the CPD, and a critic of Carter,
Kirkpatrick supported the Republican nominee wholeheartedly. Other neoconservatives joined
her, along with members of the northern working classes, former Democrats who felt abandoned
by their party through its embrace of affirmative action policies and whose economic status had
declined throughout the 1970s. The neocons and northern working classes were joined in their
support for Reagan by the social conservatives and the religious right which were attracted to
Reagan’s stance on issues such as abortion and school prayer, along with fiscal conservatives
and supporters of supply-side economics. This new coalition of voters allowed Reagan to win
51% of the popular vote compared to Carter’s 41%.
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Jeane Kirkpatrick was unabashed about Ronald Reagan’s triumph in the 1980
Presidential election, declaring his victory to be a watershed event in American history.
According to her, Reagan’s inauguration signaled the end of one major postwar epoch and the
beginning of another. Kirkpatrick claimed there were three distinct periods in the postwar era.
The first, known as the Cold War Era, began at the end of World War II and lasted until
approximately 1968. She described it as a “relatively happy respite during which free societies
and democratic institutions were unusually secure. The west was united, strong, and selfassured”.373 The second period, the Era of Détente, began with the rise of the New Left in the
late 1960s and lasted until the election of Reagan in 1980. Unlike the previous era, this one was
marked by the relentless expansion of Soviet military and political power and a corresponding
contraction of American influence. It featured the rise of the Third World dictators espousing
anti-American and anti-Western ideologies and the emergence in Western Europe of a neutralist
position. Throughout this period, an attitude of defeatism and self-doubt prevailed within the
United States. Kirkpatrick maintained that Reagan’s victory marked a new beginning for
America, one that would correct mistakes made during the era of détente, restore faith in the
American way of life, and increase American power throughout the world.374
With the election of Ronald Reagan, many members of neoconservative groups, such as
the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and the Committee on the Present Danger
(CPD), were appointed to government positions allowing them the opportunity to influence and
shape policy. CDM members who supported Reagan and subsequently worked for his
administration included: Ben Wattenberg – Vice President of Radio Free Europe, Max
Kampelman – Ambassador to the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, Eugene
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Rostow – director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Elliot Abrams – Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.375 Due to the fact that Ronald
Reagan was a member of the CPD, several of its committee members were also given prestigious
government jobs including: George Shultz – Secretary of State, Richard Allen – National
Security Advisor, William Casey – CIA Director, John Lehman – Secretary of the Navy, Richard
Pipes – Director of East European and Soviet Affairs, Donald Rumsfeld – Special Envoy to the
Middle East, and Richard Perle – Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy.376
A member of both the CDM and the CPD, and foreign policy advisor to Ronald Reagan
during the 1980 election, Jeane Kirkpatrick was named Permanent Ambassador to the United
Nations, a position given Cabinet level ranking and made part of the National Security Council
by President Reagan. As U.N. Ambassador, Kirkpatrick was responsible for articulating and
advocating the Reagan Administration’s positions on various international events. As U.N.
Ambassador she served largely as a mouthpiece for the administration, but Kirkpatrick had
opportunities to influence policy thanks to her inclusion within the NSC and the National
Security Planning Group (NSPG). Furthermore, Reagan’s fondness for and admiration of the
ambassador allowed her direct access to the president, which, in turn, enabled her to bypass
normal diplomatic channels between the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and the State
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Department. Thus, did Kirkpatrick the academic, intellectual, and party activist become
Kirkpatrick the ambassador and policymaker.
During Kirkpatrick’s tenure at the United Nations, the institution dealt with hundreds of
issues ranging from budgetary concerns, refugee crises, and public health alarms to issues
affecting women and disabled persons, economic development, decolonization, and war. Indeed,
a cursory glance at the resolutions voted on within the General Assembly and Security Council
in any given year of Kirkpatrick’s time as ambassador can seem overwhelming due to their sheer
numbers. Among those that she and the Reagan Administration deemed to be the most important
were: Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict; El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Central America; the
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and
Namibian independence and South Africa.377
Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Reagan Administration’s policies towards the Middle East had two primary goals: to
maintain the special relationship between the United States and Israel and to prevent the
expansion of Soviet influence in the region. More often than not, the administration’s support for
Tel Aviv exacerbated tensions in the region, causing more difficulties in the bilateral
relationships between the United States and other Middle Eastern nations. Tensions also rose
between the U.S. and Israel, for despite America’s steadfast support for its Middle Eastern ally,
Tel Aviv often acted on its own accord: in December of 1981 Israel ignored American appeals
for restraint and annexed the Golan Heights, and in 1982 Tel Aviv invaded Lebanon despite
American protests. These actions garnered global condemnation of both Israel and the United
States and brought about a brief withdrawal of American military aid to Tel Aviv. Nonetheless,
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America continued to back up its anti-communist ally; after all, Israeli targets in Lebanon – the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria – had ties to the Soviet Union. Indeed, the
Reagan Administration sent troops into Lebanon, a move that resulted in the deaths of American
diplomatic and military personnel, yet failed to bring peace to the region.
Throughout her tenure as Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, Kirkpatrick
demonstrated an unwavering support for the state of Israel.378 In a speech before the Conference
of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in New York City, she noted that her relationship
with the state of Israel began in her college days. “I remember vividly the bells on the Riverside
Church ringing on the day in 1948, the establishment of Israel,” she related, “I was in philosophy
class at Barnard and Harry Truman had taken a strong and marvelous stand.”379In subsequent
years, Kirkpatrick’s sympathy for Israel and the Jewish people grew, especially following her
exposure to the Nazi Holocaust files and her friendships with various German and European
Jews who had fled from the Nazis. Though sympathetic to Israel, her relationship with the
organized Jewish community of the world did not begin until she became the U.N. Ambassador
and was exposed to what she described as the “obsessive anti-Israel campaign that dominates the
agenda of the UN.”380
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Kirkpatrick’s introduction to the ‘anti-Israel obsession’ of the United Nations began in
June of 1981 when the Security Council met to discuss the June 7th Israeli bombing of a Frenchmade nuclear reactor in Iraq. In her address to the Security Council, Kirkpatrick noted that the
Middle East was combustible region, similar to the Balkans before the outbreak of World War I.
She pointed out that there were many issues that plagued the region including the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, the terrorist state of Libya and its occupation of
Chad, the territorial violations of Lebanon by its neighbors, and, the most recent crisis – Israel’s
attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Though acknowledging that Israel had not exhausted all
diplomatic means before acting, and that its actions had damaged the peace and security of the
region, Kirkpatrick maintained that Israel’s actions should not be taken out of context. The
ambassador noted that Iraq had refused to acknowledge the existence or legitimacy of the Israeli
state, and thus the Israeli attack was essentially a defensive maneuver or preemptive strike
against an enemy state armed with weapons of mass destruction. Kirkpatrick declared that the
United States was a proud friend and ally of Israel and that it would not approve of any decision
made by the U.N. that would either harm Israel’s basic interests or be overly punitive.381
Wielding the threat of a Security Council veto, Kirkpatrick was able to mitigate the
language of the resulting resolution. Resolution 487 strongly condemned the Israeli attack as a
violation of the U.N. Charter, called for Israel to both refrain from such attacks in the future and
to place its own nuclear facilities under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
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and maintained that Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction brought about by
the attack.382
Though she was successful in toning down the language of the Security Council’s
resolution regarding the Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, Kirkpatrick was unable to do the
same when the General Assembly began discussions of a resolution entitled “The Situation in the
Middle East”. By a vote of 109 in favor, 34 abstentions, and 2 opposed (the U.S. and Israel), the
General Assembly passed a resolution that expressed support for the Palestinian people and other
Arab nations in their struggle against Israeli ‘aggression and occupation’. The resolution went on
to condemn Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, along with its treatment
of peoples in those areas. The General Assembly’s white paper declared that the strategic
cooperation between the U.S. and Israel only encouraged the latter to pursue aggressive and
expansionist policies. The resolution called upon all states to put an end to the flow to Israel of
any military or economic resources that might encourage its aggression.383
In an address before the General Assembly, Kirkpatrick strenuously objected to the use of
the word ‘aggression’ and insisted that Israel’s actions should be taken within the proper context.
Kirkpatrick also questioned why the resolution called for nations to desist in giving aid to Israel,
yet failed to condemn those nations supplying arms to Israel’s enemies. She declared that the
ongoing debate and its subsequent resolution were frivolous and served to divert attention from
the pursuit of peace and stability in the Middle East.384
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The day before she delivered her address to the United Nations, The New Republic
published an article by Kirkpatrick entitled “Dishonoring Sadat”. The piece celebrated the
bravery of the Egyptian leader in signing the Camp David Accords with Israel and called for
other Arab leaders to follow his lead. Kirkpatrick was inspired to write the piece when American
and foreign pundits began questioning the outcomes of foreign policies that depended or
appeared to depend on the survival of a ‘strong man’. Many were comparing Sadat’s death to the
fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 – both were powerful authoritarian leaders, important to the
United States, whose governments rested upon personal power, and who were abruptly removed
from the scene.
Though many liberals continued to express doubt concerning the wisdom of relying on
agreements with authoritarian regimes, Kirkpatrick argued that the political realities of the
Middle East forced the U.S. to do just that. The U.N. Ambassador pointed out that the tradition
of paternalistic authority was strong in the region. She wrote:
The truth is that we cannot control the governments of the area or choose the rulers. We
cannot structure their institutions or transform their beliefs. We have no magic wand to
turn the Moslem states that stretch from North Africa to South Asia into replicas of
modern, secular, democratic nations living harmoniously with one another. We must deal
with them as we find them: authoritarian, traditional, deeply religious, subject to the
kinds of instabilities characteristic of personal autocracies. These last include periodic
rebellions, chronic succession crises, and complicated personal rivalries, all of which
have culminated repeatedly in war.385

Although the governments of the Middle East shared many similarities, Kirkpatrick was quick to
point out that the Arab states remained heavily divided: Iraq was at war with Iran, Libya was
exporting terrorism throughout the region, Syria was destabilizing Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia
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and Jordan were experiencing internal turmoil due to radical politics associated with the PLO.
Meanwhile, Soviet expansionism threatened the entire region.386
“In need of a unifying factor – beyond language and religion,” she wrote, “many Arabs
have associated themselves with the cause of radical Palestinian nationalism. This cause is
closely related to… hostility to the state of Israel.”387 Kirkpatrick maintained that it was not
surprising that Israel had become a special object of hatred in the region; after all, it was a
modern, democratic, egalitarian, Jewish state in the midst of traditional, authoritarian, classbased, Moslem societies. According to her:
The PLO wins acceptance from modern Arab nations because their leaders have been
persuaded that the link between faith and politics calls for the destruction of Israel, and
the PLO is the group most militantly dedicated to that cause… the ideological appeal of
jihad – which provides a certain sense of Arab unity – is reinforced by terror, selectively,
effectively, and ruthlessly employed. The ideology that links faith, politics, the
destruction of Israel, and Palestinian nationalism is continually reinforced by violence
and fear. Note, however, that the same linkage covertly commits traditional Arab rulers to
strengthening the radical forces, which are carriers of revolutionary politics hostile to
their own survival. The PLO thus enlists traditional Arab rulers in their own destruction.
Never has the dialectical ‘cunning of history’ operated more clearly to enlist the powerful
in the struggle for their own undoing.388

Kirkpatrick declared that there were three urgent problems that American foreign policy
needed to address in the region. First, the U.S. should work to prevent the Soviet Union from
invading, occupying, or incorporating by other means additional Arab lands into the Soviet
sphere of influence. Second, the U.S. should strengthen those regimes friendly to, or compatible
with, American interests. Kirkpatrick maintained that reinforcing moderate Arab governments
would enhance regional order and help prevent the transformation of such regimes into threats.
Third, the U.S. must protect Israel against its sworn enemies. The political scientist declared that
386
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the United States was tied to Israel though security interests, common democratic political
systems, by honor, and by a mutual membership in an ancient community of values (Western
Civilization and Judeo-Christian heritage).389
Overall, Kirkpatrick contended, the primary obstacle to peace had been the refusal of the
Arab governments to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Sadat, she claimed, embodied the solution
to all of the problems facing the U.S. in the region. He was a devout Muslim, a revolutionary
leader, and a friend of the United States and Israel; he was a serious Muslim who was both
dedicated to the Arab cause and committed to finding a solution to the Palestinian issue. She
noted:
Anwar Sadat struck out in new directions… he insisted that his separate peace did not
imply indifference to Palestinian aspirations and well-being. He insisted that the PLO
was not the custodian of Palestinian aspirations; that Israel’s existence was not
incompatible with Arab self-fulfillment; and that frank friendship with the U.S. was the
route to regional order, national independence, and economic development in the Middle
East. What is most needed now is that other Arab leaders match Sadat’s courage,
originality, and tolerance.390

In December of 1981, less than a month after Kirkpatrick published “Dishonoring Sadat”,
the Arab-Israeli conflict again resurfaced as a topic of debate within the General Assembly. By
this time, the ambassador had become noticeably frustrated with the body’s ‘obsession’ with
Israel and the refusal of the Arab states to follow Sadat’s lead. In an address before the General
Assembly entitled “Perpetuating the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, the ambassador criticized the U.N.
for passing resolutions that both repudiated the Camp David Accords which she described as ‘the
sole existing framework’ for bringing about a settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors,
and enhanced the status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an organization that
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refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. “The adoption of these resolutions by the General
Assembly,” she stated, “diminishes the ability of the United Nations to further the cause of peace
in the Middle East.”391
Noting that the title of the debate was “The Situation in the Middle East”, Kirkpatrick
called upon the world body to discuss the numerous issues that threatened the peace and stability
within the region such as the Iran-Iraq War, the destabilization of Lebanon, Libya’s subversion
and terrorism, and the threat of Soviet expansion.392 “All of these issues should be of vital
concern to this Assembly,” Kirkpatrick stated, “instead, the focus of this debate has again been
on one item and one item alone: the Arab-Israeli conflict.”393 The ambassador pointed out that
nothing was accomplished by the endless stream of criticism directed at Israel. “What are the
people of my country to conclude,” she queried, “when they witness year after year these
condemnations of Israel, a friend and fellow democracy?”394 Rather than focusing on the ArabIsraeli conflict, the American ambassador urged the U.N. to devote its energies towards a nonpartisan effort to achieve a permanent peace in the Middle East.
On the same day that Kirkpatrick was defending America’s ally to the General Assembly,
Israel passed legislation annexing the Golan Heights, territory initially seized from Syria in 1967.
Tel Aviv’s action prompted an investigation by the U.N. Security Council which was followed
by debate within the General Assembly. On January 20, 1982 Jeane Kirkpatrick addressed the
Security Council and stated her country’s opposition to a pending resolution criticizing Israel’s
actions. She claimed that the resolution was an aberration and a perversion of the purpose of the
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Security Council. According to her, the Council had the responsibility to first deal with activities
that threatened world peace and security, and second, to prevent an aggravation of a situation.
Kirkpatrick declared that the proposed resolution would only exacerbate tensions in the region.
The ambassador maintained that the U.S. would never approve of Israel annexing the Golan
Heights, and claimed that there was doubt in Washington that such an annexation had even
occurred. Instead of focusing on a non-event, the U.N. should direct its attention towards other,
more pressing issues. “What an extraordinary institution this is that, in the more than a month
since the massive, brutal repression of the people of Poland got under way,” she stated, “there
has been no mention here of the violations of their human rights.”395
With the U.S. veto blocking any action by the Security Council on this matter, the
General Assembly called an Emergency Special Session to discuss the Golan Heights. Not
surprisingly, the Assembly passed a resolution against Israel despite American opposition. “The
Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories” regretted that one vote from a permanent member of
the U.N. Security Council prevented that body from doing its job in dealing with Israel in
January. It went on to strongly condemn Israel for its actions in the region, declared that it was
illegal for the state to take over the Golan Heights, and that its decision to do so constituted
aggression. Moreover, the resolution claimed that in order for there to be a comprehensive and
just peace in the Middle East, there must be the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli
forces from Palestine and other Arab territories which had been occupied since 1967. Finally, the
document stated that Israel’s actions made it clear that it was not a peace-loving state and the
Assembly called on all member states to refrain from selling weapons to Israel, to suspend
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economic, financial, and technological assistance and cooperation with Israel, and to sever
diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations with the Jewish state.396
Kirkpatrick was outraged by the tone and text of the resolution. In a speech entitled “This
Miserable Resolution”, the United States Ambassador noted that her country opposed both the
ends and the means of the resolution because it called for unreasonably punitive measures in
order to get revenge and retribution. Kirkpatrick declared that the U.N. should be devoted to
building peace and security instead of deepening divisions and exacerbating conflicts. According
to her, the resolution undermined the integrity of the U.N. and demonstrated that any institution
could be made to serve purposes remote from its raison d’etre – the United Nations, conceived as
a palace of reason, was now being used to polarize nations and spread hostility.397
Though the ambassador had previously denied that an annexation had occurred,
Kirkpatrick now claimed that the U.S. had called upon Tel Aviv to rescind the decrees
incorporating Golan Heights into Israel and to reaffirm its commitment to a negotiated settlement
in the region. She declared that Israel had acquiesced to American requests and that the only
constructive role for the U.N. at this point was to facilitate such negotiations. The ambassador
maintained that Israel had not committed an act of aggression as “no shots were fired, no soldiers
were brought into place.”398 She also objected to the “barely veiled attack on the United States”
in the paragraph referencing the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council
and defended the right of the U.S. to use its veto to block actions that it deemed seriously
flawed.399
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The American ambassador continued her defense of Israel in the following months as the
Assembly refused to budge and convened another special emergency session. In a speech entitled
“War by other Means” she stated:
But who among us sincerely believes that the exercise in which we are now engaged –
this ‘resumed’ emergency special session – will take us closer toward the goal? Who
among us believes that the cause of peace is served by still another round of bitter
denunciation of Israel? Who among us – I wonder – believes that peace is even the goal
of this assembly? This Assembly can repeat its familiar and unbalanced charges, it can
issue flamboyant ultimata, and adopt ever harsher resolutions, all with the usual
predictable effect. That effect will be to increase – not reduce – tensions; to inflame – not
to calm – passions; to widen – not to narrow – divisions; and to make war more, not less,
likely to take place. The fact that this institution, conceived to resolve conflicts is thus
used to exacerbate and embitter divisions among nations is the cruelest of ironies.400

Kirkpatrick concluded that the ultimate goal of the resolution was to delegitimize Israel. By
claiming that Israel was not a peace-loving state and that it had violated several provisions of the
U.N. Charter, the resolution was laying the groundwork to expel Israel from the institution. “This
special session and its accompanying draft resolutions are one more clear example of a strategy
whose goals and tactics are clear,” she declared, “use a United Nations body to make ‘official’
demands incompatible with Israel’s security and survival.”401 Thus, when Israel failed to comply,
members could ‘prove’ that Israel was an international law-breaker and unworthy of membership
in the community of peace-loving states.402
Over the next three years, the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to be discussed in the
United Nations. Each time the subject was broached, Kirkpatrick came to Israel’s defense. The
American representative likened the General Assembly’s ongoing indictment of Israel as
representing the justice of Alice in Wonderland – where the Assembly (Queen of Hearts) had
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repeatedly found Israel (Alice) guilty of numerous offenses without thoroughly investigating the
situation and ignoring the context in which events occurred.403 She continued to defend the
United States’ alliance with Israel and refused to accept the Assembly’s charges that American
aid to Israel allowed the nation to continue to ignore U.N. resolutions.
The ambassador often criticized the United Nations for its treatment of Israel, especially
to Jewish organizations. In October of 1982, Kirkpatrick spoke of her disillusionment with the
U.N. to the B’nai B’rith International, an organization founded in 1843 to protect and advocate
for Jews around the world.404In her speech, entitled “An Unrelenting Assault”, the ambassador
noted that both the U.N. and the state of Israel were born out of World War II and the fight
against Nazism. She then lamented the fact that the U.N. was now involved in an assault against
the one state that served as a haven for the survivors of Nazi persecution.
Indeed, Kirkpatrick appears to have bought into the notion that opposition to Israeli
policies was proof of prejudice against Jews. The American ambassador declared that the United
Nations had become a hot-bed of anti-Semitism. Such sentiment had increased after a 1975
General Assembly resolution declared that Zionism was the equivalent of racism. Kirkpatrick
pointed out that over 150 anti-Israel resolutions had been passed within the United Nations since
1945, and 25 of the 60 U.N. Security Council meetings in 1981 alone had dealt with Arab
complaints against Israel. Moreover, anti-Semitism had spilled over into the specialized agencies
of the United Nations, turning UNESCO, the WHO, the U.N. Conference on Women, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency ‘anti-Israeli platforms’.405 According to Kirkpatrick, this
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effort was being spearheaded by the Arab states and the Soviet Union, who, in order to get a
majority within the U.N., made a deal with the African bloc: the Arabs and the Soviets promised
to support the African position against South Africa if the Africans supported the Arab position
against Israel. Such an agreement between blocs allowed for the Arab position against Israel to
have an automatic majority within the General Assembly, along with power within the
specialized agencies.
In Kirkpatrick’s mind, the campaign within the United Nations against Israel was part of
“a systematic, totalitarian assault on language and meaning”406 comparable to both the preHolocaust German ordinances that dehumanized and discriminated against Jews and the signs of
impending German aggression in Europe in the 1930s. This totalitarian assault on language and
meaning, “inspired by the Soviets, elaborated upon by Arab speakers hostile to Israel, and now
freely used by anti-Israel militants,”407 redefined Palestinian Arabs as ‘the Jews of the Arab
world’ and Israel as the Nazis of the Middle East. Indeed, according to Kirkpatrick, the entire
discourse within the U.N. had been appropriated by totalitarian verbal imperialism so that
despotic governments were called ‘democratic’, policies intended to incite war were deemed
‘peaceful’, measures imposed by terror were termed ‘popular’, and where reactionary tactics
were called ‘progressive’.408 This type of rhetorical perversion, which served to invert the
meanings of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, was especially clear to Kirkpatrick in the institution’s treatment of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The ambassador noted that on the same day in
1975 that the General Assembly passed the ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution, it also affirmed the
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legitimacy of the PLO and endowed it with the rights of a member state, going so far as to
establish a permanent committee with a large budget to promote the interest of the PLO. Now
declared a ‘national liberation movement’, the PLO could ‘legitimately’ use force against Israel;
meanwhile Israel’s use of force to defend itself against the PLO would be characterized as
aggression.409
Kirkpatrick was adamant that the U.S. was determined to see Israel receive fair treatment
at the United Nations; however, she conceded that such a goal was most likely utopian for no
matter what Israel did, it was unlikely to get fair play in the international arena.410 Nonetheless,
the ambassador assured her audience that the United States would never support U.N. resolutions
or statements that characterized Israel as aggressive or not a peace-loving state, as these were not
consistent with American policies.411
The Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan
Given Kirkpatrick’s education in the evils of totalitarianism, along with the Reagan
Administration’s emphasis on containing communism, it is not surprising that she spoke out
frequently and adamantly in the United Nations against the activities of the Soviet Union, most
notably, its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in 1979, Carter had initiated limited covert aid. Reagan increased American military
aid; however, despite his anti-communist rhetoric, he did not dramatically increase assistance to
the mujahidin until 1985. Whereas the United States often stood alone in its opposition to
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resolutions passed by the General Assembly involving either Israel or South Africa, the
superpower received widespread support for resolutions denouncing the Kremlin. Indeed, other
nations assisted the administration in providing covert military aid to Afghani
“freedom fighters” including communist China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Though Russia’s
status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council allowed it to veto any resolutions
that criticized its actions, each year throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure, the General Assembly
passed resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. And each
time the subject was broached, Jeane Kirkpatrick was there, reminding the U.N. of the plight of
the Afghan people, the atrocities committed by the Red Army, the dangers of totalitarianism, and
the bravery of the Afghan “freedom fighters”.
Kirkpatrick first spoke of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in November of 1981. In her
address to the General Assembly, the ambassador described the incursion as a momentous event
that altered the climate and course of world politics.412 The ambassador described the invasion as
a grave violation of the United Nations’ Charter that shook the very foundations of world order.
Soviet aggression shattered the prospects for stability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf,
severely aggravated tensions between East and West, and, more than anything, marked a
“watershed in the postwar era, bringing to a definitive conclusion a period of optimism
concerning the evolution of Soviet policy and intentions.”413 Of course, as a member of the CPD
and a Cold Warrior, Kirkpatrick had been warning Americans of the danger of the Soviet Union
throughout the détente era or ‘period of optimism’, long before the 1979 attack on Afghanistan.
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In her ongoing indictment of the Kremlin, Kirkpatrick observed that nearly three million
people, roughly 1/5 the population of Afghanistan, had been forced to flee from their country. In
addition to the large numbers of refugees, thousands of people had been killed. Whole villages
were being destroyed, mosques had been desecrated, religious leaders imprisoned or murdered,
schools turned into centers of political indoctrination, and Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure,
power and communication networks, and hospitals had all been severely damaged. According to
the ambassador, the significant economic and social progress that had accompanied the decade of
‘democratic freedoms and representative government brought about by the 1964 constitution’
had been totally undone.414
The Soviets, she charged, had worked hard to prevent the world from seeing just how
destructive their occupation had been to the Afghan people. They sealed the country off from
journalists and other foreign observers and banned entrance to humanitarian organizations such
as the International Red Cross. Meanwhile, the Soviets utilized thousands of booby-trapped
mines disguised as ordinary household items or toys against the Afghan people despite the fact
that they had previously signed an international convention prohibiting the use of such weapons.
According to Kirkpatrick, such actions demonstrated the true character of the Soviet Union.415
In addition to noting the suffering of the Afghan people at the hands of the Red Army,
Kirkpatrick made it her business to deconstruct any justifications offered by the Soviets for their
invasion and occupation of the Middle Eastern state. The ambassador maintained that it was
impossible for them to justify their actions based on any meaningful interpretation of
international law. Kabul had not attacked the Soviet Union, and historically, it did not pose a
threat to the Kremlin. Indeed, the two states had peacefully coexisted for decades. In fact,
414
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Afghanistan was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of states determined to stay
out of the Cold War. Moscow stated that it felt threatened by the turmoil inside Afghanistan, but
aside from student riots in 1965 and a brief period of unrest following a coup in 1973,
Kirkpatrick proclaimed that tranquility had reigned throughout Afghanistan until the
Communists violently seized power in 1978. The Soviet Union claimed to fear the rising tide of
Islamic fundamentalism in the region which might eventually infect the Soviet Empire, but
Kirkpatrick argued that the Afghan people were not fundamentalists and were tolerant of other
faiths.416
The Soviet’s primary justification for entering into Afghanistan was that they were
invited in by the Kabul regime which had invoked its right to self-defense. Kirkpatrick claimed
that this, too, was a lie as not a shred of evidence had been produced to support such allegations.
Moreover, she claimed that the Soviet invasion preceded the institution of the regime that
professed to have invited the Soviets in. Furthermore, the ambassador maintained that the Kabul
regime had no legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people as it existed only by virtue of Soviet
actions. Evidence of this could be found in the fact that large numbers of Afghani freedom
fighters continued to resist the Red Army and the puppet regime. According to Kirkpatrick, the
Kabul regime was nothing more than an appendage of Moscow, maintained in power by the
presence of 85,000 Soviet troops that allowed for the Soviets to direct all aspects of
Afghanistan’s administration, its military, and the nation’s natural resources.417The American
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ambassador called upon the assembly to support the resolution against the Soviet Union which it
did with an overwhelming majority.418
In November of 1982, 1983, and 1984 debate over the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan resurfaced within the General Assembly. Each time that the matter was broached
within the Assembly, the American ambassador delivered lengthy addresses denouncing the
Soviet Union. Kirkpatrick provided details of the atrocities committed by the Red Army against
the Afghan people, including specific instances of rape, torture, murder, the destruction of
villages and infrastructure, and the use of chemical weapons. On every occasion, she praised the
struggles of the Afghan freedom fighters and urged them to continue their fight against
incorporation into the Soviet empire. Kirkpatrick continued to insist that the Afghan struggle had
a much broader meaning. “If a small, relatively defenseless, nonaligned country like Afghanistan
is allowed to be invaded, brutalized, and subjugated,” she stated, “what other similarly
vulnerable country can feel secure?”419
The American ambassador warned members that totalitarianism was once more on the
march. “With the Soviet invasion of 1979,” she stated, “a totalitarian, one-party state ruled by the
Afghan communists has given way to a totalitarian apparatus completely controlled by the Soviet
Union.”420 According to Kirkpatrick, the communist totalitarian drive to totally restructure
society was already underway inside Afghanistan. She stated:
Perhaps the most significant is the Soviet effort to reshape Afghan culture and to replace
the decimated intellectual and middle classes with a new elite trained in the Soviet mold.
418
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Thousands of Afghans, including even children between the ages of six and nine, are
being trained in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries, while the Afghan educational
system itself is being restructured along Soviet lines. The Sovietization of Kabul
University is made evident by the presence of Soviet advisers at all levels of
administration and instruction and in the preference given to party activists in admissions.
The curriculum of Afghanistan’s primary education system has been redrawn to promote
indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology and to prepare young Afghans for further
study in the Soviet Union.421

Kirkpatrick asserted that the ‘Sovietization’ of Afghanistan was accompanied by the terror and
repression characteristic of totalitarian states. Secret police terrorized the Afghan population, and
the number of political prisoners only increased as time went on: arbitrary arrests, detention, and
torture were common tactics used by the secret police and the Red Army. Meanwhile, the
government had destroyed freedom of speech, press, and political expression.422
As usual with Soviet foreign policy, ideology had been married to long-standing Russian
strategic objectives. According to Kirkpatrick, the Soviet Union constituted a contemporary
embodiment of the Russian Empire as it existed under tsarist rule. Since the time of the tsars,
Russian leaders had pursued the dream of a warm water port on the Indian Ocean; therefore,
domination of Afghanistan was essential to the fulfillment of Russian historical territorial
aspirations.423 “The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is a clear and blatant example
of imperialist expansion,” the ambassador declared, “the fulfillment of a long-standing Soviet,
and before that Tsarist, goal.”424Should it be successful in the annexation of Afghanistan, the
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ambassador argued, the Soviet Union would then have a geopolitical access to Iran and
Pakistan.425
The Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia
On December 25, 1978, exactly one year before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan,
the communist government of Vietnam had invaded the neighboring state of Cambodia. Whereas
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted the first instance of the Soviets using direct
military force outside of the Soviet bloc since World War II, the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia was the first and only extended war between two communist nations. Though the
Reagan Administration repeatedly expressed opposition to communist expansion, the uniqueness
of this situation, the American defeat in Vietnam, previous U.S. actions throughout Indochina,
and the complicated ties and rivalries that existed between Vietnam, the Soviet Union, China,
and Cambodia inhibited Washington’s ability and will to act. Accordingly, covert aid to
‘freedom fighters’ in Cambodia remained quite limited throughout Reagan’s tenure. For one,
there was a large, disparate coalition of insurgents, including the Khmer Rouge, fighting against
the Vietnamese. American policymakers were concerned that military aid might fall into the
hands of the Khmer Rouge, allowing them to regain control in Cambodia. For another, despite
the administration’s assertion that previous efforts at containing communism in Indochina had
been morally right, nobody in Washington was eager to launch another intervention in the
region. For these reasons, Kirkpatrick did not deliver as many forceful addresses to the United
Nations regarding this situation even though the United Nations General Assembly debated the
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issue and passed resolutions against Vietnam nearly every year throughout her tenure.426
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick was not an expert on Asian politics. In her own collection of state
documents, she included her speeches regarding Cambodia in the chapter devoted primarily to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was most likely done because the political scientist
considered Vietnam to be a puppet of the Soviet Union and believed that the Soviet Union was
behind Vietnam’s actions in Indochina.
In October of 1981, Kirkpatrick addressed the General Assembly stating that it had been
nearly three years since the “Socialist Republic of Vietnam, supported and financed by the
Soviet Union” first invaded and occupied Cambodia; meanwhile, nearly 200,000 Vietnamese
troops still occupied the country.427Kirkpatrick noted that the people of Cambodia had suffered
greatly in previous years, having been “ravaged by a succession of horrors, including three
decades of war and the savage destruction of Pol Pot”; if that weren’t enough they were now
enduring conquest and occupation by their historic adversaries.428 Despite the fact that the
Vietnamese had overthrown the hated Khmer Rouge regime and were welcomed by some
Cambodians as liberators, the American ambassador claimed that the Vietnamese occupation of
Phnom Penh not only victimized Cambodians, but also all of the peoples of Southeast Asia, and
that the entire region was suffering under the oppressive tyranny of Vietnam. “The pursuit of an
unpopular war has caused widespread misery within Vietnam,” she argued, “and imperialist

426

The literature on the war between Vietnam and Cambodia remains rather slim: For an
overview see: McMahon, Robert J. The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia
Since World War II. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). See also: Morris, Stephen.
Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and Causes of the War. (CA: Stanford
University Press, 1999).
427
Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force, Volume Two. Address before the U.N. General Assembly,
October 19, 1981, “Cambodia’s Right to Self-Determination”, 287.
428
Ibid.
170

adventures have necessitated escalation of the already scandalous level of oppression inside
Vietnam.”429
As in the case with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Kirkpatrick attacked Vietnam’s
justifications for invading its neighbor. Vietnam claimed that it had entered Cambodia at the
request of the Heng Samrin regime. This justification, according to Kirkpatrick, was absurd,
especially as that regime did not even exist at the time of the Vietnamese invasion. “In this as in
other respects,” she stated, “the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is strikingly, tragically
analogous to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”430 Furthermore, the Vietnamese professed
themselves to be the liberators of the Cambodian people. This, too, was a lie, she argued. For
one, Kirkpatrick insisted that it was Vietnam that had brought the Pol Pot regime to power. She
continued along this theme in future addresses before the Assembly, arguing that the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam “must bear a full measure of responsibility for the tragic tyranny of the
Khmer Rouge. Vietnam’s support was critical to the Khmer rouge victory in 1975… Vietnam
only deposed Pol Pot when it became apparent that it could not dominate and control the Khmer
Rouge.”431 Moreover, Kirkpatrick blamed Hanoi for using Cambodia in its war against South
Vietnam, a move that resulted in massive destruction throughout the country. Therefore,
Vietnam’s contention that its invasion of Cambodia was prompted by a concern for the human
rights of the Kampuchean people “constituted a falsehood that was as offensive as it was
egregious”.432
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Kirkpatrick implored the Vietnamese and their Soviet patrons to join in negotiations to
resolve the tragic plight of the Cambodian people. She also expressed support for a resolution
calling for a U.N. supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia. It also contained
provisions for the security needs of Cambodia, had safeguards to ensure that armed political
factions would be unable to disrupt, intimidate, or coerce the outcome of free elections, and
emphasized the need for an independent Cambodia to remain neutral. The resolution also called
upon Vietnam to participate in the negotiation process. The General Assembly adopted the
resolution by a large majority.433
Namibian Independence and South Africa
With the exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, no issue dominated the United Nations’
agenda throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure more than that of Namibian independence. Because the
U.N. viewed South African rule over Namibia as illegal, discussion of Namibian independence
almost always led to the vilification of Pretoria.434 Many member states viewed South African
rule as a vestige of European colonialism and spoke out frequently against its policies of
apartheid. Though the United States had gone on record favoring the establishment of an
independent Namibia, its ties to South Africa often left Kirkpatrick standing alone in support for
Pretoria. Due to historic ‘ties’, the United States and South Africa could sometimes count on the
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support of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany; but, as was the case with
Israel, the U.S. was often the sole nation within the United Nations overtly defending the
interests of Pretoria. This put Kirkpatrick in the position of appearing to support European
colonialism.
The Reagan Administration’s policy in regards to South Africa and Namibian
independence was known as ‘constructive engagement’. Constructive engagement, a method in
which pressure could be brought to bear on countries to improve their human rights records
while maintaining cordial diplomatic relations and profitable economic contacts, represented an
attempt to reconcile two ideals of American foreign policy – the spread of democracy and the
containment of communism. As was the case with other regions, American policies towards
southern Africa were dominated by Cold War concerns. A communist regime, maintained in
power by the presence of thousands of Cuban troops, governed Angola, a state that shared a
border with Namibia. Despite the racist, imperialist nature of South Africa, it was an anticommunist state that fought against various communist regimes in the region. Moreover, its
occupation of Namibia was seen as a bulwark against communist expansion. Thus, Reagan and
company were reluctant to apply pressure to Pretoria in the name of either Namibian
independence or the end of apartheid. Indeed, constructive engagement linked Namibian
independence to the total withdrawal of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola.
In a speech before the Overseas Press Club, Kirkpatrick laid out the administration’s
goals and policies towards Namibia and South Africa. Why was the United Nations obsessed
with Namibia, she queried, why not deal with the Libyan invasion of Chad, or the Soviet threat
to Poland, the destruction of Lebanon, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Kirkpatrick
asserted that the reason that the U.N. was ‘seized’ with Namibia was because it was an institution
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that specialized in certain kinds of issues, most notably ‘decolonization’.435Furthermore, she
claimed that the U.N. liked to deal with issues that were not of serious concern to the major
global powers. Thus, the issue of Namibian independence and its occupation by South Africa
was ‘safer’ to focus on than the illegal occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.
Kirkpatrick characterized the socio-economic make-up of the African state as a large,
ethnically heterogeneous territory, rich in minerals, and poor in political experience. Similar to
South Africa, Namibia’s population was predominantly black, with a small minority of white
Europeans. The black population was dominated by the Ovambo tribe – predominantly poor,
with only a very small middle class. Thus, wealth was concentrated primarily in the hands of the
Afrikaaner, German, and English (or white) population. Kirkpatrick described Namibia’s ruler,
South Africa, as a medium-sized power that did not constitute a major threat to any state within
the international arena except to its immediate neighbors and “some of its own population.”436
Kirkpatrick maintained that the principal goal of the Reagan administration was to see
Namibia achieve independence; however, since Namibia had the world’s largest uranium
deposits, a concomitant goal of the U.S. was to prevent the mineral-rich territory from falling
into the Soviet sphere of influence. Furthermore, the administration was determined not to sour
its good relations with surrounding African states (South Africa) in its dealings regarding the
issue of Namibian independence. Complicating matters was the presence of approximately
30,000 Cuban troops in neighboring Angola. Kirkpatrick gave no credence to the notion that the
Cuban troops would leave once Namibia was independent and South Africa’s troops were pulled
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away from the border of Angola. Instead, the U.S. asserted that the Cubans would use Angola as
a base of operations to spread communist influence throughout the region.437
The number of political actors involved in the issue, including SWAPO, DTA, South
Africa, the United Nations, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, further
complicated any attempts at negotiating independence for Namibia. The South West Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO) was the oldest, best-established coalition dedicated to
Namibian independence. Though dominated by the Ovambo, SWAPO was, according to
Kirkpatrick, a mixed bag: some were nationalists and some were enthusiastic supporters of
Marxism-Leninism and closely tied to the Soviet Union. There were minor parties in Namibia,
but Kirkpatrick only named one – the Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a predominantly white party
tied closely to South African government. Though she acknowledged that the DTA appeared to
not be as ‘strong’ as SWAPO, the ambassador claimed that “one cannot accurately estimate the
popular strength of a group in the absence of either free elections or careful opinion polls.”438
In addition to political parties inside Namibia, one of the major actors involved in this
issue was, of course, South Africa. Kirkpatrick described South Africa as a democracy on top
and an authoritarian system on the bottom – meaning that its white population enjoyed all of the
rights and protections of citizens living in a democracy, while the majority of its population, nonwhites, suffered under authoritarian rule. According to the ambassador, South Africa’s white
population identified with Europe, considered itself to be an heir to Judeo-Christian, Western
Civilization, and was deeply concerned about being accepted as such by the Western world. This
desire to be accepted, she claimed, constituted an important factor in the equation as they might
eventually submit to Western pressure to end apartheid. Moreover, though racist, the South
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African government featured a rule of law which was “of course, a protection to the population, a
restraint on government, and a lever for peaceable change.”439
In addition to SWAPO, the DTA, and South Africa, the United Nations and Western
European nations were also political actors involved in the Namibian equation. According to
Kirkpatrick, the United Nations’ decision to recognize SWAPO, a national liberation
organization comprised of communist elements, as the sole authentic representative of the
Namibian people demonstrated partisanship and “tarnished its credentials” as a fair mediator in
Namibia.440 As for Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Kirkpatrick
noted that they had large investments in Africa which gave them a ‘special stake’ in the
region.441
The United Nations, she proclaimed, was ‘seized’ with obtaining Namibian independence
via Resolution 435. This resolution was passed in 1978 and called for the following: the
withdrawal of South Africa’s illegal administration of Namibia so that power could be
transferred to the people of Namibia, and the establishment of a U.N. Transition Assistance
Group (UNTAG) which would remain in place for one year in order to ensure free elections
under the supervision and control of the U.N. It welcomed SWAPO’s cooperation in signing and
observing a ceasefire during this transitional period, and called upon South Africa to cooperate
with the U.N. in this endeavor.442 Kirkpatrick maintained that the U.S. was in favor of this
resolution, but that it had many ‘gaps’ that the Reagan Administration was concerned about. For
one, it failed to envision what kind of regime would emerge following elections; for another, it
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failed to state who would govern Namibia in the interim. The ambassador asserted that the U.S.
would only support the resolution if such issues were resolved, if it included a provision for the
protection of minority rights in Namibia, and if it provided a framework that would protect
Namibian independence once it was won.443
In her first year at the United Nations, Kirkpatrick spoke before the General Assembly
and the Security Council about Namibia and South Africa on multiple occasions. In March of
1981, the General Assembly attempted to revoke South Africa’s credentials. Kirkpatrick was
angered by this move, and in a speech before the Assembly she pointed out that according to the
U.N. Charter, a member state could only be suspended or expelled upon the recommendation of
the Security Council. With the U.S. strongly opposed to this action and having permanent veto
power, South Africa could not be forced out of the U.N.444 The following month, Kirkpatrick
chastised the Security Council for its unwillingness to hear from representatives of the DTA.
“We do not purport to know how many Namibians support this party or any other party. We will
not know the answer to that question unless or until free elections are held in that country,” she
stated, “we only know that some Namibians support this party.” Should the Council refuse, then
the fundamental principles of fairness, democratic spirit, and evenhandedness upon which the
United Nations was founded would be violated, thus damaging the organization’s capacity to act
as a peacemaker and impartial mediator.445
In April of 1981, the Security Council passed four different resolutions regarding the
occupation of Namibia by South Africa, all of which were vetoed by the United States, the
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United Kingdom, and France.446 Kirkpatrick mounted a vigorous defense of the Western powers
in debates. “There have been charges that the Western countries… have failed to achieve the
goal of an independent, stable, self-governing Namibia,” she proclaimed, “It has been suggested
that because the Western Contact Group… have substantial economic relations with South
Africa, they are somehow responsible for the continuation of repression in South Africa.”447This
was not true, the ambassador declared. Moreover, in an effort to distance her country from such
charges, Kirkpatrick alluded to the actions of the Soviet bloc in the region:
My government has no other objective than to achieve authentic independence and selfgovernment for Namibia and indeed I believe that all the Western Contact Group has no
other objective than this. We have no territorial objectives in Africa. We have no
aspiration to station thousands of our troops in African countries. We have no desire to
send armed surrogates to subvert the independence of the new states of Africa. We have
no desire to divide this body or to divert its attention from the problem of selfgovernment for Namibia to the creation of divisive decisions here.448
In addition to denying the charges levelled against the U.S. and other Western nations,
Kirkpatrick opposed the resolutions’ calls for sanctions against South Africa. The ambassador
maintained that the Reagan Administration did not view economic sanctions as an effective
means of influencing political policy. Moreover, the administration did not see sanctions as a
‘realistic alternative’ to future efforts to resolve the issue peacefully by negotiation. Kirkpatrick
argued that sanctions had not been effective against Italy in the 1930s or Rhodesia in the 1970s;
furthermore, neither had American sanctions against the Soviet Union following its invasion of

446

See, for example: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/14462 Last
accessed: 6/13/14
447
Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force, Volume Two, Address before the Security Council, April
23, 1981, “Solving the Problem of Namibia”, 309-10.
448
Ibid, 310.
178

Afghanistan.449Thus, given the historical ineffectiveness of sanctions, the United Nations should
cease in its efforts to force member nations to adopt them.
In 1984, the General Assembly passed several resolutions against South Africa and the
practice of apartheid. The U.S. either voted against or abstained from voting for each resolution
with the exception of one – The U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa which provided humanitarian
assistance to those persecuted under the apartheid system.450 American opposition to these
resolutions was widely criticized by U.N. member states. The ambassador declared that the U.S.
deplored and condemned apartheid “as we condemn all denial of full citizenship and rights of
full citizenship and of democracy to all citizens of all countries, unequivocally.”451
Unfortunately, ‘excesses of language’ prevented the U.S. from supporting these resolutions; for
example, the ‘direct, hostile, and unfair references’ to specific members of the United Nations. In
particular, the U.S. opposed the phrase “on account of the veto of the United States” as it implied
that aggression committed by South Africa against its neighbors was solely the result of the
American veto in the Security Council.452 Such implications were preposterous, she declared.
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Moreover, the language contained within the resolutions was calculated to discourage those
engaged in the effort to bring independence to Namibia. 453
Criticisms
The transition from college professor to policymaker was not an easy one for Kirkpatrick.
She took a leave of absence from her job at Georgetown in order to devote herself to her new
position which required her to travel frequently back and forth between New York and
Washington, DC. Being a U.N. Ambassador and member of the NSC also required her to travel
frequently around the globe. Inevitably, her new position forced her to spend more time away
from her husband and children. Moreover, as the first female Permanent Ambassador to the
United Nations from the United States and the first woman to sit on the National Security
Council and the National Security Planning Group, Kirkpatrick faced special pressures and
problems. In an interview with People Magazine in 1982, Kirkpatrick talked of the
complications of being a woman in a high governmental position:
A woman in high office is intrinsically controversial. Many people think a woman
shouldn't be in high office. Kissinger is described as 'professorial.' I am described as
'schoolmarmish.' Brzezinski is called 'Doctor.' I am called 'Mrs.' I am depicted as a witch
or a scold in editorial cartoons—and the speed with which these stereotypes have been
used shows how close these feelings are to the surface. It is much worse than I ever
dreamed it would be.454

Her gender also placed her appearance under scrutiny. Dating back to her adolescence and her
days at Stephens College, Kirkpatrick had never been interested in fashion, make-up, or
hairstyles. This ‘indifference’ regarding her appearance did not draw much criticism in academic
453

Ibid, 323.
“Ambassador Under Fire” by: Clare Crawford-Mason. People Magazine. June 28, 1982.
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20082519,00.html Accessed 12/9/13. NOTE: Searches
through newspapers and magazines back her up. She is almost always noted as ‘Mrs.’ rather than
‘Dr.’ Other derogatory references were made: see also: http://memory.loc.gov/ : Secretary of
State, Al Haig, referred to her as a ‘bitch’.
454

180

circles; however, it did land her on the worst dressed list of People Magazine in 1981. As a high
profile diplomat and policy-maker, Kirkpatrick was required to look the part. She was given a
make-over that included more make-up along with highlights and more fashionable clothing and
jewelry.455
In addition to having to adjust to a new job, sacrificing time with her husband and
children, and enduring difficulties due to her gender, Kirkpatrick also had to withstand public
and political scrutiny concerning her job performance. Assessments of Kirkpatrick’s tenure as
United Nations Ambassador, outside of conservative circles, have been generally critical.
Notable U.S. Ambassadors Since 1775: A Biographical Dictionary provides a brief biographical
sketch of Kirkpatrick, along with an overview of various important issues raised at the U.N.
during her tenure there. In the work, Kirkpatrick is described as an outsider who was not fond of
public and social functions. This, combined with her insistence on appointing her own team,
created additional distance between the U.S. mission and the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Many
career officers felt left out and resigned as Kirkpatrick and other ‘inexperienced outsiders’ took
over.456The author praised Kirkpatrick for standing up for American interests at the United
Nations, but also noted that the U.S. often stood alone in its support for both Israel and South
Africa, and in its opposition to disarmament issues and international agreements such as the Law
of the Sea Treaty. Finally, the author observed, it was under Kirkpatrick’s watch that the United
States government withdrew support from UNESCO (Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
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Organization of the U.N.) and had the voting records of countries recorded and passed on to
Congress to be used in the assessment of future aid requests.457
Seymour Maxwell Finger offers a much harsher assessment of Kirkpatrick as U.N.
Ambassador in his work American Ambassadors at the United Nations.458 According to Finger, a
major issue affecting her performance as ambassador was her negative view of the institution. He
criticized her both for repeatedly speaking ill of the United Nations and for exhibiting
confrontational attitudes towards other nations. Furthermore, Finger maintained that Kirkpatrick
had appointed persons to the U.S. mission based solely on their political views rather than their
experience in international diplomacy. The lack of experienced professionals, he charged,
handicapped the mission, its goals, and its relations with other national groups. Though he
praised her for defending American interests and standing up to the Soviets, Finger’s overall
analysis of her performance remained uncomplimentary. According to him, Kirkpatrick’s
ideological approach to international affairs, along with her frequent denunciations of the U.N.,
led to repeated unnecessary confrontations with Third World nations and resulted in diminished
support for American policies. Moreover, her speaking style, lack of diplomatic experience, and
inaccessibility hampered her effectiveness.
Both Gary Ostrower and Linda Fasulo offered negative assessments of Kirkpatrick’s
tenure as United Nations Ambassador in their respective works – The United Nations and the
United States and Representing America: Experiences of US Diplomats at the UN.459 Ostrower
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described Kirkpatrick as confrontational, blunt, acerbic, and angry – the most ideological of
Reagan’s foreign policy team. He accused her of alienating many at the U.N. and the State
Department and blamed her for the U.S. decision to cut funding from the U.N. and to withdraw
from UNESCO. Ostrower was particularly critical of her decision to keep track of nations’
voting habits in the United Nations in order to determine whether or not the U.S. should
acquiesce to future aid requests from them. Like Finger, Fasulo criticized Kirkpatrick for
frequently speaking negatively of the United Nations and for being confrontational. Her
willingness to bypass normal diplomatic channels in order to speak to the President one-on-one
was deemed ‘unprofessional’. Moreover, Fasulo points out that Kirkpatrick was not of the same
public stature as previous representatives, noting that this might be an indication of how the
Reagan Administration felt about the U.N.
The most positive assessment of Kirkpatrick’s performance as ambassador comes from
Allan Gerson, an international attorney who served as legal counsel and special assistant to
Kirkpatrick throughout her tenure at the United Nations. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy
without Apology 460focused on major issues that arose within the U.N. between 1981 and
Kirkpatrick’s resignation in April of 1985 and, as such, provides valuable insight into the
workings of the U.S. mission. Gerson does address an issue that Ostrower, Fasulo, and Finger
did not: Kirkpatrick’s influence over policy. He claimed that the political science professor had
more influence over foreign policy than any previous United Nations Ambassador.461Though
supportive of Kirkpatrick, Gerson’s descriptions of the workings of the United Nations were
overwhelmingly negative. The lawyer noted how frequently the U.S. was outnumbered and out-
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voted on numerous issues, never acknowledging any legitimacy in opposing viewpoints. This is
not surprising given his belief that traditional theories of international law constituted “makebelieve universalism”462, a sentiment that is reminiscent of Kirkpatrick’s distrust of ‘rational
utopianism’. Gerson maintained that with the creation of the U.N., international law was
erroneously seen as being able to overcome the multiple varied conceptions of justice and world
order held by different cultures. Indeed, international law was viewed as nothing less than a
guide to a promised land of universal peace. Gerson believed that instead of following traditional
theories of international law, the U.S. should have adopted a more national security oriented
approach.463 This theme – that United States policy should reflect American interests rather than
those associated with the United Nations Charter – was often repeated throughout the book,
making it quite clear that neither Kirkpatrick nor Gerson had much faith in multinational
institutions.
Keith Hindell, a British journalist, offers a more recent critique of Kirkpatrick’s time as
the American ambassador to the United Nations in his article “Madame Ambassador: An
Appraisal of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick as U.S Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 19811985”.464Hindell’s article analyzed the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, her performance within the United
Nations, and her influence on foreign policy. The reporter began by criticizing the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine’s assumption that right-wing dictatorships were somehow less repressive than other
dictatorial regimes. “In view of all the horrors inflicted by juntas in Argentina, Chile, Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil,” he wrote, “it was bizarre to speak up for
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‘traditional autocracies’.”465 Hindell went on to point out the number of times Kirkpatrick did not
know an answer during her confirmation hearing, implying that she was not qualified to be an
ambassador. Like Finger, Ostrower, and Fasulo, Hindell disapproved of Kirkpatrick and her
staff’s inexperience. “Despite being exposed as being less than the master of her brief,” he
asserted, “she scorned an induction proffered by the State Department and underlined her view
by appointing three outsiders to key positions in the UN mission, rejecting candidates from the
Foreign Service.”466
Hindell claimed that Kirkpatrick was at her best defending Israel at the United Nations,
something she had to do quite frequently. The journalist also praised her energy, noting that she
gave seventy speeches to the U.N. Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Third
Committee (the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee), that she regularly testified
before Congress, and that she wrote numerous articles during her tenure. However, Hindell
asserted that Kirkpatrick’s speeches failed to have a marked effect on the voting patterns of
member states, and he described her as more of an advocate than a diplomat.467Unlike Gerson,
Hindell maintained that Kirkpatrick had little influence over the Reagan Administration’s foreign
policies, after all, Reagan did not offer her a senior position in the government upon her
retirement from the United Nations.468
Ann Miller Morin’s work, Her Excellency: An Oral History of American Women
Ambassadors, offers a more balanced analysis of the political scientist turned ambassador.469
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Morin’s work in many ways mirrored Kirkpatrick’s own work with female legislators in
Political Woman. Morin conducted interviews with 34 female ambassadors in an attempt to
answer the following questions: What character/personality traits do these women have in
common? How successful were female ambassadors? What effect did being a woman have on
them? Did any of them influence foreign policy? At the time that Morin began her research in
1984, only 44 females had served as ambassadors, the first of whom was Ruth Bryan Owen who
was made chief of the diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1933.
Based on her position as United Nations Ambassador, member of the Cabinet, the NSC,
and part of the NSPG, Morin credited Kirkpatrick with having more foreign policy clout than
any woman in the United States history.470 Though she had a reputation for being confrontational
and lacking accessibility, Morin praised Kirkpatrick for taking down the ‘Kick Me’ sign on the
back of the U.S. in the United Nations. Kirkpatrick sent letters to representatives who
continuously voted against the United States, warning them that they could not repeatedly vote
against American interests and then expect military and economic aid to continue. “From then
on,” Morin noted, “those who wished to maintain friendly relations with the United States were
much more careful of how they voted.”471
In interviews Morin questioned Kirkpatrick about a number of issues including her
gender, her accessibility, her relations with other ambassadors and diplomats, and her overall
assessment of the United Nations. When asked about what role gender played in her treatment at
the international institution Kirkpatrick told Morin, “I had no notion what a shock my gender
would be. I was not only the first woman to head the U.S. mission to the United Nations. I was
the first woman to ever represent a major power at the UN. I was the first woman to ever
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represent a Western government at the United Nations. I was also the first woman to sit in the
National Security Council on a regular basis.”472 Kirkpatrick was proud of her accomplishments,
both for herself and for other women, noting “I have no doubt that my appointment and survival
of those first two years in fact opened doors for women in career foreign service positions.”473
Despite initial negative reactions towards her gender, Kirkpatrick maintained that she profited as
much from being a woman as she suffered. The ambassador told Morin: “I think in macho
cultures, like both Latin and Arab – and somebody said African – they’re much less likely to
regard a woman as a competitor. And I think women are generally, including me, trained to be
good listeners. I did an awful lot of listening and a lot of seeking of advice, and my colleagues
liked that.”474
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that she did delegate quite a bit, but pointed out that the U.S.
Mission had specialists for all areas of the world who were trained to work on issues affecting
those regions. Thus, based on their expertise, she felt it would oftentimes be better for them to
deal with regional issues. As for charges of inaccessibility, Kirkpatrick conceded that at times
she was. This she blamed on her frequent travel between Washington and New York. The
ambassador maintained that taking part in both the NSPG and NSC was “absolutely essential”
for the U.S. Mission to function effectively. After all, attending policy meetings gave Kirkpatrick
access to authoritative decisions from the highest level475. Frequent travelling also increased her
reliance on area specialists and delegating certain tasks to others at the mission.
In her conversation with Morin, Kirkpatrick described her relationships with fellow
Security Council members as “very close”, noting that while she worked most closely with the
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British and the French she managed to maintain “reasonably good relations” with the Chinese
and Soviet ambassadors.476The ambassador noted that outside the Security Council, she was
close with many of the Latin American ambassadors and some of the African diplomats.
Kirkpatrick’s language skills – her fluency in both French and Spanish – were unique among
American Ambassadors to the U.N. and allowed for her to work well with representatives of
nations who spoke those languages477.
Perhaps the most common and germane critique of Kirkpatrick’s performance as U.N.
Ambassador concerned her frequent denunciations of the institution. Critics wondered, rightly
so, whether or not someone who did not believe in the efficacy of the United Nations was the
best person to represent American interests there. In this vein, Morin asked Kirkpatrick about the
effectiveness and the importance of the U.N. The ambassador described the institution as “a
seriously bloated, overblown, international bureaucracy with a lot of the worst aspects of many
national bureaucracies combined.”478 In regard to its central responsibilities, namely the peaceful
resolution of conflict, peacekeeping, and peacemaking she declared the U.N. to be ineffective.
There were, Kirkpatrick acknowledged, certain programs affiliated with the U.N. that were quite
effective including the UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees), UNICEF (Children’s Fund),
and WHO (World Health Organization). Though overall critical of the institution, Kirkpatrick
maintained that the United States should not withdraw from the U.N. because it was too
important to many small, poor Third World countries. “I don’t think it’s objectively important to
them,” she relayed to Morin, “but it’s subjectively. I think what’s most important to Third World
countries is that there be a place in which they can meet people, a lot of arenas, you know, in
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which different kinds of problems are discussed and in which they can speak, just get a
hearing.”479
Kirkpatrick elaborated on her views of the United Nations in Legitimacy and Force, a
two volume set that included all of her speeches, testimonies, addresses, statements, and articles
from her time as ambassador. The ambassador repeatedly deplored the relative impotence of the
United States within the United Nations, observing that American influence had been in decline
within the U.N. since the early 1960s, a time when European powers began giving up their
empires. “There is no greater irony in our time,” she noted, “than that the decolonization process
and the proliferation of former colonies as members of the United Nations should have been
associated with the decline of U.S. influence”.480 As a former colony itself, the U.S. had declared
itself in favor of decolonization in the immediate postwar era; however, it was the Soviet Union
who was able to successfully seize upon the decolonization issue due to the capitalist nature of
former imperial states. Kirkpatrick failed to acknowledge that American support for its European
Cold War allies often placed Washington in opposition to independence movements throughout
the Third World.
As more and more nations gained admittance into the United Nations, the U.S. slowly
became more isolated.481 Many of the new nations were former colonies whose entire national
histories had been lived out since the end of WWII. Most were poor, weak, and unhappy, and
very few were democracies. According to Kirkpatrick, these nations pushed two overriding
agendas in the United Nations: decolonization and economic development; yet, despite the fact
that decolonization, economic development, and development assistance were utterly consistent
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with American national experience, values, and practices, the United States still had major
difficulties garnering support from these nations.482
Moreover, American impotence had to do with the structure of that U.N. General
Assembly, specifically its emphasis on one nation, one vote. This method of representation, she
charged, created a disjunction between power and responsibility; for example, the United States
was responsible for 25% of the U.N. budget and had more responsibilities than other nations, but
did not possess commensurate voting clout.483 In addition, Kirkpatrick blamed American
diplomats for their longstanding lack of skill in practicing international politics in multilateral
arenas. According to her, Americans had not been effective in defining or projecting a
conception of U.S. national purpose within international forums. In short, Americans had not
practiced good politics at the United Nations. Kirkpatrick placed part of the blame for American
political ineptitude with the rapid turnover of delegates (one reason she stayed at her post as long
as she did). However, the major issue for Americans at the U.N. was that they ignored the
political nature of the United Nations, and instead operated as though there were no differences
between relations with its supporters or opponents, no penalties for opposing American views
and values, and no rewards for cooperating with a superpower.484
According to Kirkpatrick, a political culture had developed within the institution that
featured all of the elements of interest-based politics. For instance, the political blocs inside the
U.N. functioned similarly to the political parties in a parliamentary system, and as such, sought
to control the dynamics of legislative politics. There were a variety of blocs: some were
geographical blocs, such as the OAU (Organization for African Unity), and some consisted of
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political and economic coalitions, such as the Soviet bloc. The most important and largest bloc
during the 1980s was that of the non-aligned states, a bloc that claimed over one hundred nations
that allegedly operated outside of the East-West conflict. The power of the blocs depended on
their cohesion and their size; for example, Kirkpatrick noted that the African bloc was very
cohesive while the Latin American one was not. Alliances are made among the blocs and these
frequently determined outcomes. According to her, the Soviets had been very skillful in handling
the blocs, especially the non-aligned group.485
Unlike the Soviets, the United States was a country without a party in the United Nations.
The U.S. had never belonged to any bloc and because of this often ended up as a non-participant
in key political decisions within the organization. Kirkpatrick maintained that American political
isolation within the U.N. stemmed from its universalism, the very same universalism that led the
U.S. to assist in the creation of a world assembly in which all the nations would be represented
on the basis of one country, one vote. In keeping with their utopian, idealistic bent, Americans
believed that a superpower should not become a part of any bloc in order to not demonstrate
favoritism for one group over another. Apparently, the United States continued to take George
Washington’s warnings about ‘entangling alliances’ seriously, even in the United Nations.
Therefore, the U.S. had influence within the U.N. only when the blocs failed to act like cohesive,
disciplined parties; in all other cases, the American ambassador expended much time and energy
in a fruitless effort to sway the major blocs and frequently had to exercise its veto power in the
Security Council. Casting a veto meant, much to Kirkpatrick’s chagrin, acknowledging that
one’s country did not have enough political clout to carry the day on the issue at hand.486
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Kirkpatrick believed that one way for the United States to become more effective within
the United Nations was to be clear to other nations that the U.S. took the U.N. seriously –
meaning that acts against the American interest within the U.N. by any nation would be taken
into account in assessments of bilateral relationships. Consequently, she supported placing the
voting records at the U.N. under congressional oversight. According to her, annual reviews of
U.N. voting patterns and practices would provide Congress with a reliable, systematic basis for
assessing the attitudes, policies, and decisions of member states. Thus, Congress could withdraw
economic or military aid from nations that repeatedly voted against the United States in the
United Nations.487
In addition, the United States could use its control over the international organization’s
purse strings in order to increase its influence. Kirkpatrick testified before congress on more than
one occasion that despite having signed the United Nations Charter that committed member
nations to perpetual financial support, the United States did not have to continue paying a quarter
of the total U.N. costs. She pointed out that other countries sometimes refused to pay their share
and were not penalized; therefore, the U.S. could do the same. Moreover, the U.S. had complete
control over its voluntary contributions to the United Nations’ specialized agencies. Kirkpatrick
maintained that Congress should only favor those programs that were both supported by their
constituents and consistent with American values. Conversely, U.N. programs that had
succumbed to politicization or had strayed from their original purpose and task should be
penalized by the withdrawal of American monetary support.488
Despite her numerous critiques of the international organization, Kirkpatrick declared
that it was, in some ways, important to the global community. In speeches and articles, she
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repeatedly praised its work with refugees, children, and global health issues. The U.S.
ambassador noted the importance of the organization as a global forum for small, Third World
nations. In addition, Kirkpatrick maintained that the United Nations was able to focus world
attention on various issues, for the problems discussed within the organization were publicized
around the globe. Moreover, she charged, decisions made by the U.N. on various issues were
often interpreted as reflecting global opinion, and as such, became endowed with moral and
intellectual force.489 For these reasons, the United States should remain active within the U.N.
while continuing to increase its influence therein.
Conclusions
As the Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick was responsible
for articulating and defending the Reagan Administration’s foreign policies to the global
community. In this respect, her ambassadorial tenure can be deemed quite successful. Due to her
inclusion within the National Security Council and the National Security Planning Group, along
with her personal access to the President, the Georgetown professor was privy to the
development of policies as they evolved within the State and Defense Departments. Such direct
access to the machinations of foreign policies allowed Kirkpatrick to excel in her position as
mouthpiece for the administration, and, in each of the issues discussed in this chapter – Israel and
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia, and Namibian independence and South Africa – the ambassador
faithfully represented the goals and views of her country.
Kirkpatrick’s successful articulation of the Reagan Administration’s policies, however,
did not necessarily sway global opinion, especially in the cases of Israel and South Africa. In
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nearly every instance in which these issues were debated within the United Nations, the United
States found itself as a country without allies, unable to amass support for its views. Within the
domain of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. was able to thwart majority opinions on the ArabIsraeli conflict and the illegal South African occupation of Namibia via the use of the veto.
Indeed, throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure, the U.S. ambassador was forced to employ the veto on
nineteen occasions: five of these vetoes pertained to South Africa and Namibia, while ten of
them concerned Israel and the situation in the Middle East.490 Outside of the Security Council,
Kirkpatrick was unable to garner the support necessary to block General Assembly resolutions
which criticized America’s allies.
As the U.S. appeared increasingly to stand alone against global opinion, Kirkpatrick’s
disenchantment with the United Nations increased. Her disillusionment with the international
body, especially in regards to its unceasing attacks on Israel, caused the ambassador to call for
controversial changes in American policy towards the organization. For one, Kirkpatrick
spearheaded the decision to place U.N. voting records before Congress in the hopes that House
Representatives and American Senators could utilize them in their assessments of aid requests
from foreign nations. For another, the ambassador supported withdrawing U.S. funds from
UNESCO due to its anti-Israel orientation. In both cases, Kirkpatrick hoped to utilize one of
America’s greatest resources – money – in order to increase U.S. influence within the United
Nations. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the South African occupation of Namibia,
such tactics were ineffective as the majority of member states continued to support measures that
went against American wishes.
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Though the U.S. frequently stood alone in its support for Israel and South Africa within
the United Nations, American policies and goals concerning the Soviet invasion and occupation
of Afghanistan, along with the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, were widely supported by
the majority of member states. In these instances, the United States and the United Nations were
in nearly complete agreement. President Reagan, who, like Kirkpatrick, was not the most ardent
supporter of the international organization, publicly commended U.N. resolutions relating to
Afghanistan and Cambodia.491 Though these issues were not debated as frequently as those
pertaining to Israel or South Africa, and resolutions passed against the Soviet Union and
Vietnam were not, according to Kirkpatrick, as rhetorically ‘harsh’ as those that criticized Israel,
the fact that the U.N. repeatedly passed resolutions condemning these actions constitutes
evidence that the international organization was not completely dominated by the Soviet bloc
and its aspirations as Kirkpatrick often implied.
Despite the passage of numerous resolutions vis-à-vis Israel, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and
Namibia, none of these conflicts were resolved by the United Nations during Kirkpatrick’s
tenure. Thus, her contention that the organization was ineffective in regards to its central
responsibility which consisted of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, peacekeeping, and
peacemaking may contain some truth. However, its inability to end these conflicts had much to
do with both the veto power of the United States and the Soviet Union and the intransigence of
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the Middle Eastern states. Neither the Reagan Administration’s policies nor the U.N. resolutions
directed toward the Arab-Israeli conflict proved successful, as peace in the Middle East remains
elusive even up to present day. Moreover, while the Soviet veto prohibited the Security Council
from acting in Afghanistan and Cambodia, the American veto blocked U.N. efforts at realizing
Namibian independence. In fact, these crises were not resolved until the end of the Cold War era
– Soviet troops did not withdraw from Afghanistan until 1989, Vietnam did not withdraw its
troops from Cambodia until 1989, and Namibia did not become independent until 1990.
East-West rivalry indeed played an important role in American support for South Africa
and Israel. In her own analysis of Middle Eastern issues, Kirkpatrick had given first priority to
the goal of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining an additional foothold in that region.
President Reagan also named the ‘strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates’
as one of the most salient issues facing American interests there.492 Given Israel’s status as a
democratic, anti-communist state, American support for Tel Aviv remained ironclad.
Furthermore, though South Africa’s status as a democracy was questionable at best, its stance
against communism was not. In her description of the issues complicating the independence of
Namibia, Kirkpatrick had noted that a major goal of the U.S. was to prevent Namibia’s uranium
deposits from falling into the hands of the communists. Given that communist-dominated
movements had taken over Angola and Mozambique, states that bordered on Namibia and South
Africa respectively, the U.S. believed that it had to support South African activities geared
towards rolling back communism in Southern Africa. Therefore, the U.S. supported South
Africa’s refusal to grant Namibian independence until Cuban troops were taken out of Angola.
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The Reagan Administration’s foreign policies were centered on the containment of
communism. Such an emphasis mandated that the administration protect and assist friendly, noncommunist nations, such as Israel and South Africa, do everything in its power to prevent the
spread of Soviet influence in regions around the world, and provide aid to those freedom
fighters, like the mujahidin in Afghanistan, who were resisting communist, totalitarian invasions
and occupations. The administration’s determination to not only contain, but also to rollback
communism, though obvious in these particular cases, was even more apparent in its policies
towards Central America. Faced with what it perceived as an expanding communist threat in its
own front yard, the Reagan Administration, under the influence and guidance of the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine, intensified its support for Nicaraguan “freedom fighters” and stepped up military aid to
the government of El Salvador.
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Chapter Five: Central America
Kirkpatrick’s long-standing interest in non-democratic regimes, her work on Peronist
Argentina, her affiliation with the American Enterprise Institute and its focus on Latin American
politics, and her critique of President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policies in “Dictatorships and
Double Standards” fostered her reputation as a Latin American political expert. Thus, throughout
her tenure as United Nations Ambassador, Kirkpatrick took a special interest and played an
important role in the formulation of the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policies. In
January of 1981, just prior to her appointment as ambassador, Kirkpatrick’s critique of United
States’ policies towards the region was published in Commentary magazine.493 The article, “U.S.
Security and Latin America”, served, in many ways, as a complement to, and continuation of, her
criticisms of Carter’s global development strategies, human rights policies, and alleged
misunderstandings of Latin American politics found in her “Dictatorships and Double
Standards” article.
Kirkpatrick began by sounding the alarm over the spread of communism in the region,
asserting that the Soviet Union had established itself as a major military power in the Western
hemisphere, a fact that made the entire region at risk for a communist takeover. Along with
Cuba, she maintained that Marxist-Leninist regimes had come to power in Nicaragua and
Grenada, and the nation of El Salvador was on the brink of anarchy, a situation caused by
communist guerillas whose “fanaticism and violence are reminiscent of Pol Pot”.494 In addition
to Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador, Kirkpatrick proclaimed that Castroite forces were
threatening the governments of the nations of Guyana, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. Thus,
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according to the Georgetown political scientist, one of the most pressing tasks of the new
administration was to review and revise the nation’s flawed policies towards these states and the
region as a whole.495
Kirkpatrick maintained that prior to the Vietnam War, the United States had a special
relationship with the nations of Latin America, one that emphasized national security and anticommunism. However, the American defeat in Southeast Asia had prompted U.S. policymakers
to reassess the objectives of Cold War policies around the globe based on ‘lessons’ learned from
the war in Vietnam. According to her, such lessons included the following: the Cold War was
over, therefore, East-West competition should be deemphasized; intervention in the affairs of
other nations was immoral; the United States should not support autocrats faced with popular
revolutionary movements; and the U.S. should make amends for its ‘deeply flawed national
character’ and past actions by restraining itself in international affairs.496
Kirkpatrick disagreed with such conclusions and noted that these sentiments were
strengthened by the increasing acceptance of development theory by many members of the
American foreign policy apparatus. She pointed to Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, and his work Between Two Ages, as a prime example of this new mode of thinking.
In his work, Brzezinski claimed that global politics were in a state of flux: nationalism was
waning and ideological competition was on the decline as nation-states became increasingly
interdependent. Kirkpatrick contended that such dismissal of ideology and the East-West conflict
allowed for the regional ‘special’ relationship between the U.S. and Latin America to be
subsumed into a global framework that deemphasized American national security interests in
order to focus on economic and technological development within the Third World. Having
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divested the region of its strategic importance and incorporated Latin American states into the
‘Third World’, the Carter Administration was free to base its global policies on what Kirkpatrick
deemed to be utopian and abstract ideals – development and human rights.497
Having criticized Carter’s global approach to foreign policy, Kirkpatrick turned her
attention to Latin America. The political scientist noted that many similarities existed between
Latin American political systems, especially among the nations of Central America. All were
small states and relatively poor. Despite various attempts made by the wealthy and ruling classes
to modernize their nations’ economies, the majority of persons living in Central America were
landless peasants who worked on large estates and plantations and lived in poverty. Wealth
remained heavily concentrated among the upper classes and the small middle classes.
Throughout the region access to education, medical care, decent housing, proper nutrition, and
political power remained limited. In the realm of politics and government, the Central American
states exhibited characteristics similar to other Latin American political systems: disagreement
on the means and ends of government, widespread distrust of authority, broad ideological
spectrums, low levels of participation in voluntary associations, preference for hierarchical
modes of association, and a history of military involvement and intervention in government.
Each had experienced democratic interludes; however, democratic reforms had been undermined
by the fraud, corruption, and intimidation that seemed endemic to the region. Thus, political
competition took place in a variety of arenas by diverse groups, a fact that demonstrated that
there was a lack of consensus regarding legitimate routes to power.498Such a lack of consensus
allowed violence and military coups to remain legitimate avenues to power and ensured that
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violence was an “integral, regular, and predictable” aspect of Latin American politics.499
Following her description of the similarities shared by the nations of Latin America,
Kirkpatrick offered a brief political history of Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Nicaraguan
political tradition combined both autocratic and democratic elements. Throughout the 19th and
early 20th centuries, Nicaraguan politics had been dominated by political factions controlled by
the small, wealthy, ruling classes. These factions competed under a two party system in elections
that were often decided by a very slim margin. Because of this, the United States was often
called upon by various factions to assist in maintaining peace within the nation. This was the
case until Anastasio Somoza García came to power in 1936. Somoza’s ability to maintain the
loyalty of the National Guard, along with his political skills and ability to retain American
support, made Nicaragua one of the most stable nations in Central America. Though he was a
dictator, Kirkpatrick claimed that Somoza engaged in only ‘limited oppression’ and allowed for
‘limited opposition’. He made no effort to control the church or to change Nicaraguan culture. In
short, Somoza’s government, like those of other Latin American states, was moderately
oppressive and moderately corrupt.500
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Nicaraguan government was dominated by Somoza’s
son – Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a West Point graduate married to an American woman. The
younger Somoza, who had a reputation for womanizing and heavy drinking, continued the
policies of his father and, according to Kirkpatrick, had every reason to believe that he would
continue to receive American military and economic aid. He had no idea that his government
would be brought down by the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and a group of
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“Cuban backed terrorists”.501 By the time Carter entered office in 1977, a revolution against the
Somoza regime had begun. The Nicaraguan dictator’s efforts to put down the revolution made
him vulnerable to charges of human rights abuses. In an attempt to placate the Americans and
continue to receive military aid, Somoza oscillated between repression and reconciliation in his
dealings with revolutionary groups. According to Kirkpatrick, this vacillation demonstrated to
the Nicaraguan people and the guerillas that Somoza could not perform the basic function of
government – the maintenance of order – which delegitimized the regime.502
Kirkpatrick contended that Carter brought about the fall of Somoza by cutting off
military aid at a time when he needed it the most. By ignoring the violence brought about by
guerilla revolutionary groups and focusing purely on Somoza’s attempts to curtail such violence,
the administration helped bring down one of the most stable governments in Central America.
Lack of military aid prevented Somoza from dealing with the opposition while it was still small
enough to be taken out.503 Moreover, the ambassador claimed that Carter’s efforts at mediation
between Somoza and his opposition within the Organization of American States (OAS) brought
legitimacy to the revolutionaries. Furthermore, in the mistaken belief that progress and
democracy could not come to Nicaragua if Somoza remained in power, the State Department
demanded that Somoza resign.504 Eventually, due to the increase of revolutionary violence and
the withdrawal of American military aid, Somoza was forced out and the Nicaraguan
government was taken over by what Kirkpatrick characterized as a communist, totalitarian,
terrorist group with ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union – the Sandinistas.505
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Meanwhile, revolution was brewing in the neighboring state of El Salvador. As in other
Latin American countries, military coups were a normal part of the political landscape in the
small nation. Indeed, Kirkpatrick described El Salvador as a caricature or prototype of a Central
American republic; its political history regularly featured oligarchy, violence, revolution, and
militarism.506 Similar to Nicaragua, 19th and early 20th century politics were dominated by the
wealthy Salvadoran elite who competed with each other in a two party system for political
power. Over time, other factions of Salvadoran society became politically active, either in
electoral politics as the franchise was extended, or in other political arenas typical of Latin
American systems.
Though the nation had experienced periods of stability, such eras were short-lived.
Kirkpatrick noted that the political system in El Salvador was chronically weak and unstable,
even in comparison to other Central and Latin American states. Its political history was
characterized by numerous constitutions and military coups. Indeed, there was a lack of
agreement amongst the Salvadoran citizens as to the legitimate means and ends of government
which, according to Kirkpatrick, left all holders of power vulnerable to the charge that they were
usurpers.507 In such systems, government lacks legitimacy, and without legitimacy there is no
authority; instead, there is only power and the habit of obedience to whomever successfully
claims power.508Such governments, Kirkpatrick claimed, were especially vulnerable to
revolutionary violence and terrorist subversion.509
According to Kirkpatrick, had the Carter Administration understood the distinctive
characteristics and problems inherent in the political structure of El Salvador, and other Latin
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American nations for that matter, then it might not have been so quick to embrace the overthrow
of Romero. The administration had indeed greeted Romero’s overthrow as the dawn of a new era
and a watershed event in Salvadoran history. “A more prudent appraisal of politics in Central
America,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “would have left policymakers a little less enthusiastic about the
destruction of any semi-constitutional ruler, not because they approve the ruler, but because they
understood that authority in such systems is weak, stability fragile, and order much easier to
destroy than reconstruct.”510
Though a change in government had occurred, revolutionary activity by Salvadoran
guerilla groups continued, prompting Carter to offer military and economic aid to the new junta.
In return for weapons and money, American policymakers insisted that the new government
institute land reforms. Washington hoped that the transfer of land to the peasants would
vaccinate the masses against the appeals of the communist guerillas and give them a stake in the
new government. Kirkpatrick remained highly critical of these and other reform measures
instituted by the Carter Administration and believed they would not be successful. She
maintained that revolution sprang not from the resentments of landless peasants, but in the
bosom of the middle classes. “Revolutions in our time,” she wrote, “are born in the middle class
and carried out by sons of the middle class who have become skilled in the use of propaganda,
organization, and violence.”511 Therefore, a greater understanding of revolution and Salvadoran
politics would have allowed American policymakers to be less sanguine about the contributions
of reforms to political stability.
Despite the advent of a new regime and the initiation of land reform policies, leftist
guerilla groups with ties to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas stepped up their revolutionary activities
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causing the Salvadoran government to crack down on the opposition. As in the case of Somoza
in Nicaragua, the U.S. viewed these efforts as human rights violations. Kirkpatrick wrote, “State
Department supporters have consistently emphasized the danger from the Right – that is, from
authoritarian, intensely anti-Communist defenders of the status quo”; however, the political
scientist maintained that El Salvador was more likely in the long run to fall to a coalition of
revolutionaries “trained, armed, and advised by Cuba and others.”512 A clear comprehension of
the problem of order in El Salvador, she asserted, would have made American policymakers
more sympathetic to the inability of the government to control the situation, and less anxious to
inhibit the use of force against violent revolutionaries.513
Kirkpatrick concluded that Carter’s Latin America policies were failures. She wrote,
Because it failed to take into account of basic characteristics of Latin American political
systems, the Carter administration underestimated the fragility of order in these societies
and overestimated the ease with which authority, once undermined, can be restored.
Because it regarded revolutionaries as beneficent agents of change, it mistook their goals
and motives and could not grasp the problem of governments which become the object of
revolutionary violence. Because it misunderstood the relations between economics and
politics, it wrongly assumed (as in El Salvador) that economic reforms would necessarily
and promptly produce positive political results. Because it misunderstood the relations
between ‘social justice’ and authority, it assumed that only ‘just’ governments can
survive. Finally, because it misunderstood the relations between justice and violence, the
Carter administration fell (and pushed its allies) into an effort to fight howitzers with land
reform and urban guerrillas with improved fertilizers. Above all, the Carter
administration failed to understand politics. Politics is conducted by persons who by
various means, including propaganda and violence, seek to realize some vision of the
public good…. When men are treated like ‘forces’ (or the agents of forces), their
intentions, values, and world view tend to be ignored. But in Nicaragua the intentions and
ideology of the Sandinistas have already shaped the outcome of the revolution, as in El
Salvador the intentions and ideology of the leading revolutionaries create intransigence
where there might have been willingness to cooperate and compromise, nihilism where
there might have been reform.514
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Kirkpatrick’s assessment of the situation in El Salvador in “U.S. Security and Latin
America” was, to say the least, flawed. Her political history of El Salvador was incomplete. In
1980, the tiny Central American nation boasted a population of approximately 4.75 million
persons. The state itself comprised 8,236 square miles, an area roughly the same size as the state
of Massachusetts. With an annual population increase of 3.5%, El Salvador was the most densely
populated nation in the region. Nearly half of its citizens consisted of illiterate peasants who
depended on working the land for their livelihood. Approximately150,000 families worked as
agricultural laborers while another 150,000 families were tenant farmers or sharecroppers.
Altogether, about 1.8 million Salvadorans were landless peasants in a nation whose per capita
income was $680.00 U.S. dollars per year. The economy of El Salvador was based primarily on
agricultural exports, along with economic aid from foreign nations.
As was the case with other Central and Latin American nations, El Salvador had
experienced the harshness of Spanish colonial rule. Vestiges of colonialism remained following
the nation’s independence in the 19th century as the wealthy landowning classes continued to
exploit the indigenous masses just as the Spanish had before. Over 60% of the arable land in the
nation was owned and controlled by the wealthiest 2% of the population – the ‘Fourteen
Families’.515 Terror, which had served as a useful tactic for the Spanish in their domination of the
native peoples of El Salvador, continued to be utilized by the Salvadoran oligarchy, making
violence a primary political tool throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. In addition to violence,
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the Salvadoran political system was characterized by a combination of rigged elections, military
coups, oligarchical rule, and direct political actions such as strikes and demonstrations.
In December of 1931, members of the Salvadoran military staged a coup against the
newly elected government and installed General Maximilian Hernández Martínez as President.
Beginning in 1932, Salvadoran peasants, primarily those from the coffee- growing regions where
economic conditions were the worst, began protesting against the new regime. These peasants
were hit hard by the declining prices of coffee on the global market, and this, along with their
dissatisfaction with the new political leadership, caused them to join socialist and communist
parties. Augustin Farabundo Martí, a communist party leader, led the peasants and other
Salvadoran dissidents in numerous strikes and demonstrations across the nation. The Salvadoran
military responded with extreme force, killing between ten and thirty thousand Salvadorans,
primarily peasants, and executing Martí. The military’s crackdown on dissidents in 1932 was
successful in the short-term, but memories of the uprising, as well as the injustices that spawned
from it persisted. Many of the revolutionaries of the 1970s and 1980s claimed to be continuing
the revolution began by the peasants and Martí in 1932, naming themselves the Farbundo Martí
Front for National Liberation, or the FMLN, after the famous revolutionary.516 In her own
analysis of the 1932 uprising, Kirkpatrick discounted the 10-30,000 Salvadoran revolutionaries
executed by Martínez and the Salvadoran military and instead praised the government for
restoring stability to the nation. “It is sometimes said that 30,000 persons lost their lives…” she
wrote, “the violence of this repression seems less important than the fact of restored order and
the thirteen years of civil peace that ensued.”517
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When Martínez overthrew the elected government of El Salvador in 1931, the United
States was at first reluctant to acknowledge him as the legitimate ruler. However, once
communists began leading revolts against the new regime, Washington began to change its
stance, offering official recognition of the Martínez government in 1934.Thus, long before the
advent of the Cold War or the articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, the United States showed
that it preferred dictatorship and stability over revolution in Central America. The American
acceptance of and support for autocracy in the region only increased in the postwar era as Cold
War tensions escalated. The mastermind of containment, George F. Kennan, agreed with the
American penchant for authoritarianism, noting in 1950 that “It is better to have a strong regime
in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by
communists.”518
The coup that placed General Martínez in power in El Salvador ushered in an era of
military dominance over Salvadoran life. Between 1931 and 1944, the military became the
primary source of political authority as it was the only institution that could guarantee stability
and maintain order. Consequently, the traditional agrarian oligarchy drifted into the background
of Salvadoran political life. This was part of a general trend; the phenomenon of dictatorships
headed by generals and dependent upon the military for survival had become common
throughout Central America. Indeed, with but two exceptions, from 1930 to the 1979 Nicaraguan
revolution, every single extra-constitutional change in government within the region had required
the acquiescence, support, and participation of the existing military establishment.519
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The newfound wealth and power of the Salvadoran military gave it a large stake in
preserving the status quo; reform of the existing political, social, and economic system became
ever more difficult. Occasionally, elements within the military, specifically junior officers who
felt far removed from power, would express the desire to improve the conditions of the poor;
however, they were unsure how to simultaneously promote social justice while preserving the
power of the military. Overall, the military was unable to resolve the many contradictions
inherent in the effort to combine modernization with stability: How could the economy be
modernized without the concomitant political and social mobilization becoming a destabilizing
element? How could political coalitions be broadened while maintaining the hegemony and
support of the oligarchy? How could the military allow political competitiveness without losing
its authority?520 Unable to reconcile such contradictions, the Salvadoran military continued to
repress its citizens and stifle efforts at reform.
In the 1970s, the political, social, and economic conditions within El Salvador worsened
due to the eruption of war with Honduras, overpopulation issues, and the oil crisis. In 1969, El
Salvador and Honduras went to war. Sparked by a qualifying match between the nations for the
1970 World Cup, the war was a result of long-standing border disputes and the increasing
number illegal Salvadoran immigrants that had been flooding into Honduras. Economic
conditions within El Salvador had caused many of its citizens to seek refuge in neighboring
states. While the nations were at war, approximately 25,000 Salvadoran immigrants illegally
working in Honduras were sent back to their homeland. This influx of people exacerbated the
economic woes of the nation and caused many Salvadorans to suffer from starvation and
malnutrition. Moreover, external factors, such as the 1973 oil embargo, conspired to make
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matters worse. By the end of 1973, the combination of war, overpopulation, and oil crisis had
brought about inflation levels of sixty percent in El Salvador.521
In the midst of this social and economic turmoil, opposition to the government grew.
Many Salvadorans joined the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) led by José Napoleón Duarte, a
Notre Dame educated engineer, former mayor of San Salvador, and acquaintance of Kirkpatrick.
In 1972, Duarte ran against the military candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina, for the presidency.
The military rigged the election and Molina was declared the winner. The outcome of the
election angered some of the junior officers of the Salvadoran military who seized Molina and
attempted to install Duarte as president. However, the majority of the military supported Molina
and came to his aid. Nicaragua’s leader – Somoza – sent his National Guard to thwart the
attempted coup. Duarte was severely beaten and forced into exile. Meanwhile, as the military
took measures to severely weaken the PDC, leftist revolutionary groups, including the FMLN,
became more active.522
Throughout the 1970s, violence from both the right (military) and the left (FMLN)
escalated. Those suspected of union activities or communist sympathies either disappeared, or
they were arrested, and sometimes executed by the military’s death squads. Leftist guerillas
kidnapped members of the oligarchy and held them for ransom in order to raise money to buy
arms. In the midst of this ongoing civil war, elections were held in 1977. Again, thanks to fraud
on the part of the military, the will of the people was thwarted and General Carlos Humberto
Romero was installed as president. Popular protests followed and with Romero’s approval the
military gunned down the protestors. Decrying this blatant disregard for human rights, the Carter
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Administration threatened to suspend military and economic aid to El Salvador. Romero
subsequently proclaimed that El Salvador did not want U.S. aid and proceeded to crack down
harder on the opposition.523
Despite widespread government violence, protests against Romero’s regime increased
throughout 1977. Accordingly, Romero decreed the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of
Public Order which made it illegal to oppose the government in any fashion. The law instituted
full censorship of the press, outlawed strikes, banned public meetings, and suspended normal
judicial proceedings.524 Political activities and violence only increased. By 1979, reports from
Amnesty International, the Organization of American States, and the U.S. State Department were
condemning the Salvadoran government and military for their systematic torture, murder, and
persecution of political dissidents. Government violence brought about an increase in new
recruits to the radical left which in turn stepped up its bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations
of government officials.525
In October of 1979, Romero was overthrown in a coup led by junior military officers who
accused the regime of corruption, electoral fraud, and human rights violations. Pledging to
reform the nation’s economic, social, and political structures in many ways, they offered to work
with the leftist revolutionary forces in order to negotiate an end to the civil war, to initiate land
reform so as to better the economic situation of the peasants, and to control the right-wing death
squads. Though serious about instituting reforms, the young men were unable to deliver on their
promises. Reform initiatives were consistently blocked by the military and the Salvadoran
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oligarchy. With the new regime increasingly paralyzed, violence began to escalate yet again.526
Throughout 1980, the Salvadoran government was battered by attempted coups on the part of the
right wing of the military and increasing violence from leftist revolutionary groups. In response
to events in neighboring Nicaragua, the Carter administration resumed military aid to El
Salvador in hopes that the government would be able to put down the communist revolutionaries
and prevent the extreme right from taking control of the government.
During 1980, more than eight thousand Salvadorans were killed, the majority slain by the
government’s security forces and the paramilitary right-wing death squads associated with the
Salvadoran military. On March 24, 1980, the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo
Romero, was assassinated by agents of the death squads while in the midst of giving mass.
Romero had repeatedly called for social and political reforms, the end of repression by the
government and military, and a negotiated settlement with the leftist guerillas.527 In November,
leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition of left-wing civilian opposition
parties, were tortured, killed, and mutilated by a paramilitary death squad. The following month,
four American nuns who had been working with the poor in El Salvador were raped and killed
by a right-wing paramilitary group.528
In response to these assaults on the basic human right of ‘life’, President Carter
temporarily suspended military aid and demanded that the Salvadoran military control its death
squads. Carter discussed this decision in his memoirs:
I was insisting that the Salvadoran leaders protect the rights of their own people. The
situation there was terrible: the murder of four American nuns, we believed by
Salvadoran soldiers was another incredible act the country’s officials were trying to
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ignore… I was determined that the murderers of the nuns be brought to justice, that
elections be scheduled, that some equitable system of justice be established, and that
promised land reforms be carried out. We had to convince the Salvadorans that brutal
persecution of their own people was the major obstacle to their economic and political
stability.529
With the death tolls rising, Carter sent envoys into El Salvador to assess the situation. American
representatives visited the site where the nuns were killed and held talks with Duarte, the
administration’s choice as president of the nation. Reports from American emissaries prompted
the president to describe the situation there as a bloodbath. Carter noted in his memoirs that
right-wing death squads had killed approximately nine thousand persons in the last year. “They
don’t have anyone in jails,” he wrote, “they’re all dead. It’s their accepted way of enforcing the
so-called law.”530
At the time, Kirkpatrick was working as a foreign policy advisor for Reagan’s
presidential campaign. Due to her professed concern with order and the fragility of the
Salvadoran political system, she viewed the situation quite differently. The professor maintained
that the military and their so-called ‘death squads’ were merely responding to the violence of the
leftist guerilla groups. In regards to the murder of the American nuns, Kirkpatrick claimed that
the nuns were not just nuns, but also political activists on behalf of the FMLN. Since the nuns
had traveled to Nicaragua before going to El Salvador, she asserted that they had ties to the
Sandinistas, and as such, were rightly perceived by the Salvadoran military as working on behalf
of the revolutionaries.531
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In the weeks following the rape and murder of the American nuns, the civil war in El
Salvador continued and violence from both the military and the guerillas again escalated. In
January, two Americans working for the American Institute for Free Labor Development were
gunned down by assassins while having dinner with the head of the Salvadoran Institute of
Agrarian Transformation. The men responsible for the deaths claimed that the deputy director of
intelligence of the Salvadoran National Guard had ordered to the killings. Shortly thereafter, the
FMLN, the FDR, and other leftist groups embarked upon a ‘final offensive’ against the
Salvadoran government. Though the military offensive failed, ties between the guerillas and the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas caused the Carter Administration to reverse its policies towards El
Salvador. The administration feared that the Salvadoran guerillas were communists that, once in
power, would ally El Salvador with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Thus, Washington
increased military aid to El Salvador via emergency provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.532
Such was the situation inherited by the Reagan Administration.

Kirkpatrick’s writings on Latin America and American foreign policy enhanced her
reputation as a Latin American political expert and made her a major player in the development
of the Reagan Administration’s Central American policies.533 In an NSC meeting in February of
1981, the president echoed Kirkpatrick’s views on human rights and American foreign policy,
noting that the U.S. had failed to establish good relations with its southern neighbors. “We must
change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we do not bring down governments in the
name of human rights,” Reagan said. “None of them are as guilty of human rights violations as
her comments on the nuns were taken out of context, but she maintained that at least two of the
nuns had ties to the Sandinistas.
532
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533
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are Cuba and the USSR. We don’t throw out our friends just because they cannot pass the ‘saliva
test’ on human rights.”534 Throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure as Permanent Ambassador to the
United Nations, the Reagan Administration’s policies, specifically, its unconditional support for
the Salvadoran government, its opposition to a negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran Civil
War, its unwavering defense of the Nicaraguan Contras, and its unceasing hostility towards the
Sandinistas and the Cubans, adhered nicely to Kirkpatrick’s prescriptions for regional security
and stability.
Upon assuming office, President Reagan made Central America a top priority.
Kirkpatrick was pleased with this move for she believed it represented efforts by the
administration to both revitalize the special relationship between the U.S. and the nations of the
region and reinforce American national security. “In foreign affairs, geography is destiny”
Kirkpatrick declared.535 Situated at the southern-most tip of North America, the U.N.
Ambassador designated the area as the ‘fourth border’ of the United States, making any
expansion of communism in the region a threat to American national security.536 Though she was
pleased that the administration recognized the importance of Central America to American
national security interests, Kirkpatrick bemoaned the fact that Americans and many American
allies seemed to not understand this. When critics of the administration expressed doubt
concerning the importance of the region, the political scientist pointed out that the Soviet Union
viewed Central America as an area of high strategic significance. NATO relief troops and
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equipment would be shipped overseas via the Caribbean Basin. In addition, raw materials
travelling from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa to the United States passed through the Gulf
and Caribbean region. Finally, American oil was refined in areas of the Caribbean.537 Thus,
Kirkpatrick claimed that the area must remain out of communist hands in order to not only
protect American national security, the security of Western Europe and Israel, but the security
and independence of the nations of Central America as well.538
Though Central America was high on the administration’s foreign affairs agenda,
members of Reagan’s National Security Council were at odds as to which particular situation in
the region was of the utmost importance. In an NSC meeting in November of 1981, Secretary of
State, Al Haig, maintained that the Sandinistas and the Cubans constituted the greatest threat to
the region and to American national security. Kirkpatrick disagreed. She argued that El Salvador
should be the first priority for the United States as the government of El Salvador would collapse
if the guerrillas were allowed to continue in their destruction of the Salvadoran economy. Once
El Salvador was stabilized, the U.S. could turn its attention more fully towards Nicaragua. In the
meantime, covert action and proxy forces would “do the work for us” in fighting the
Sandinistas.539
Reagan’s NSC did agree that the threat to American national security in Central America
was unprecedented in severity, proximity, and complexity. National Security Advisor William P.
Clark observed that the weak economies and political institutions invited subversion from the
Soviet Union, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Vietnam, Libya, and the PLO. Kirkpatrick argued that
the real problem was the projection of Soviet military power in the region. “At a minimum, they
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may neutralize us,” she said, “at a maximum, they can threaten us.”540 Kirkpatrick was adamant
in her insistence that there was a communist conspiracy to take over Central America; the U.S.
must prevent yet another domino from falling in its own front yard. President Reagan agreed,
noting that American credibility was at stake in the region and a victory for the Salvadoran
guerrillas would signal a defeat for the United States in the Cold War.541
In early 1981, the Reagan administration began increasing military aid to El Salvador in
order to bolster anti-communist forces in the region. Unlike its predecessor, the administration’s
support for the Salvadoran government did not hinge upon land reform or the improvement of
the regime’s human rights record.542Washington’s determination to provide aid to the
government of El Salvador despite its lack of progress in the curtailment of human rights abuses
by its military led to much criticism. One of the most compelling statements of opposition to
American aid to the government of El Salvador came from a man who was assassinated by the
Salvadoran military – the Archbishop of San Salvador, Romero. Prior to his death in 1980, the
prelate had written to President Carter, begging him to withhold aid to the Salvadoran military
and to refrain from intervening in the civil war. Romero maintained that the struggle was an
indigenous movement and thus not a part of the East-West conflict. “It would be unjust and
deplorable if the intrusion of foreign powers were to frustrate the Salvadoran people,” he wrote,
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“to repress it and block its autonomous decisions about the economic and political path that our
country ought to follow.”543 Romero then chastised the Salvadoran government, its military, and
its security forces for reverting to repression and violence.544 The Catholic Archbishop of
Washington, James A. Hickey concurred. He maintained that due to their work with the poor,
members of the church in El Salvador were labelled as communists, a designation that resulted in
their deaths by the hands of the government.545 “For attempting this renewed Christianization of
their country,” the Archbishop said, “they have been called communists, subversives; and they
have suffered persecution, even death… An Archbishop, eleven priests, thousands of lay people,
and now four American missionaries are dead in that effort.”546
Both Romero and Hickey spoke of the importance of understanding the history of the
Catholic Church and its role in Salvadoran society. Though historically the Church had
maintained a socially conservative stance, the Second Vatican Council of the Medellin in 1968,
the Puebla Conferences of Latin American Bishops in 1979, and the teachings of Pope John Paul
II had brought about a change in the Church’s policies. Indeed, rather than supporting the status
quo, the Church had become the leading voice for reform and social change. Essential elements
of the new dogma included the defense of human dignity and the promotion of human rights, a
position which Romero had died for in El Salvador. Kirkpatrick criticized the new role of the
Church and associated its tenets with socialism. Moreover, the U.N. Ambassador accused the
‘Catholic Left’ of disrupting the traditional patterns of political participation in Central America.
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“As for the Catholic Left,” she wrote, “its interest in revolution on this earth has waxed as its
concern with salvation in heaven has waned.”547
The Catholic Church was not the only religious organization that objected to American
support for the government and military of El Salvador. Representatives from the American
Baptist Churches claimed that members of the Baptist Association within the small nation had
suffered from government sponsored terrorism. Some had been arrested and tortured, while
others had either been killed or had disappeared. In testimony before the U.S. Senate, the
Reverend Robert W. Tiller maintained that Salvadoran government forces were responsible for
violence against Christians, not the FMLN, and that those persecuted by the government were
not guerillas, but ordinary persons. In addition, the reverend claimed that there was a government
hit list of Salvadoran Baptists. “The Government of El Salvador has established a telephone
number for reporting subversives who should be eliminated,” he testified, “All you need to do is
call up and report that a certain person is carrying out subversive activity and that person will
soon be executed. The process works swiftly and is not complicated by anything like verifying
the initial report or investigating the person reported or holding a trial.”548The Baptist minister
insisted that it was immoral for the U.S. government to provide support for a regime that had a
habit of violating the human rights of its citizens.549
Human rights groups, congressmen, and various nations around the world joined
religious organizations in their protest against the administration’s support for the Salvadoran
regime. Amnesty International condemned the Salvadoran military for its human rights abuses,
noting that several thousand Salvadorans who had no proven affiliation with the leftist
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insurgency had died at the hands of the military and its death squads.550 Democratic
Congresswoman Barbara Mikulski (D – MD) claimed that it was morally wrong for the U.S. to
“lavish arms on a government that cannot or will not stop its own troops from making war
against its own people.”551 Kirkpatrick’s U.N. predecessor, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D
– NY), a fellow neoconservative, also opposed the administration’s Central American policies.
His assertion that the Salvadoran conflict was internal, and therefore not a threat to national
security, caused many of his fellow neoconservatives, including Kirkpatrick, to accuse him of
selling out to the left.552
In response to congressional criticism, the administration reiterated the importance of the
region to American national security. In an address before Congress in April of 1983, President
Reagan proclaimed that both national security and American credibility was at stake in Central
America. The president implied in his speech that should Congress fail to provide the money and
materials requested for the region then it would be responsible for losing El Salvador, and
subsequently, Central America.553 Kirkpatrick maintained that there were certain persons in
Congress who did not approve of the administration’s efforts to “consolidate the constitutional
government of El Salvador and who would actually like to see the Marxist forces take power in
that country.”554Her statement angered many members of the House and Senate who demanded
to know to whom she was referring. Kirkpatrick refused to answer, insisting that she had been
quoted out of context.
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On top of domestic opposition, the administration’s policies failed to find favor with
many American allies. France, Mexico, Venezuela, Sweden, West Germany, and other Western
European nations all maintained that the civil war in El Salvador was indigenous and that the
U.S. should refrain from intervening in the war unless it wished to foster a negotiated political
solution between the government and the leftist guerillas.555Moreover, Europeans questioned
why the United States was placing such a large emphasis on the tiny nations located in Central
America.556 Kirkpatrick responded to such condemnation of American policies in two ways.
First, she proclaimed that many of the foreign nations who opposed the administration’s Central
American policies were socialists. “A number of socialist leaders… unable to win popular
support for peaceful revolution in their own countries,” she wrote, “have grown progressively
enthusiastic about revolution elsewhere and less fastidious about the company they keep and the
methods utilized.”557Second, the U.N. Ambassador instructed Europeans to take a closer look at
their maps. Given the region’s strategic location in the Gulf area and near the Panama Canal, she
maintained, it was vital to both American and European security. “If the Soviets can distract us
here at home in our own front yard,” she noted, “they can prevent us from supplying aid to our
European allies.”558
Due to advocacy of the Reagan administration’s Central American policies, Kirkpatrick
became a “lightning rod for campus protests”.559 In several instances, the political scientist was
either prevented from speaking due to concerns about her security in the face of student
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demonstrations, or booed off stage.560 The Georgetown professor viewed these protests in the
same light that she had viewed student protests by the New Left in the 1960s. “Frankly, I do not
know what the critics of our Central American policy want,” she wrote, “I fear they are charter
members in the ‘blame America first club’ which is prepared to give everybody, except the
United States, the benefit of the doubt about almost everything in the world.”561
Though the administration acknowledged that the human rights situation in El Salvador
was not ideal, it continued to provide support for the Salvadoran military in its struggle against
the FMLN. When questioned about the Reagan administration’s support for the ‘bad, corrupt’
Salvadoran regime, Kirkpatrick stated: “The truth is that most of the governments in the world
are, by our standards, bad governments. They are not democratic, never have been.”562Moreover,
the ambassador insisted that the government was merely responding to the violence created by
the guerillas. Because the insurgents hid among the people, it was only natural that violence
would spill over into Salvadoran society.563 “The essence of their strategy is provocation,” she
noted of the guerillas, “through persistent attacks which disrupt society and make ordinary life
impossible, such revolutionaries challenge authority and force repressive countermeasures in the
expectation that such repression will undermine the legitimacy of the regime.”564
In addition to blaming the guerillas for the violence perpetrated by the Salvadoran
military upon its own citizens, Kirkpatrick refused to see the FMLN as anything other than a
communistic, terrorist organization. The ambassador viewed the guerillas as the Salvadoran
counterpart to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and described them as a well-armed Marxist
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insurgency, a professional guerilla group directed from command centers in Nicaragua, armed
with Soviet bloc weapons, and intent upon establishing a one party dictatorship.565 Thus, the
administration refused to consider a negotiated settlement between the guerillas and the
Salvadoran government. After all, Kirkpatrick declared, the Carter administration’s attempts to
include the Sandinistas in negotiations had led to a communist take-over in Nicaragua and the
Reagan administration was determined not to make the same mistake. According to her, there
were only two possible solutions for ending the civil war in El Salvador: either the guerillas
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and participated in elections, or the war
continued until the government achieved a military victory.566
Kirkpatrick and the Reagan Administration refused to allow the guerillas to shoot their
way into power. Though the Salvadoran military had been able to fend off the guerilla’s ‘final
offensive’ in January of 1981 without much assistance from the United States, Reagan and
company opted to dramatically increase military aid. Moreover, though the Salvadoran peasants
had refused to take part in the insurrection, a fact utilized by the administration to prove that the
guerillas lacked a mass following, the administration claimed that the danger of communist
subversion had actually increased. Kirkpatrick insisted that the U.S. could not stand by “while a
small nation, under-equipped and unsophisticated, succumbs to well-armed and well-trained
guerilla forces.”567 The well-armed and well-trained guerillas she referred to numbered
approximately 6,000 in 1980, with only 3,000 taking part in the final offensive due to a weapons
and ammunitions shortage. FMLN numbers peaked at between 10 and 13,000 in 1983, falling to
approximately 5,000 by 1985 due to desertions. By contrast, the Salvadoran military in 1980
565
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numbered 7,000 with an additional 5,000 men in its security forces. In 1985, thanks to American
military aid, the Salvadoran army had expanded to include 40,000 men. Furthermore, its security
forces, which included the Treasury Police, the National Police, and the National Guard, claimed
13,000 men, giving the Salvadoran government approximately 53,000 men under arms. In
addition to increasing the size of the Salvadoran military, the U.S. provided training, boots,
uniforms, weapons, ammunitions, trucks, jeeps, and artillery. Moreover, in order to interdict
arms shipments to the guerillas, the Salvadoran military was given a navy and a new air force
base.568
Kirkpatrick’s staunch support for the Salvadoran government and resistance to a
negotiated settlement between it and the FMLN was matched by her relentless opposition to the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and unwavering advocacy on behalf of the Contras. Though the U.N.
Ambassador had argued in NSC meetings that El Salvador should have first priority in the
administration’s Central American policies, she consistently argued for more support for the
Nicaraguan Contras and increased pressure on the Sandinistas. Indeed the two nations were
considered by government officials to be opposing sides of the same coin. In the minds of
Kirkpatrick and other foreign policymakers, the American failure to thwart the Nicaraguan
revolution had resulted in the birth of a communist regime allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union
which then exported revolution to the neighboring state of El Salvador. Therefore, in order to
stabilize El Salvador, the United States must provide not only military aid to the Salvadoran
government, but also attempt to rollback communism in Nicaragua by supporting the Contras.
According to Kirkpatrick, failure to provide assistance to El Salvador and to the Contras
would make the United States the tacit enforcer of the Brezhnev Doctrine which viewed
568
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communist revolutions as irreversible.569 The ambassador maintained that the Kennedy
Administration had already enforced this doctrine through its unwillingness to support the antiCastro forces in the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and she frequently compared the situation
facing the Reagan administration in Nicaragua to that of Cuba and Kennedy. Kirkpatrick
contended that in both cases a broad coalition overthrew a dictatorship in the hopes of
establishing democracy and progress. Following the coups, the communists “dissembled, hiding
their identity, confusing the issues until they had driven democrats out of the government and
into prison or exile”.570 At this point, both Castro and the Sandinistas had established political
and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, well-meaning Western liberals turned
a blind eye to their communist beliefs until it was too late. Nicaragua, she argued, was on the
verge of being fully integrated into the Soviet empire just as Cuba had been two decades earlier.
Should the U.S. stand idly by and let this happen, then Nicaragua would become part of the
Castroite effort to take over the hemisphere – providing military bases for the Soviets in an area
of high strategic importance, troops for communist insurgencies in Latin America and Africa,
training for guerillas intent on overthrowing neighboring regimes – basically, wreaking havoc
throughout Central America.571
Had Kennedy acted more decisively, Kirkpatrick maintained, then the Bay of Pigs may
have been successful and Castro would never have come to power. If Castro had been defeated,
Cuba would be free and thousands of Cuban troops would not be stationed abroad causing
problems in Africa. Moreover, if Castro had not been allowed to consolidate power, then Cuba
would not be arming and training guerillas throughout Latin and Central America. In addition,
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Central American nations would have been spared much of the bloodshed and destruction of the
previous two and a half decades and there would have been peace and economic development in
the region. Finally, the Soviets would not be able to threaten American national security in its
front yard without Cuba. Unfortunately, the U.S. abandoned Cuba and was paying for it with
increased security, military, and defense costs. According to Kirkpatrick, these costs would only
increase if the U.S. abandoned the Nicaraguan freedom fighters or failed to adequately support
the government of El Salvador.572
During and after her tenure as U.N. Ambassador, despite numerous allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and congressional opposition to
funding their activities, the political science professor repeatedly defended the Contras and U.S.
policy towards Nicaragua. When questioned about U.S. support for this mercenary group,
Kirkpatrick responded with vitriol: “I think that calling the Contras mercenaries is like calling
the mujahedeen in Afghanistan mercenaries… I think they are freedom fighters and anybody
who calls them mercenaries is engaging in a really quite brutal and heartless kind of propaganda
attack.”573Moreover, Kirkpatrick identified the withdrawal of aid to the Contras by the U.S.
Congress as part of the ‘tradition of abandonment’ in the region and again cited the Bay of
Pigs.574 “If we don’t find the money to support the Contras,” the ambassador claimed, “it will be
perceived as our having abandoned them, and this will lead to an increase in refugees in the
region and it will permit Nicaragua to infiltrate thousands of trained forces into El Salvador.”575
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Should the U.S. fail to get the funds needed for the Contras from Congress, the ambassador was
adamant that the administration “find the money elsewhere.”576 In the meantime, Kirkpatrick
maintained that the government should consider using the Contras in other areas, for example, in
El Salvador to help defend against the guerillas there.577 Such support for the Nicaraguan
freedom fighters resulted in the Contras naming a battalion after her – The Jeane Kirkpatrick
Brigade.578
The Reagan Administration’s backing of the Contras, along with its support for covert
operations against the Sandinistas, caused many to question whether or not the U.S. would send
troops into Nicaragua should the Contra effort fail. In early meetings of the NSC, members were
divided on that issue. Secretary of State Al Haig warned about the dangers of creating an
insurgency in Nicaragua if the administration was not prepared to go all the way. The
Department of State was at odds with the Department of Defense, with State initially supporting
the use of unilateral force in Central America while the DOD stood in opposition. All members
of the NSC, including the President, were worried that the introduction of American troops
would result in a second Vietnam. Kirkpatrick rejected the Vietnam analogy, claiming that
unlike Central America, Vietnam had not involved vital U.S. national security interests. Despite
differing opinions on whether to put boots on the ground, NSC members agreed that covert
operations should be a large part of the administration’s policies toward the Sandinistas,
including the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors. President Reagan’s greatest concerns were whether
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or not covert operations could be traced back to the United States and what kinds of operations
would inflict more than just ‘flea bites’ onto the Sandinista regime.579
Though supportive of covert operations against the Sandinistas, Kirkpatrick repeatedly
expressed her opposition to the dispatch of American troops. The ambassador claimed it was
neither desirable nor necessary for the U.S. to become directly involved in the region. “I think
that the Contras, who are Nicaraguans after all, and who believe in democracy for their country
will be quite capable of bringing the kind of struggle to Nicaragua that may perhaps persuade the
government of Nicaragua to do what the government of El Salvador has already done,” she said,
“and that is offer dialogue, open the processes of government to all the citizens of Nicaragua.”580
Kirkpatrick maintained that the Contras could win as long as they were given the same amount
of support that the Sandinistas were given by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and that the
introduction of American troops should serve as a last resort. “I am against military solutions of
problems,” she said, “Military intervention would only be a last resort in a situation where we
judge the security of the U.S. and our most sacred values to be at stake.”581
The political scientist’s ongoing criticism of the Carter Administration’s policies towards
Nicaragua and El Salvador, along with her emphasis on American national security interests at
stake in the region and her support for the Contras, caused many to doubt her professed
opposition to military involvement. In an effort to clarify her stance, Kirkpatrick published an
Op-ed piece in the Washington Post on June 20, 1983 entitled “Pardon Me, But Am I That Hard579
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liner the Anonymous Sources are Talking About?” Kirkpatrick begins by noting that the media
had created a political melodrama in which the administration’s ‘good guys’, or the moderates,
were pitted against its ‘bad guys’, or the hardliners, over Central American policy. According to
the media, the good guys supported political solutions, negotiations, regional dialogue, and
bipartisan consensus. Meanwhile, the bad guys opposed these good strategies and instead
advocated military solutions and preferred political polarization. Because her name was
frequently associated with the ‘bad guys’, Kirkpatrick wrote that she had decided to make clear
what advice she had given the president. She wrote,
I have recommended humanitarian and economic assistance; bipartisan participation in
developing a new policy; support for the Contadora process and regional dialogue. I took
a very hard line on hunger, malnutrition, infant mortality, illiteracy, and economic
underdevelopment. I have argued that the US should not stand in the way of Contadora
and if the nations involved want us out of it, we should stay out. No one has proposed
sending US troops into the region and no one has proposed abandoning them either. I
have also argued for continued military assistance at levels adequate to meet and match
guerilla arms. Above all, I have argued that the people in the region are important to the
US. Our security and history bind us to the Americas just as it does to Europe. I have
insisted that the fact that our neighbors have suffered under dictatorships is no reason to
consign them to dictatorships affiliated with the Soviet Union, rather we should help
them escape to freedom.582

Fears that American assistance to the Contras might lead to the involvement of the U.S.
military in the region prompted the Nicaraguan government to file a complaint against the United
States with the United Nations Security Council in 1982. Nicaragua claimed that the U.S. had
violated the U.N. Charter by intervening in its internal affairs. Moreover, the Sandinistas claimed
that the United States was preparing to launch a full-scale military attack upon their country.
Nicaragua demanded that the U.S. desist in its attempts to destabilize its government, withdraw
its financial and military support of the Contras, cease its utilization of Honduras as a training
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area for anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups and as a base of armed aggression against Nicaragua,
withdraw American naval vessels from the coastal waters of Nicaragua, and end overflights by
spy planes which violated Nicaraguan air space.583
Nicaragua brought its complaints against the U.S. before the United Nations forcing
Kirkpatrick to defend American actions in the region. In an address before the U.N. Security
Council in 1982, she claimed that it was ridiculous of the Nicaraguans to think that the U.S. was
going to invade their country.584The ambassador admitted that the U.S. had sent unmanned
planes over Nicaragua in order to verify reports of Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador, but
maintained that these flights did not represent a threat to regional peace and security. Moreover,
Kirkpatrick pointed out that the United States had not opposed the Sandinista rise to power, nor
had it attempted to prevent their consolidation of power. In fact, the U.S. under President Carter
had provided more money to them in their first two years in power than it had to the Somoza
regime throughout the 1970s. “Despite this aid,” she said, “the Sandinistas still claim the U.S. is
the Yankee enemy of mankind.”585 Moreover, the ambassador stated that the U.S. had
“repeatedly attempted to explore ways with the government of Nicaragua in which we could
cooperate in alleviating tensions in the area.”586 Her government, she claimed, wanted only peace
in Central America.587
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According to Kirkpatrick, it was Nicaragua, not the United States, who sought to subvert
neighboring regimes. “Nicaragua has accused the United States of the kinds of political behavior
of which it is guilty,” she asserted, including “large-scale interventions in the internal affairs of
neighbors, persistent efforts to subvert and overthrow by force and violence the governments of
neighboring states, aggressive actions which disrupt the ‘normal conduct of international
relations’ in the region.”588 The ambassador maintained that Nicaragua’s complaints against the
U.S. were “an interesting example of projection, a psychological operation in which one’s own
feelings and intentions are simultaneously denied and attributed… to someone else.”589
Moreover, she claimed that such charges were typical of communist states: “The familiar
totalitarian assertion that they are surrounded by enemies internal and external has been heard
again and again to justify the elimination of opponents and the concentration of power in a tiny,
one-party elite.”590 Kirkpatrick concluded that Nicaragua’s assertions were part of the familiar
pattern of doublespeak where “totalitarians assault reality in an attempt to persuade us that
making war is keeping peace, that repression is liberation, etc.”591
The American ambassador maintained that the major issue confronting the Sandinista
regime was not the United States, but the Nicaraguan people. “It is a fact that there is very
widespread unhappiness, even misery, in Nicaragua,” the ambassador stated, “Nicaragua’s
problem is thus with Nicaraguans. In Nicaragua today, Nicaraguans fight other Nicaraguans for
control of their country’s destiny.”592 The ambassador insisted that U.S. interests in Central
America were only to help poor, small, helpless, powerless peoples to resist being incorporated
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into totalitarian regimes by violent minorities, trained and armed by remote dictators.593She
concluded that the most that the United States could be charged with was providing arms and
advice to Nicaraguans fighting for their right to national self-determination against a pawn and
proxy of Cuba and the Soviet Union.594
The deployment of American troops into Grenada in October of 1983, an act which,
according to Nicaragua, demonstrated that the U.S. would utilize military force to overthrow
leftist regimes in its front yard, only intensified the fears of the Sandinistas. On October 24,
1983, just one day after 271 American Marines were killed by a suicide bombing in Beirut,
Lebanon, President Reagan and his NSC team opted to send U.S. troops into Grenada to rescue
American nationals and stabilize the government of the small Caribbean nation. That same day,
Nicaragua called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in order to
introduce a resolution condemning American action in Grenada as an act of aggression.595Once
the issue was broached at the U.N. it became Kirkpatrick’s task to defend the administration’s
actions.
Allan Gerson, an international lawyer and Kirkpatrick’s legal counsel at the United
Nations, was charged with assisting the ambassador in drafting the United States’ defense against
charges of aggression. According to Gerson, both he and Kirkpatrick viewed U.S. actions in
Grenada as justified under international law and the law of the U.N. Charter as an act of
collective self-defense in response to an armed attack. Though there had not been an actual
‘armed attack’ on the U.S. or on any of the other states of the Caribbean, Gerson maintained that
Operation Urgent Fury was a preemptive strike similar to the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear
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reactor in 1981.596 In addition, both Gerson and Kirkpatrick viewed the situation as being
important to American national security. Since 1979, Grenada had been under the control of
Maurice Bishop, a leftist who had forged ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The construction
of a large airport on the small island, along with the presence of Cuban troops, had been a cause
for alarm for the United States as the government believed that the air strip could be (or was
being) used to funnel weapons to leftist revolutionaries in Central America. Following Bishop’s
overthrow and murder, the tiny island descended into chaos causing many American
policymakers to fear that the island would fall under Soviet control thanks to the presence of
Cuban troops and the power of the communists within the Grenadian military. Thus, U.S.
national security interests were at stake in the region, as the United States could not afford to
have another Cuba or Nicaragua in the Caribbean.597
According to Gerson, the State Department opposed using American national security
interests as an argument to defend American actions in Grenada. The department feared that if
the U.S. claimed an expanded notion of self-defense to justify preemptive strikes, then others
might do so in order to justify their own preemptive ‘military adventures’. In short, should the
U.S. endorse self-defense as the rationale behind the Grenada action, it would be enlarging an
exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force to the point that armies could
‘march right through it’.598 Instead, State advised that Kirkpatrick argue that the U.S. acted due
to a unique set of circumstances, including the need to protect American nationals living abroad
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and the desire to protect members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) who,
feeling themselves threatened by the situation, had requested American intervention.599
Though Kirkpatrick acquiesced to the demands of the State Department, she did not shy
away from mentioning Grenada’s ties to the communist world. In a speech before the U.N.
Security Council, the political scientist denied the charges that Operation Urgent Fury was a
classic example of the invasion of a small country by an imperial superpower, or a case of
intervention in the internal affairs of an independent nation. She pointed out that Grenada had
been ruled over by Maurice Bishop, a man with strong ideological convictions that allied him
with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Thus, Grenada’s internal affairs had already fallen under the
permanent influence of one neighboring and one remote tyranny.600 Moreover, Kirkpatrick
maintained that the prohibitions against the use of force within the U.N. Charter were contextual,
not absolute. “They provide ample justification for the use of force against force in pursuit of the
other values also inscribed in the Charter – freedom, democracy, peace,” the ambassador
declared. “The Charter does not require that people submit supinely to terror, nor that their
neighbors be indifferent to their terrorization.”601
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that such words might be dismissed as cynical by members of
the U.N. who had grown accustomed to hearing similar justifications for the Soviet Union’s
invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia. However, there
was an easy way to test the differences between U.S. actions in Grenada and communist actions
elsewhere based on ‘what came after’. She assured the council that unlike the communists, who
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claim they will leave an area once order had been restored, the U.S. would leave Grenada as soon
as law and order had been reinstated, and as soon as democratic rule had been put into place. “It
should not be difficult for any people, especially any democratic people, which has ever suffered
a reign of terror from either foreign or domestic tyrants, to discern the difference between the
force that liberates captive people from terror,” she said, “ and the force that imposes terror on
captive peoples.”602
Kirkpatrick declared that a unique combination of circumstances in Grenada and the
Caribbean that had led the U.S. to deploy troops. The American government was concerned for
the safety of U.S. nationals, specifically, American medical students who were living in Grenada.
‘Madmen’ had overthrown and killed Bishop, wiped out the Grenadian government, and
imposed a 24 hour, shoot-on-sight curfew. With the airport shut down and American citizens
denied the right to exit the country, the U.S. government was afraid that the American medical
students might be taken hostage.603 In addition, there was a vacuum of power in Grenada with no
responsible government. Terrorists were in control of the bureaucracy, in charge of the military,
and had access to Cuban troops, all of which threatened neighboring states whose militaries were
practically nonexistent. Finally, members of the OECS had asked the U.S. for help and had
invoked their own regional collective security agreements.604
Kirkpatrick’s spirited defense of U.S. actions in Grenada fell on deaf ears in the United
Nations. On October 28, 1983, the U.N. Security Council voted to condemn the American and
OECS intervention in Grenada as a flagrant violation of international law and a transgression
against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Grenada. Only Kirkpatrick’s
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veto prevented the resolution from passing. A few days later, the General Assembly adopted a
similar resolution. The Eastern Caribbean states, Israel, El Salvador, and the United States were
the only nations that voted against the resolution.605
In an article written for the Council on Foreign Relations entitled “The Reagan Doctrine,
Human Rights, and International Law”, Kirkpatrick and her U.N. legal adviser, Allan Gerson,
provided further justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America and in other areas of the
world and elaborated on the significance, intentions, and historical tradition of the Reagan
Doctrine. Although both the former U.N. Ambassador and the international lawyer argued that
American action in Grenada did not fall under the purview of the Reagan Doctrine’s assertion
that support for freedom fighters constituted self-defense, both agreed that Reagan
Administration policies towards El Salvador and Nicaragua did. The article began with a quote
from John Stuart Mill which nicely summarized their view of American involvement in
international affairs throughout the Reagan Era:
The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be
accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the
free States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this
miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the
right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not
always prudent.606

According to Kirkpatrick and Gerson, the Reagan Doctrine was rooted in the moral
legitimacy of American support, including military aid, for insurgencies under specific
circumstances. Such circumstances included instances where indigenous forces were opposed to
a government maintained by force rather than by consent, where such a government relied upon
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arms supplied by the Soviet bloc, and where the people were denied a choice regarding their
government and their future. The Reagan Doctrine expressed America’s solidarity with the
struggle for self-government against one-party dictatorship and incorporation by force into the
Soviet socialist world system. Though the doctrine allowed for the use of force, Kirkpatrick and
Gerson maintained that armed revolt was only justified as a last resort in instances where the
rights of citizens are systematically violated. According to them, the Reagan Doctrine did not
require that the U.S. offer armed assistance to freedom fighters; it permitted such assistance
under certain circumstances.607 Moreover, the policy mirrored American constitutional
principles, namely that legitimate government depends on the consent of the governed and on its
respect for the rights of citizens; the doctrine stood in opposition to traditional isolationism and
post-Vietnam assumptions regarding the illegitimacy of U.S. intervention.608
The Reagan Doctrine was a response to changes in the global environment, namely the
Soviets’ objective of a establishing a global empire and its efforts at incorporating Third World
countries into the socialist world system. The authors noted that nine new communist
dictatorships had been established between 1975 and 1981: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. In each nation where
communism had spread, resistance movements had developed. In establishing the moral and
legal right to provide aid to such indigenous resistance movements, Kirkpatrick and Gerson
contended that the Reagan Doctrine constituted a form of ‘rollback’, a Cold War policy first
articulated by the Eisenhower Administration.609
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Both Gerson and Kirkpatrick argued that the Reagan Doctrine was not at odds with the
U.N. Charter and international law. Though one article of the U.N. Charter called on all members
to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, the U.S. maintained that this had to be viewed within the context of the entire
Charter. Article 51acknowledged the right to individual and collective self-defense and allowed
for the use of legitimate force. Moreover, numerous other articles guaranteed human rights to all
citizens of member states. President Truman, they maintained, had recognized this in 1947 when
he had declared that the policy of the United States must be to support free peoples who were
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. Truman chose not to
speak of ‘direct military attacks’; rather, he chose to place the issue within the “values of the
Charter and of the Declaration of Independence.”610
In addition to not violating international laws, Kirkpatrick and Gerson placed the Reagan
Doctrine squarely within the American domestic and foreign policy tradition: commitment to the
promotion of democracy, they argued, had served as the primary purpose of American foreign
policy for decades. Thus, the Reagan policies were a continuation of the values expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, in the American Constitution, in the Atlantic Charter signed
between FDR and Churchill, and in the Truman Doctrine. Moreover, the American commitment
to the promotion of democracy continued on throughout the following decades with the signing
of the Rio Treaty, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and in the actions of
American presidents from Truman to Johnson.611
Critics of the Reagan Doctrine charged the administration with appropriating the methods
of the Soviet Union, but this, Kirkpatrick and Gerson argued, could not be further from the truth.
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There was no ‘moral equivalence’ between American aid to freedom fighters and Soviet aid to
national liberation movements. “The latter countenances expansion of Soviet power,” they wrote,
“the Reagan Doctrine permits assistance in self-defense. The Brezhnev Doctrine preserves
foreign influence. The Reagan Doctrine restores self-government. It countenances counterintervention, not intervention.”612Furthermore, the Soviets intervened to deny the free expression
of self-determination, making the only political, social, and economic choice a variation of
socialism and the institution of one-party rule. The U.S. intervened to preserve and promote
freedom.613Kirkpatrick and Gerson cited the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who suggested that
republican government was necessary in order for perpetual peace to be established. According
to them, in Kant’s view, intervention to bring down a despotic government should always be
encouraged. Though the Reagan Administration did not go this far, its policies had the same
philosophical underpinnings.614
Conclusions
Upon assuming office, President Reagan and his foreign policy team were determined to
both rectify the damage they believed had been inflicted upon the special relationship between
the U.S. and Latin America by Jimmy Carter’s adherence to modernization theory, emphasis on
human rights, and misunderstanding of Latin American politics and halt the spread of
communism in its own front yard. As a Latin Americanist and part of the Reagan
Administration’s National Security Council and National Security Planning Group, Kirkpatrick’s
criticisms of Carter’s policies, along with her recommendations for the restructuring of American
strategies towards the region, became official administration policy. The administration’s
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unconditional support for the Salvadoran government, its steadfast defense of the Nicaraguan
Contras, and its resolute hostility towards the Sandinistas and the Cubans were all endorsed by
the U.N. Ambassador.
Such policies were based on the administration’s emphasis on containing communism
and buttressed by the Kirkpatrick Doctrine which sanctioned U.S. support for authoritarian
regimes in the name of stability and anti-communism. The Doctrine’s defense of
authoritarianism grew out of Kirkpatrick’s contention that such regimes were less oppressive and
more open to reform than their non-democratic, totalitarian counterparts. Though authoritarian
dictators sometimes infringed upon the human rights of their citizens, the ambassador maintained
that such violations were minor when compared to those committed by totalitarians. Moreover,
the ambassador claimed that in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the late 1970s, those
acts which Carter regarded as human rights abuses were taken out of context as both states were
under attack by communist guerillas whose terrorist actions required that the regimes utilize
force in order to counteract the violence of the revolutionaries.
Consequently, the Reagan administration ignored the human rights abuses committed by
the Salvadoran government and provided it with large amounts of military aid to put down the
leftist insurgency that threatened its power, while continuously criticizing the human rights
abuses of the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. According to Kirkpatrick, communist
totalitarian regimes, whose desire to create socialist utopias led them to control and transform all
aspects of society, culture, and politics, were by definition the governments with the worst
human rights records. Therefore, Reagan administration policies directed towards containing or
rolling back communism were based on the desire to protect the human rights of peoples around
the world.
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Though often couched in terms of human rights and the American moral obligation to
support freedom fighters such as the Nicaraguan Contras or the Afghan mujahidin in their
struggles against communist totalitarianism, the administration’s policies were heavily
influenced by national security interests and the East-West conflict. This was especially true of
Central America, an area considered by Kirkpatrick to be the fourth border of the U.S. The
Soviets already had a foothold in the region and should the U.S. fail in its efforts to save El
Salvador and overthrow the Sandinistas, American national security, along with the security of
Western Europe, would be seriously compromised. In conclusion, Reagan policies that provided
support for friendly regimes and freedom fighters, whether El Salvador or South Africa, the
Contras or the mujahidin, not only served to reinforce national security, but, thanks to the
Kirkpatrick Doctrine’s distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, they were
elevated to the status of human rights strategies, thereby freeing the government from any
culpability for its support of right-wing dictators.
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Conclusion
Kirkpatrick’s position as a member of the Reagan foreign policy team allowed her to
impart her own foreign policy ideas to a much wider audience. For example, after becoming
U.N. Ambassador more persons read her article, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”. Though
her article was more widely circulated, political pundits tended to focus solely on her distinctions
between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, or the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, and how such
distinctions might affect American policies towards non-democratic states within the context of
the Cold War. Such a narrow focus overlooked other components of the article including her
astute appraisal of the difficulties inherent within the development of democracy, her critique of
modernization theory, and the context from which her views had developed, reducing her
doctrine to the simplistic dichotomy of ‘authoritarian is acceptable, totalitarian is not’. Moreover,
historians and commentators have largely ignored works that outlined the political scientist’s
comprehensive view of America’s role in global politics.
As the product of a liberal, democratic tradition grounded in individual liberty and
freedom, Kirkpatrick maintained that the United States was an extraordinary nation with a strong
moral purpose dedicated to the preservation of democracy and the protection of human rights.
Dating back to the signing of the Declaration of Independence in the late 18th century, the
justification of the American government has been, according to Kirkpatrick, a doctrine of
universal human rights. The conviction that the United States has a moral mission that flows
from its identity and guides it policies was the very essence of American Exceptionalism.615Prior
to World War I, this notion of American Exceptionalism had served as the foremost justification
for an isolationism foreign policy; however, by the early 20th Century it became the primary
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pretext for intervention and internationalism as President Woodrow Wilson and many others
came to believe that an ‘exceptionalist America’ had both a moral duty to extend its superior
political system to others and a mission to lead all of mankind to a new international society in
the future.616
The idea that Americans should transform and improve the world, that American foreign
policy should serve universal, altruistic goals, had resulted in the creation of international
organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, along with American
adherence to moral doctrines, such as containment and human rights, in U.S. foreign relations.
According to Kirkpatrick, though a foreign policy that sought to expand and protect human
rights was as American as the Declaration of Independence itself, the implementation of such a
policy was not without difficulties. For one, there was a lack of consensus on which specific
rights constitute ‘human rights’ and which rights should have priority over others. For another,
American policymakers could not agree on which methods might be utilized to promote human
rights abroad.617 Moreover, in order to extend human rights throughout the world, the U.S. would
have to engage with governments that were not democratic and whose practices were often not
humane, a fact with which many Americans were uncomfortable with.618
Should we try to change repressive regimes or should we dissociate ourselves from
them? Do we ‘dirty our hands’ by supporting regimes that violate human rights or not? The
political scientist pointed out that though isolationism might protect the U.S. from being
involved with undesirable governments, it also precluded Americans from helping those in need.
She maintained that denying aid to the least developed countries simply because they were
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governed by autocracies and dictatorships that violated human rights prevented the U.S. from
assisting the people who needed help the most. Should America deny food and other resources to
a people suffering under a bad government just because they already suffer under a bad
government, she queried? Should the U.S. deprive those already denied self-government of
material independence by withdrawing American aid? Kirkpatrick’s answer to these questions
was a resounding ‘no’, especially as the withdrawal of aid might result in a communist takeover
which would only increase the misery of a people already suffering under ‘inefficient, home bred
autocracies’.619
Despite her insistence that the United States serve as the champion of human rights,
Kirkpatrick was quite critical of the Carter Administration’s human rights based foreign policies
which she considered to be seriously flawed. For one, the ambassador maintained that the
administration’s conception of human rights was so broad, ambiguous, and utopian that it could
serve as the grounds for condemning nearly any society. According to her, Carter’s human rights
policies lacked specific content except to demand that societies provide all the freedoms
associated with constitutional democracy, all the economic security promised by socialism, and
all the self-fulfillment featured in Abraham Maslow’s theory of human needs.620 Furthermore,
Kirkpatrick maintained that Carter demonstrated a reluctance to criticize totalitarian, communist
regimes for their massive human rights abuses, but was not reticent to criticize right-wing
authoritarian regimes, especially those who received economic or military aid from the United
States. Carter made an operational distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, she
619
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proclaimed, and preferred the latter. Moreover, Kirkpatrick charged the Carter Administration
with hypocrisy. Though the president claimed to have an ‘absolute’ commitment to human
rights, the U.N. Ambassador pointed to several instances where such policies were selectively
applied. For example, based on the annual human rights reports required by the 1976 Foreign
Assistance Act, Carter had withheld economic and military aid from various right-wing
authoritarian regimes including Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.
In addition to withdrawing aid from these American allies, Kirkpatrick charged, the
administration “accompanied these decisions with a policy of deliberate slights and insults that
helped delegitimize these governments and rendered them less susceptible to US influence.”621
Meanwhile, despite their rather poor human rights records, Carter justified the continuance of aid
to the nations of South Korea and the Philippines as serving the national security interests of the
U.S.622
As further evidence of the biased nature of Carter’s policies, Kirkpatrick maintained that
South American military regimes were judged much more harshly than African ones, while
‘friendly autocrats’ were treated less indulgently than hostile ones. Why was this? Kirkpatrick
claimed that part of the reason for such policies was the administration’s exclusive concern with
violations of human rights by governments. According to her, the administration refused to
acknowledge the various violations of human rights by revolutionary guerrilla groups attempting
to overthrow autocratic regimes. In the mind of the administration, she charged, the murders and
terrorist actions executed by national liberation fronts and guerrilla groups failed to qualify as
violations of human rights. Meanwhile, a beleaguered government’s efforts to eliminate such
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terrorism and to fight off revolutionary violence qualified as repression and abuse and resulted in
loss of aid.623
According to the ambassador, certain distinctions must be made in order for the United
States to have an effective human rights policy. These included the distinctions between ideas
and institutions, recognition of the differences between rights and goals, and distinctions between
intentions and consequences. Kirkpatrick noted that ideas and words were more easily
manipulated than were institutions for ideas have only to be conceived in order to exist. The idea
of a right was very easy to conceive; however, not everything that could be conceived of could
be created. The ambassador utilized the unicorn as an example of the imagined versus the reality.
A unicorn can be imagined and described in great detail, and mankind can destroy forests in an
attempt to find it, but the unicorn will never be found.624 The belief that anything that can be
conceived can be brought into being disregards the distinctions between ideas and institutions
and leads to the expectations that declarations give rights existential reality. Unlike ideas which
are easily envisaged, institutions are stabilized patterns of human behavior that involve millions
of real people. They are shaped by experience and composed of habits and internalized values
and beliefs. Because of this, institutions are extremely resistant to change. Yet in order for a right
or idea to move from the imagined into reality, it must be translated through institutions into the
reality of daily lives.625
In addition to recognizing the differences between ideas and institutions, Kirkpatrick
maintained that policymakers must distinguish between rights and goals. One factor that had
increased the difficulty in discerning between the two was the fact that rights had proliferated at
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a very fast pace in the mid to late 20th century. Kirkpatrick pointed out that the old 18th century
rights of life, liberty, security of persons and property still existed, but had been joined by many
more rights such as the right to privacy, equal rights in marriage, the right to an education, the
right to leisure, the right to the full development of one’s personality, the right to selfdetermination, and the right to adequate standards of living. According to her, such declarations
take on the character of a letter to Santa Claus.626 The plethora of rights or, as Kirkpatrick
described them, the ‘lists of entitlements’, that had been conceived of in the postwar era
consisted of goals rather than rights. She argued that treating goals as rights was grossly
misleading about the way in which goals were actually achieved in real life – through hard work
over time.627
Finally, Kirkpatrick claimed that distinctions must be made between intentions and
consequences. According to her, there were theories in political philosophy that emphasized
motives and there were those that emphasized consequences. Political purists, such as President
Carter, tended to be preoccupied with motives or intentions. For such persons, doing what one
knows is right becomes more important than producing any desirable results. In human rights
and foreign policy, the Carter Administration’s focus on intentions caused a great deal of
concern over the purity of American motives rather than the various consequences that might
result from the implementation of such policies. In other words, because Carter believed his
motives to be good, he failed to see how his human rights strategies might result in the loss of
American allies like Nicaragua and Iran. According to Kirkpatrick, a human rights policy that
emphasized intentions rather than consequences functioned only to make us feel good about
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ourselves and she questioned whether or not ‘feeling good about ourselves’ was an appropriate
goal for a foreign policy.628
Unlike the previous administration, Kirkpatrick claimed that the President Reagan and his
government would take all of these distinctions under consideration in order to create a human
rights policy that was both fair and based on global political realities. According to her, the
Reagan Administration had a more accurate idea of the relationship between force, freedom,
morality, and power, along with a more adequate conception of the relationship between abstract
rights and concrete societies. Consequently, the administration would implement human rights
policies that were less sweeping than those of its predecessor with the expectation that such
programs could produce more progress in the arena of human rights.629 Thus, the Reagan team
refused to criticize South Africa too strongly for its dismal human rights record in the
expectation that over time, such restraint, combined with the continuance of American military
and economic aid, might encourage Pretoria to end its racist apartheid policies.
According to Kirkpatrick, in addition to an emphasis on human rights, the protection and
dissemination of democratic systems have constituted the core of American foreign policies. Due
to this historic emphasis on ‘making the world safe for democracy’ the Georgetown professor
spoke often about both the nature of democratic states, along with the many obstacles that
hindered their establishment, and the role of the United States, a democratic superpower, in the
world. Though in favor of promoting democratic ideals around the world, the political scientist
remained a realist when it came to global politics, noting that autocratic systems were the
political norm while democratic states remained relatively rare. According to Kirkpatrick, the
paucity of democracy was due to the heavy demands placed upon a population by such a system.
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For one, most societies lacked the appropriate patterns of social and political behavior that
allowed for majority rule, opposition, accountability, and the protection of minority rights. She
maintained that the establishment of a democratic political system was dependent upon certain
social and cultural prerequisites, such as a citizenry which views itself as political participants
rather than subjects, a population which has the ability to form voluntary associations based on
shared interests and cooperation, leaders from various social groups who are willing to renounce
violence and the threat of violence in politics, and the acceptance by the entire population of the
legitimacy of the democratic processes for determining who should rule and to what broad
ends.630 Her repeated emphasis on the various conditions necessary for democracy to thrive
cautioned Americans against expecting instantaneous political change in nations around the
world, even in those states, such as El Salvador and South Africa, that were American allies and
recipients of U.S. economic and military aid.
In comparison with the plethora of non-democratic states, democratic political systems
were scarce, and as such, required protection. The ultimate defense of democracy, according to
Kirkpatrick and her fellow neoconservatives, was the maintenance of American power. Military
supremacy was absolutely vital for the preservation of the political institutions and values of
American democratic society and Western Civilization, especially in the face of communist
expansion.631 Throughout the 1970s, Kirkpatrick had bemoaned the decline of American military
power in the face of Soviet expansion and criticized efforts towards achieving détente. The
ambassador placed the blame for American decline on the New Left’s assault of American
political, social, and cultural domestic values and the attitude of defeatism that accompanied the
American withdrawal from Vietnam. In order to counter the effects of these experiences, in
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particular, the notion that the two superpowers were morally equivalent, Kirkpatrick maintained
that Americans must recognize who they were, especially in comparison to the Soviet Union. By
understanding who they were, Americans could then understand why American power was
necessary for the survival of liberal democracy in the modern world.632
The citizens of the United States were, she pointed out on numerous occasions, the heirs
of a long struggle against arbitrary power and part of a tradition that recognized that people have
natural rights and that the central purpose of government was to protect those rights. Thus, as the
inheritors of a liberal, democratic tradition rooted in freedom, Americans must preserve and
protect these values. Such endeavors constitute the core of American national interest and the
guiding purpose of the foreign policy of the United States. Identification with, and respect for,
the American tradition and Western Civilization, along with understanding that the strength of
the U.S. was crucial for the defense of democracy and freedom, would, according to Kirkpatrick,
enable Americans to understand that it was morally legitimate to be concerned about the military
power of the United States. Moreover, by acknowledging the exceptional nature of the United
States and its role in the world, Americans could understand that it was both legitimate and
important for the United States to be concerned with, and involved in, events that occurred in
many remote regions of the world. Finally, an appreciation of American Exceptionalism would
allow the American people to be more wary of democracy’s greatest adversary – communism.633
Facing who the Soviets were – the nature of their government, their relations with other
communist regimes, and their interactions with states outside of the Soviet bloc – was, according
to Kirkpatrick, an “extremely unpleasant task.”634 For unlike the liberal, democratic tradition that

632

Ibid, 399.
Ibid, 35-7.
634
Ibid, 37.
633

250

fostered the American political system, the Soviet system was structured by tsarist autocracy and
imperialism. Despite their “artful manipulation of symbols and language”635 which often clouded
Americans’ abilities to assess the true nature of communism, the Soviets had continued the work
of their tsarist predecessors by expanding their totalitarian empire through the uninhibited and
skillful use of violence, subversion, terrorism, and guerilla warfare. Kirkpatrick asserted that it
was only through deception, violence, and subjugation that the Soviet Union was able to spawn
governments based on one-party dictatorships. “The pattern is familiar,” she wrote, “choose a
weak government, organize a national liberation front, weaken an already weak economy, and
then intensify the violence.”636 Having come to power through violence, the new communist
leaders sought to remain in power via military assistance from members of the communist bloc.
Thus, resources and personnel from all over the Soviet bloc were brought to bear on ‘small,
helpless countries’ of the Third World and their indigenous political rivalries. Meanwhile, due to
concerns of interfering the in the internal affairs of others, or fears of being bogged down in a
quagmire, Americans stood “passively by while another small, relatively helpless people
succumbs to Marxist-Leninist tyranny and is ruthlessly incorporated into the Soviet empire.”637
As a democratic superpower, it was the duty of the United States to help prevent the
incorporation of additional states, democratic or otherwise, into the Soviet Empire and to assist
those nations under attack by the forces of communism. Kirkpatrick maintained that rather than
worrying about quagmires or intervening in the internal affairs of others, Americans should act
to help people trapped in tyranny to disengage themselves from the world’s only colonial empire.
Unlike many of her fellow neoconservatives, the ambassador was opposed to the dispatch of
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American troops in most cases, but she approved of sending the kinds of aid that the Soviets
were delivering to their clients: helicopters, accurate missiles, intelligence, and logistical support.
Moreover, she maintained that the United States should offer these people solidarity by letting
the world know that America stands with those who stand for freedom. “Standing with freedom
fighters,” she wrote, “is the only policy consistent with our values and our interests.”638
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick was adamant in her assertion that American aid to freedom fighters did
not make the U.S. the ‘moral equivalent’ to the Soviet Union, noting that the force that liberates
was not ‘morally equivalent’ to the force that subjugates.639She wrote,
If client rulers have the ‘right’ to ask for foreign assistance to maintain themselves in
power, citizens deprived of their rights can ask for external aid to reclaim them…A
government which takes power by force, and retains power by force, has no legitimate
grounds for complaint against those who would wrest power from it by force. So let us be
clear about it: helping the contras, helping UNITA, helping the Afghans…is not only
morally and politically permissible. It is morally and politically – and strategically –
necessary.640

Woven throughout her foreign policy views, whether on the spread of democracy, human
rights, or American support for freedom fighters was an emphasis on limitations. Though
Kirkpatrick envisioned the U.S. as the protector of liberal democracy, she maintained that there
were limits to the United States’ ability to spread democracy. Likewise, though she saw the
American government as the champion of human rights, the ambassador pointed out that there
were limits as to which rights a government could and should provide for their citizens, along
with limits to the ability of the United States to successfully export human rights abroad.
Moreover, though she advocated American aid to freedom fighters around the world, such aid
should be limited and not involve the dispatch of American troops except in those instances
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where vital national security interests were at stake. Furthermore, the ambassador’s stress on
limitations can be found in her defense of authoritarian regimes – unlike totalitarian regimes,
authoritarian governments are limited in power and allow limited contestation and opposition,
and such limitations rendered them open to political evolution and change.
This emphasis on ‘limits’ can also be found in Kirkpatrick’s view of domestic social
policies. She held that the government’s efforts to bring equality to women and minorities should
be limited to the establishment of political equality. Once political equality was guaranteed by
law, individuals’ ambition and hard work would eventually bring social and economic equality to
disadvantaged groups. The importance of limitations, along with distinctions between both ideas
and institutions and rights and goals, caused Kirkpatrick to oppose the New Left’s demands for
radical social and cultural changes.
Of course, Kirkpatrick’s hostility towards the New Left was not just a product of its
domestic platform: the ambassador could not countenance its attacks on American foreign
policy, specifically the New Left’s rejection of the inherent morality of the Cold War. Indeed,
rising criticisms of American actions in the name of anti-communism had forced Washington to
adjust Cold War policies. The Nixon administration attempted to lessen the moral content and
ideology in foreign affairs in its embrace of realpolitik. Meanwhile, Nixon and Kissinger hoped
to relax tensions between the two superpowers by engaging in détente. In an effort to both bring
back morality into foreign affairs and offset charges from the left that the U.S. supported
dictators in the name of anti-communism, the Carter administration based its Cold War policies
on human rights. Accordingly, the administration withdrew aid from autocratic regimes that
failed to improve their human rights records. In the case of Nicaragua, the withdrawal of aid
resulted in a communist takeover. The spread of communism along America’s borders caused
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Carter to embrace the morality of containment at the expense of human rights. His decision to
increase military aid to El Salvador, an authoritarian regime battling against a leftist insurgency
with ties to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, resulted in a considerable amount of domestic criticism.
The right claimed his human rights policies had facilitated the spread of communism and feared
that American aid to El Salvador might be too little, too late. Meanwhile the left charged him
with vacillating hypocrisy.
Ronald Reagan, a fervent anti-communist, believed that the containment of communism
was morally correct; thus, the Great Communicator and his staff rejected détente due to its lack
of ideological zeal. The administration maintained that the Soviet Union was the “Evil Empire”,
and as such, Washington could not broker deals with Moscow. Moreover, America should do
anything and everything in its power to prevent the spread of communism around the world,
especially in its own front yard. However, by the time Reagan entered the White House, the
president could no longer rely upon Congress and the American public to support Cold War
policies, such as the backing of authoritarian dictators, based solely on the presence of the
communist boogieman. Thus, Reagan was forced to do something that previous Cold War
presidents had not: provide moral justification for the support of dictators and non-democratic
regimes that had nothing to do with anti-communism. Jeane Kirkpatrick provided this with her
distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. By investing authoritarian regimes
with political legitimacy and presenting them as transformative systems, the political scientist
moved away from the notion that the U.S. could only be safe if surrounded by like-minded
political systems and provided a third option between democracy and totalitarianism.
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